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ABSTRACT 
The world has been engaged in a global ‘development project’ since the late 1940s.  This process 
gained new momentum with the end of colonialism and the emergence of newly independent 
countries, all of them plagued with high levels of poverty.  Traditional models of economic growth 
based on industrialisation and import-substitution did not deliver the expected results to reduce 
poverty, especially in Africa.  New ways of engaging with development emerged; in particular the 
basic needs approach in the 1970s and later the human development approach. 
Independently a new environmental movement surfaced in the 1960s, responding to the rallying call 
of global environmental destruction as a result of economic activities.  For the first time a global 
language on the limitations nature presents to development emerged.  The ‘movement’ received 
particular traction with the emergence of global climate disruption as the single largest global 
environmental issue.  ‘Human needs’, represented by the anthropocentrists, and ‘environmental 
limitations’, represented by environmentalists were merged in an uncomfortable union to give birth to 
the notion of sustainable development.  Yet, as a result of a large variety of perspectives, no 
agreement has been reached on what sustainable development means or should achieve. 
There is agreement though that developmental needs and environmental challenges are both urgent.  
An important unanswered question is how the world will pay for sustainable development 
interventions.  Some interesting ideas on alternative sources of development finance has been 
around for a while, yet has not found practical application.  Carbon finance, an innovative new source 
of funding, is an exception. 
This exploratory research was conducted by reviewing existing relevant literature using the inductive 
logic technique.  It was initiated as a result of specific experiences leading the researcher to some 
general ‘truths’. 
The findings revealed that carbon markets, which are primarily focussed on reducing carbon 
emissions and which in itself makes a positive contribution to sustainability, has over the last few 
years successfully leveraged billions of dollars for investment in sustainable development projects 
globally.  Some of these have the added advantage of co-benefits for the poor.  Its role is set to 
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expand as a source of development finance.  South Africa has the potential to earn large amounts 
from carbon trading, assisting the country to move to a more sustainable development trajectory.  The 
findings concluded that realising this potential will require a more focussed approach, especially from 
the South African Government. 
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SAMEVATTING 
Die wêreld is sedert die 1940s besig met ‘n grootskaalse ‘ontwikkelingsprojek’.  Die proses het nuwe 
momentum gekry teen die einde van die koloniale tydperk.  Die nuut onafhanklike state het almal 
gebuk gegaan onder hoë vlakke van armoede.  Tradisionele modelle van ekonomiese groei 
gebasseer op industrialisasie en invoer vervanging, het nie die verwagte resultate in terme van 
armoede verligting - veral in Afrika - gehad nie.  Nuwe benaderings tot ontwikkeling - spesifiek die 
‘basiese behoeftesbenadering’ in die 1970s en later die menslike ontwikkelingsbenadering – is 
ontwikkel met die hoop dat dit beter resultate sal lewer om armoede hok te slaan. 
Terselfdertyd het ‘n nuwe omgewingsbeweging in die 1960s ontstaan, in reaksie op die vernietig van 
die natuur deur die mens se ekonomiese aktiwiteite.  Die gevolg was dat daar ‘n internasionale taal 
onstaan het wat die beperkinge wat die natuur op ontwikkeling plaas kon verwoord.  Dit het veral 
momentum gekry met die bewuswording dat aardverwarming die wêreld se grootste 
omgewingsuitdaging bied.  Mense se behoeftes soos verwoord deur antroposentriste, en 
omgewingsbeperkings soos verwoord deur omgewingskundiges, het bymekaargekom om die nuwe 
konsep van volhoubare ontwikkeling te vorm.  As gevolg van ‘n groot verskeidenheid van 
interpretasies is daar geen ooreenstemming oor wat volhoubare ontwikkeling beteken of behoort te 
bereik nie. 
Waaroor daar wel ooreenstemming is, is die feit dat die wêreld se behoefte aan ontwikkeling sowel as 
die omgewingsuitdagings beide dringend is.  ‘n Belangrike vraag wat niemand nog kon beantwoord 
nie, is hoe die wêreld gaan betaal vir volhoubare ontwikkelingsprojekte.  Alhoewel daar ‘n paar 
kreatiewe idees vir alternatiewe bronne van ontwikkelingsfinansiering die rondte doen, het nog nie 
een daarvan praktiese beslag gekry nie.  Die enigste vindingryke nuwe bron van 
ontwikkelingsfinansiering wat wel geïmplimenteer is, is koolstof finansiering.   
Dié ondersoekende navorsing is gedoen deur middel van ‘n literatuur studie van bestaande relevante 
materiaal, deur gebruik te maak van die induktiewe logika tegniek.  Die studie is geïnisieer as gevolg 
van spesifieke ondervindings wat die navorser gelei het na algemene ‘waarhede’. 
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Bevindinge uit die studie het aangedui dat koolstof markte, wat primêr ten doel het om die vrystel van 
aardverwarmingsgasse te beperk en dus opsigself ‘n positiewe bydrae tot volhoubaarheid lewer, oor 
die laaste paar jaar daarin geslaag het om miljarde dollars beskikbaar te maak vir volhoubare 
ontwikkelingsprojekte wêreldwyd.  Sommige hiervan het die voordeel dat dit arm gemeenskappe 
bevoordeel.  Die rol van die koolstofmarkte gaan in die toekoms toeneem.  Suid Afrika het die 
potensiaal om groot bedrae te verdien uit koolstof finansiering, wat die land behoort te help om op ‘n 
meer volhoubare ontwikkelingspad voort te gaan.  Die bevindinge sluit af deur aan te dui dat die 
realisering van dié potensiaal ‘n baie meer gefokusde benadering deur veral die Suid Afrikaanse 
Regering gaan vereis. 
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CHAPTER 1 | INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
After decades spent searching for creative and innovative ways in which to improve the quality of life 
of all, while at the same time trying to protect the environment, it may be time to be brutally honest:  it 
seems like we are losing this battle on all fronts. 
The needs of the poor seem to mount.  More and more people, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa 
either experience no improvement or a real deterioration in their quality of life.  Access to nutrition, 
clean water, health care and shelter seems to be getting more precarious.  On every ‘development’ 
indicator, African countries invariably occupy the bottom places.  While only 15% of the developing 
world population live in Africa, it is home to approximately a third of those living on less than $1 per 
day; many living on much less.  The situation has been aggravated by the emergence of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa in the mid-1980s, with a marked negative impact on socio-economic 
progress.  The countries of Southern Africa are the worst affected in the world - South Africa is home 
to the largest population of people living with HIV/AIDS (5.7 million in 2008) (UNICEF, 
2010:unnumbered) while neighbouring Swaziland is the country with the highest HIV prevalence rate 
(26.1% of all adults).  According to the United Nations Development Program (2005:2) the pandemic 
has stopped possible economic and social progress.  If current trends continue the "longer term 
existence of Swaziland as a country will be seriously threatened" (UNDP, 2006:2). 
At the same time, regular reports are published of yet another species gone extinct, another tract of 
forest disappearing, and yet another coral reef that has been destroyed.  Although the loss of 
biodiversity is serious, the most urgent environmental problem is climate disruption. 
All this will be enough to demoralise even the most determined optimist.  Instead of giving up and 
accepting the status quo, we need to renew our focus and with creativity fashion a new sustainable 
future in which all will share equally.  It is not possible to ignore the needs of the poor.  They have a 
legitimate right to ‘receive’ development.  What that means is not always clear.  At the very least it 
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should address the basic needs of a population, enabling them to lead a healthy life, be educated and 
have access to a decent standard of living.  Development should be mindful of the environmental 
limitations within which it must take place. 
There is growing international support for achieving development objectives while addressing 
environmental challenges – in particular global warming.  Policy makers have started referring to a 
“’...green New Deal’.  Investing to cut greenhouse gasses can create ‘green jobs’ and provide fiscal 
stimulus while protecting the planet.  But how is it going to be paid for?” (Smith, 2009: unnumbered).  
The way to finance development and redevelopment interventions has been an ongoing debate over 
the last few decades, often pitching rich and poor against one another with the same tired arguments.  
Besides the ‘normal’ investment needed for growth and development, additional needs have arisen 
which needs to be urgently addressed.  The question then arises whether the pursuit of sustainable 
development needs special financing? 
Policy makers’ realisation that the international development finance system need to adapt to new 
challenges has radically changed the context of development finance over the last 20 years.  Adopted 
at the end of the century, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have renewed hope for 
progress on development and poverty reduction, while creating a focus and an impetus for searching 
for new and additional sources of development finance.  Policy makers are in agreement that all 
development resources including domestic savings, market mechanisms and official development aid 
must be unlocked, while a more effective and performance-oriented aid-management culture must be 
fostered.  To complement traditional grants and loans, existing as well as new actors are turning 
increasingly to innovative mechanisms to raise and deliver funds.  Treating aid as just one of several 
finance flows and involving the private sector in the development process, marks an important shift in 
consciousness. 
There are two ways to make additional funding immediately available for sustainable development; 
reduce damaging flows and increase positive flows.  The world is spending trillions of dollars 
subsidising unsustainability (Pearce, 2007:454).  If those subsidies could be discontinued, funds 
would immediately be available for sustainable development interventions.   Powerful elites, who have 
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captured rents associated with the subsidies, ferociously oppose any changes to the status quo.  This 
can be seen in the modest progress made in reversing agricultural subsidies in rich countries. 
More success can be shown in stopping a second source of damaging flows – debt repayments.  
Many poor countries have benefitted from various debt relief programmes, which already have had a 
positive impact on resource availability for local development interventions. 
At the same time positive flows must be increased.  Despite the negative critique official development 
aid (ODA) and foreign direct investment (FDI) often receive it remains important sources of 
investment.  Aid may come under pressure within the next few decades as a result of a demographic 
transition taking place in many rich countries.  This demographic transition is boosting an important 
emerging trend.  As rich country populations age, these economies attract workers from poor 
countries.  Already their remittances back to their home countries are having a marked effect on the 
availability of development finance on a micro-scale.  There are also some interesting suggestions for 
new sources of finance.  These range from global taxes on currency transactions and arms sales, to 
creating a global lottery and issuing global premium bonds. 
A relatively recent development which is often described as an innovative market-creating tool to 
achieve sustainability is the creation of carbon markets.  They are seen as a cost effective way of 
creating a demand for new environmentally friendly technologies, while putting a price on pollution 
and thus an incentive to pollute less.  Emerging over the last two decades, carbon markets have 
grown exponentially since the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol requiring the establishment of regulated 
international carbon markets.   
 
1.2. MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY 
I have been working in ‘development’ for nearly twenty years, both in the public sector as well as in a 
variety of private sector organisations.  In the process I have gained some insight into the difficulties 
accessing adequate finance for development interventions, especially for ‘marginal’ projects. 
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Within the public service, available funding is rigidly employed in line with budgeted processes.  This 
complicates the ability to be responsive to community needs or project realities.  In addition, in South 
Africa, the requirements of the Public Finance Management Act, even though necessary to safeguard 
public money, set hurdles in the way, slowing down the development process.  Governments do not 
always focus on sustainability; their interventions are often motivated by political expediency within a 
fairly rigid policy context. 
In the non-governmental sphere, even though the rules and processes may be less rigid, finance 
allocations are not necessarily easier.  Development programmes are often funded through grant 
financing allocated to achieve specific deliverables specified in a grant agreement.  While 
acknowledging that this is a subjective view, in my experience funding provided by foreign 
governments are often only there to serve the political or marketing needs of the grant maker, being 
far removed from the needs and realities of the development context.  Decisions on priorities made in 
Washington, London, Beijing or Geneva cannot serve current local needs adequately. 
Besides complications arising from political agendas, it is often difficult to access sufficient amounts to 
effectively facilitate sustainable development interventions.  Poor countries needs massive amounts 
of investment in physical infrastructure, as well as social and economic development programmes to 
assist them on their way to sustainability.  Within the context of the environmental limitations on 
development, current financing programmes are inadequate.  This experience led me to investigate 
alternatives to the way we finance sustainability. 
 
1.3. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
In the renewed focus on poverty alleviation in the international development arena, there has been an 
emphasis on development assistance from rich donor countries to poor developing countries.  This 
however may not be a reliable source of development finance. 
In the context of sustainable development, poor countries will not be the only ones requiring 
development finance.  It is clear that rich countries need to undergo a process of ‘redevelopment’ to 
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adjust to a more sustainable development trajectory.  This will place unprecedented demands on the 
international financial system, which is still in the process of recovering after the recent financial crisis.  
It may therefore be necessary to look at alternative sources of development finance.  There are some 
interesting proposals around.  One alternative, which has received a lot of attention lately, is carbon 
finance and the possible contribution thereof to sustainable development. 
This paper investigates alternative sources of finance for sustainable development in South Africa.  It 
specifically investigates carbon trading, as an alternative, market-based mechanism to raise 
development finance, while making direct positive contributions to sustainability. 
Specifically this paper provides an overview of: 
• The meaning and context of sustainable development; 
• Some alternative sources of development finance; 
• Carbon trading, including: 
• its history and development; 
• theory supporting carbon trading; 
• additionality; 
• critique of the concept; 
• voluntary markets; and 
• compliance markets; and 
• The clean development mechanism in South Africa. 
 
1.4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research seeks to determine if carbon trading is a useful source of development finance for 
sustainability in South Africa.  Based on an initial review of the literature, the following research 
questions were formulated: 
1) What constitutes the more traditional sources of development finance for developing 
countries? 
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2) What are some alternative sources of development finance? 
3) How much sustainable development can be expected from clean development mechanism 
projects? 
4) What is the scale of potential income from the clean development mechanism for South 
Africa? 
5) What can the South African Government do to leverage the clean development mechanism to 
benefit the poor? 
 
1.5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Research is the collection of information about a particular subject.  According to Muller 
(2010:unnumbered) it requires “an active, diligent and systematic process of inquiry in order to 
discover, interpret or revise facts, events, behaviours, or theories.”  The process of inquiry selected 
for this research, is an empirical research methodology exploring and analysing existing data 
(Mouton, 2001:57). 
According to van der Merwe (1996:287) exploratory studies are “focussed on the exploration of a 
relatively unknown area.  Aims can be to: 
• Obtain new insights into the phenomenon; 
• Conduct a preliminary investigation as a precursor to a more structured study; 
• Explicate central concepts and constructs; 
• Determine priorities for further research; and 
• Develop new hypotheses about an existing phenomenon”. 
Exploratory research methods include reviewing existing relevant literature, surveys and analyses of 
relevant examples.  The method selected for this study is a review of existing literature appropriate to 
the topic in order to familiarise myself with “the latest developments in the area of research, as well as 
in related areas” (Bless & Higson-Smith, 2000:20).  In the process I used books, journal articles, 
websites, databases, abstracts and opinion pieces, the oldest of which dates back to 1961, but with 
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the majority published over the last decade.  In order to get clarity on published data and get insight 
into the national perspective, I interviewed officials from the Designated National Authority. 
According to Mouton (2001:179 - 180) a review of the literature is “essentially an exercise in inductive 
reasoning, where you work from a sample of texts that you read in order to come to a proper 
understanding of a specific domain of scholarship.”  Inductive reasoning being a process of 
describing, evaluating and reasoning, a literature review therefore aims to review the critical points of 
current knowledge on a specific topic.  Van der Merwe (1996:279) describes inductive logic as 
“reasoning that proceeds from specific experiences to general truths... From the researcher’s 
perspective, this means that the research project is initiated without any explicit conceptual 
framework.  The research is loosely guided by general hypotheses or conjectures.  This type of 
research is less structured and it is only after the data has been generated that the researcher looks 
for links and patterns in the data.  The outcome of this type of research is a more systematic 
explanation or even a new conceptual framework.  Studies featuring inductive logic are usually 
hypothesis-generating and their goals are normally exploratory”. 
Bless and Higson-Smith reports the identification of relevant sources as the most common problem 
when starting a literature review.  They argue that “often the impression is created that nothing has as 
yet been written on the chosen topic and the multiplicity of non-relevant literature can be 
overwhelming” (Bless & Higson-Smith, 2000:21). 
This was a challenge that had to deal with.  Subsequently, the approach of the study was first to 
obtain a broad range of relevant literature from expertise in the field, and information specialists. In 
addition, online resources were accessed for amongst others policy documents, media statements 
and discussion papers.  Since carbon trading as a field is still relatively young, this proved to be a 
valuable source of information.  Key words that were used in the search included: 
• Carbon trading; 
• Clean development mechanism; 
• Development finance; 
• Sustainable development; and 
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• Voluntary carbon markets. 
 
Importantly, the context was established through a comprehensive overview of the initial material; in 
total 388.  From this material, the most relevant items were selected and their bibliography and 
references interrogated to find new sources and more precise information – a snowballing technique. 
The documented sources were selected to ensure an appropriate breadth and depth to the study.  As 
a result of the complex nature of sustainable development and the diverse nature of the research 
topic, an interdisciplinary approach was applied to source selection, including documents from the 
following disciplines and fields: 
• Sustainable development theory and practice; 
• Development theory and practice; 
• Economics; 
• Finance; 
• Emissions trading; 
• Climate change; and 
• Policy statements by national and international agencies. 
There are some inherent risks to a literature review, including being “influenced by the results of 
previous research, or one may accept without criticism their chosen characteristics and explanations 
so that one fails to discover new possibilities and to observe without preconceptions or expectations” 
(Bless & Higson-Smith, 2000:20).  In addition, the researcher may only be influenced by the literature 
they are aware of. 
Another disadvantage of a literature review is the use of secondary sources.  Since my purpose with 
the study is to familiarise myself with the latest developments in the area of research, I do not attempt 
to report any new or original work.  Since I possessed limited prior knowledge on the specific topic, I 
approached the study in an unbiased way.  My goal was to get up to date with current literature with a 
view to a practical application in the future.  Despite these risks associated with the research 
methodology, it is the most appropriate methodology for the purpose of the study. 
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1.6. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
As with any research, there are limitations that exist with the body of work.  The research conducted 
for this study had, inter alia, the following limitations: 
• A disadvantage of a literature study is the use of secondary sources.  I did not attempt to 
report any new or original work, but rather to answer the research questions by reviewing 
existing scholarship.   
• The literature study and the reporting of key issues may be biased brought about by the 
author’s perceptions or interests.  
• Access to information, especially the limited accessibility of information on the South African 
context.  In this regard, very little documented information exists on the size, scope and 
impact of the voluntary carbon market in South Africa. 
• Available resources, including researcher time, limited the scope of the study. 
 
1.7. STRUCTURE 
This thesis consists of eight chapters as illustrated in figure 1.1.  Chapter 1 introduces the topic and 
outlines in broad terms the scope, motivation for and purpose of the study.  The research 
methodology is briefly discussed and the structure outlined.  Chapter 2 provides an overview of the 
concept of sustainable development. 
Chapter 3 investigates development finance, specifically existing and possible future sources of 
development finance.  Chapter 4 introduces the concept of carbon trading, its history and 
development, the theory of carbon trading, and the concept of additionality.  Chapter 5 focuses on 
voluntary carbon markets, while in chapter 6 compliance markets are discussed.  Chapter 7 provides 
an overview of the South African context and the development and potential of the clean development 
mechanism in South Africa.  The conclusion and recommendations of the way forward is found in 
chapter 8, followed by a Bibliography and Appendices providing additional information. 
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Figure 1.1 | Research Structure 
 
Research focused on three themes to create context to the discussion in chapter 7 on the South 
African experience: 
• Sustainable development (Chapter 2); 
• Development finance (Chapter 3); and 
• Carbon trading (Chapters 4, 5 and 6). 
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CHAPTER 2 | SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
By way of introduction to the context within which the debate on development finance occurs, chapter 
2 gives a brief introduction to the concept and dimensions of sustainable development.  Flowing from 
the definition of sustainable development, the chapter gives an overview of the concept of needs and 
specifically needs of the poor against the background of growing insight into the development 
process.  Counter balancing this is the concept of environmental limits, discussed in the context of 
global climate disruption.  The chapter closes off with a discussion of the different interpretations of 
the meaning of sustainable development.  The fact that there are different interpretations adds a level 
of complexity to the debate on the need for and effectiveness of development finance for 
sustainability. 
 
2.2. THE EMERGENCE OF SUSTAINABILITY 
Over the last four decades it became clear that development theory and practice had reached a 
turning point.  At first ‘development’ largely meant westernisation, but this process began to threaten 
the delicate balance between social and ecological systems in many developing societies (Treurnicht, 
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2000:61-63).  There were two crises which lead to this paradigm shift.  The first was an intellectual 
crisis brought about by the replacement of indigenous knowledge systems with western beliefs and 
the resultant failure of ‘development’ practice in non-western societies.  
The other was the emerging environmental crisis and specifically human induced climate disruption 
which affects every society on the planet.  Several authors (Lichtman, 2003:1; Bartelmus, 1994:7 and 
Treurnicht, 2000:61) see the need to address these two crises, and to integrate it with economic 
policy, as the impetus that gave birth to the concept of sustainable development.  Dresner (2002:63) 
affirm that this process specifically “…was to be the ground on which the mainstream was to consider 
the environmentalist case.” 
In our new ‘environmental age’ emerging over the last twenty years, the terms sustainable 
development and sustainability has become interwoven into public policy debates and statements.  It 
is in fact used so often, in countless number of contexts and with an endless variety of meanings that 
it is in danger of becoming meaningless jargon.  This is apparent in one of the most common points of 
criticism against carbon trading; often accused of being divorced from the goals of ‘sustainable 
development’, yet without providing any clarity on what is supposed to be achieved. 
Part of the problem is that there is no agreed definition of what sustainable development is or should 
be.  A reason for this can be the ambiguity of the term ‘development’, which Sachs (2002:14) criticises 
as a term which “can mean just about anything… It is a concept of monumental emptiness, carrying a 
vaguely positive connotation… As a result, the notion of sustainable development has been stripped 
of any clear meaning by linking ‘sustainable’ to ‘development’… What exactly should be kept 
sustainable remained forever elusive, giving rise to eternal quarrels about the nature and scope of 
sustainable development.” 
Acknowledging that giving a precise definition of sustainable development is complex, it is 
nevertheless possible to identify a common set of core principles contained in the concept. “In 
essence, the concept is fairly straightforward: sustainable development is all about behaving in a 
manner in which current efforts to raise the quality of life of a society’s citizens (i.e. ‘development’) can 
be continued (or ‘sustained’) into the future.  It is about adopting a development path that improves 
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the quality of life of current generations, yet that leaves future generations with at least the same 
capacity and options for development that we have at present”  (Hanks, Sowman, Swilling, Wilson, & 
van Breda, 2005:2).  The new focus was on forms of economic development that would permanently 
raise the living standards of the world’s population, and especially the living standards of the poorest 
people.  “The notion of permanent development was intended to avoid forms of economic change that 
would benefit generations now but would impose unacceptable risks for generations in the future” 
(Pearce & Barbier, 2003:172). 
The most often quoted definition of sustainable development is to be found in the 1987 United Nations 
report, ‘Our Common Future’ – the famous Brundtland report.  Even though it was not the first 
international report to focus on the notion of sustainability, it remains the best known.  It defines 
sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” (Gallopin, 2003: 21; Mebratu, 1998:501).  
According to Dresner (2002:64) this definition has often been criticised as being too vague. 
The problem of finding a balance between environmental and economic concerns resulted in a 
consensus on a definition “that was at the very least rather vague. Some have seen the vagueness as 
meaninglessness: you can claim anything as part of sustainable development” (Dresner, 2002:63). 
What is important and often overlooked is that the definition contains within it two key concepts: 
• “The concept of ‘needs’, in particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to which 
overriding priority should be given; and 
• The idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organisation on the 
environment’s ability to meet present and future needs” (Mebratu, 1998:501).  
 
2.3. THE CONCEPT OF NEEDS 
Poverty eradication first emerged as part of an explicitly stated international public policy point during 
the 1940’s when American President Franklin Roosevelt said that “…he would like to extend freedom 
from want to all the peoples of the world” (Mock, 2005:5).  Till then assisting the poor was seen as 
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charity and a local responsibility, but the post-war world institutionalised and formalised a focus on 
poverty eradication.  Roosevelt’s successor, President Truman, in 1949 set the objective of global 
development, which at the time was generally seen “in terms of increasing that newly invented 
measure, (gross national product) GNP” (Dresner, 2002:68).  Within the context of the sustainability 
crises this is problematic. 
Even though much progress has been made over the last several years to “end poverty” (Sachs, 
2005:24), McLaren (2003:21) argue that there is a widespread yet wrong assumption that sustainable 
development means that countries of the South need to be developed to attain the same levels of 
wealth (in its narrow sense), consumption and well-being as those of the North1.  This belief assumes 
that sustainable development is simply a more efficient, better managed process of conventional 
economic development, which emphasises growth in the gross domestic product of states. 
Conventional economics measures a country’s wealth and therefore its development status in terms 
of its gross domestic product (GDP), treating the consumption of natural resources as if it were 
income.  In contrast, the conditions for sustainability would be achieved if “capital was non-declining” 
(Dresner, 2002:73).  This implies that attention should be given to the notion of increasing stocks of 
overall per capita wealth where ‘wealth’ comprises a broad spectrum of assets  corresponding to the 
five classes of capital which can be used to measure sustainability (Ruta and Hamilton: 2007:45).  
This includes manufactured capital, human capital, social capital, financial capital and natural capital.   
“It cannot be taken for granted that rich countries pursue paths of development that obey the 
fundamental ‘rising per capita wealth’ rule” (Pearce, 2007:453).  In fact, Sachs (2000:18) goes so far 
as to say that “…the times of copycat development are over.  Not because emulation of the North has 
not produced the desired results, but because the development model of the North is historically 
                                                     
1
 Global North and South are used with reference to the traditional classification of states into “developed” (North) 
and “developing” (South).  Countries of the North are mostly members of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
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obsolete.”  This implies that all countries – even rich ‘developed’ countries – are in need of a new 
sustainable development paradigm. 
The post-war world’s focus on poverty eradication employed the traditional definition of poverty which 
focused only on material - specifically monetary - measures of well-being.  Poverty therefore would be 
the state of having little or no money and few or no material possessions.  Yet poverty is a 
multidimensional phenomenon, characterised by an inability to satisfy basic needs, lack of control 
over resources, low levels of education and skills, poor health and malnutrition.  In addition the poor 
lack adequate shelter, have poor access to water and sanitation and are vulnerable to shocks, 
violence and crime.  The poor also often lack political freedom and do not have a ‘voice’ in public 
affairs. 
A more holistic, multi-dimensional way of looking at poverty only emerged recently.  As a result, 
definitions of poverty have expanded to include the social and psychological burdens of daily survival 
of the poor.  “Poor people not only endure deprivation in relation to income and human development, 
but also suffer from great income insecurity. They are profoundly constrained in their ability to shape 
their own lives” (Tungodden, 2003:13).  This broader conception is seen as a lack of capabilities that 
enable a person to live a life they value, including income, health, education, empowerment and 
human rights (Mock, 2005:6).  South Africa’s Department of Social Development (2006(b):27) 
attempts to define poverty from both the individual and community perspective.  This includes: 
• Assets poverty, including a lack of assets and food; 
• Income poverty, including lack of income and limited access to basic services; and 
• Human capital poverty, which refers to a lack of access to skills and education. 
 
2.3.1. DIMENSIONS OF POVERTY 
While there are many different views on what poverty is, it is useful to distinguish between dimensions 
or degrees of poverty - extreme or absolute poverty, moderate poverty and relative poverty (Sachs, 
2005:20).  Extreme poverty has become synonymous with acute want or deprivation in the classically 
accepted sense, where households cannot meet basic needs for survival.  Moderate poverty is 
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characterised by “… conditions of life in which basic needs are met, but just barely” (Sachs, 2005:20).  
A shock can push households back into conditions of extreme poverty.  Within the context of World 
Bank policy those classified as living in absolute poverty would be living on less than $1.252 (constant 
2005 prices) per day per person.  From Figure 2.1 and 2.2, it is clear that much progress has been 
made recently in addressing absolute poverty in all regions except in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Relative poverty essentially has to do with the deprivation of individuals relative to others in the 
society in which they function.  Therefore relative poverty is a universal and permanent feature of 
human society.  Relative poverty is generally described as a household income level that falls below a 
predetermined average of national income.  Whereas all three dimensions of poverty are found in 
developing countries, only relative poverty is still found in countries of the North. 
The eradication of absolute poverty is a focus within the scope of the wider development debate.  It is 
an emotionally and politically charged issue in the Global South and a source of tension between the 
North and South.  In fact, “developing countries were deeply suspicious of the emerging environment 
issue as a ‘disease of the rich’ which could impose new constraints on their central priority of 
economic development” (Strong, 2003:22).  In addition, the introduction of various ideological issues 
into the poverty debate has at times diverted attention from addressing absolute poverty.  As a result, 
inappropriate social and ideological agendas are frequently pursued in the name of poverty reduction 
(Ackron, 2002:1). 
 
                                                     
2
 In this thesis the “$” will always refer to the United States’ dollar, unless specifically indicated otherwise. 
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Figure 2.1 | Number of Extreme Poor per Region (Source: Sachs, 2005:21) 
 
 
Figure 2.2 | Proportion of Population Living in Extreme Poverty (Source: Sachs, 2005:22) 
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2.3.2. APPROACHES TO POVERTY 
As mentioned before, part of the difficulty in defining the concept ‘sustainable development’, is that 
there is no agreement on what is meant by ‘development’.  Development became explicitly part of 
public policy in the late 1940s.  For the first few decades “development was pursued through state-
directed industrialisation.  In the newly independent countries, some were more ‘socialist’ and 
emphasised state ownership of most of the economy, while others were more ‘capitalist’ and allowed 
extensive private ownership” (Dresner, 2002:68-69).  Whatever the individual preference between 
socialism and capitalism, the state played a central role in promoting industrialisation. 
Historically, colonial country economies were geared towards exporting commodities to metropolitan 
countries and importing manufactured goods from them in turn.  Most newly industrialising countries 
followed a policy of import substitution to promote national self-sufficiency.  Available capital – often 
from foreign aid – was concentrated on creating specific industries, which it was believed would set in 
motion a process of industrialisation.  Once this process matured it will become self-sustaining. 
This industrialisation process did not include an explicit focus on assisting the poor, since it was 
believed that the solution to the poverty problem was simply employment.  In a desperate search for 
employment opportunities, expanding populations migrated to urban areas, resulting in worsening 
conditions for the poor.  These failures of ‘development’ lead to a search for new approaches 
summarised in Figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.3 | Approaches to Poverty (Source: du Preez, 2006:10) 
 
2.3.2.1. INCOME 
The Income approach is the oldest and still most widely used approach to poverty.  Accordingly, a 
person is seen as poor when their personal income or consumption level falls below a specified 
‘poverty line’ (Nunan, 2002:9). The poverty income line is defined as the level at which households 
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have enough income to meet their basic needs, which would include nutrition, shelter and 
transportation (Davids, 2005:38). 
The Income approach to poverty is favoured by most governments and economists, who see the 
solution to poverty as full employment attained through economic growth. This is problematic in the 
current context of sustainability, since economic growth traditionally relied on the exploitation and 
conversion of natural capital.  While economic growth is essential for sustainable poverty reduction, 
the very poor do not benefit from any ‘trickle-down’ effect that may result from growth.  In countries 
where growth is inadequate, there is a need to put in place mechanisms that reduce poverty directly 
and improve the ability of the very poor to contribute to growth. 
In 1990, the World Bank began using the measure of $1 per day as an official “international poverty 
line, meant to roughly approximate the poverty lines of low-income countries” (World Bank 1990:27).  
Even though the ‘$1 per person per day’ measure is a complicated statistical standard measuring 
income at purchasing power parity, it features prominently in public policy circles (Sachs, 2005:20).  
This measure remains controversial, but has provided a starting point for international comparison 
and for important poverty initiatives, including the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals.  
Using this measure places 1.1 billion people in extreme poverty. 
There are several criticisms against the Income approach to poverty.  According to Chossudovsky 
(1998:298), the World Bank framework departs sharply from established concepts and procedures for 
measuring poverty, since it arbitrarily sets a poverty threshold at $1 a day, labelling people with a per 
capita income above one dollar a day as ‘non-poor’.  This measure is used irrespective of actual 
conditions at the relevant country level.  For example with the liberalisation of international commodity 
markets, the domestic prices of basic food staples in developing countries have risen to world market 
levels.  As a result the one dollar a day standard has no rational basis since many people in 
developing countries with per capita incomes of more than one dollar a day are unable to meet basic 
expenditures on food, clothing, shelter, health and education (Chossudovsky, 1998:298). 
The very poor tend also to depend on non-income sources of support, such as extended family, that 
are not taken into consideration with this approach.  For example, the Commission for Africa in its 
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report (2005:30) found that “Africans survive – and some prosper – in the face of low incomes and 
few jobs in the formal economy. They do so using a complex network of social relations…” 
In addition the value of environmental and public services is not captured.  It is therefore possible for 
environmental and public services to deteriorate considerably, with significant negative impacts on the 
poor themselves, without any effect on the income-expenditure based measures of poverty incidence 
(Kanbur, 2001:7).  This approach usually only focus on national figures; so while the national 
incidence of poverty may be falling, it may very well mask the growth in the incidence of poverty 
experienced for example in rural areas.  After consistent criticism, the World Bank adjusted the $1 per 
day measure to $1.25 per day during 2005 (in constant 2005 dollars), to incorporate changed 
circumstances. 
 
2.3.2.2. BASIC NEEDS 
Thinking about poverty expanded with the development of the concept of basic needs,  formulated by 
the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in 1976 (Martinussen, 1997:298).  Against the background 
of a growing disillusionment with the results of development planning, it was realised that the poor 
were disadvantaged by lack of education, bad health and nutrition, and could therefore not ‘compete’ 
on an equal footing with the non-poor.  In its broader conception it involved a reassessment of 
development essentially defined as economic growth, and reflected a new awareness of ecological 
and environmental costs (Haines, 2000:45-46).  The basic needs approach is not necessarily one 
coherent theory, but includes many different strategies (Haines, 2000:47). 
The approach is based on the view that economic growth does not necessarily lead to a substantial 
expansion of employment opportunities and incomes for the poor.  Measures such as the diffusion of 
resources targeted at the poor are needed in addition to growth.  Accordingly, the most important goal 
of development is to ensure that the basic needs of the poor are satisfied (Monaheng, 2000:131).  
Basic needs are defined as a minimum consumption basket, which may include food, water, shelter, 
clothing, health care and education.  Some well-known poverty indicators originating from the basic 
needs perspective include access to potable water, literacy, life expectancy and nutrition levels 
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(Davids, 2005:39).  Other indicators incorporate issues of ill-being, shelter, clothing and access to 
health services (Nunan, 2002:9).  In practice, the approach tended to “concentrate on top-down state 
provision of basic public services, rather than the non-material aspects to empower the poor 
themselves” (Dresner, 2002:69). 
The debt crisis emerging in the early 1980s created pressure to reduce public spending, shifting the 
development emphasis away from basic needs to ‘structural adjustment’.  Yet it did not completely 
disappear.  Even where “other perspectives on poverty are highlighted, there is a strong emphasis on 
first satisfying the elements of deprivation as defined from a basic needs perspective. Where people 
wish to add other interpretations to the material definition of poverty, they refer to ‘going beyond a 
basic needs approach’ – in other words, not only including, but extending, the basic needs definition 
of poverty by focusing on space or livelihoods” (Davids, 2005:39). 
 
2.3.2.3. SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
The social exclusion perspective has its origins in European experiences of poverty, where most 
people’s basic needs have been met.  There may be little income poverty, but there remains a group 
that is excluded from the mainstream benefits of society and is prevented in some way from fully 
enjoying general prosperity (Davids, 2005:39-40).  Groups may be discriminated against on the basis 
of a variety of characteristics, including their sex, race, age or where they live. 
The perspective has two main defining characteristics.  Firstly, it focuses on the multidimensionality of 
deprivation - people may be excluded or deprived in the economic, social and political spheres and 
are often excluded from different things at the same time.  Secondly, social exclusion implies a focus 
on the relations and processes that cause deprivation.  People can be excluded by many different 
sorts of groups, often at the same time.  Exclusion happens at each level of society (de Haan, 
1999:8). 
Social exclusion as a perspective on poverty is important because it causes the poverty of particular 
people and gets in the way of poverty reduction (United Kingdom, 2005:5).  It hurts people materially 
but can also hurt them emotionally, by shutting them out of the life of their community.  Socially 
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excluded people are often denied the opportunities available to others to increase their income and 
escape from poverty by their own efforts.  So, even though the economy may grow and general 
income levels may rise, excluded people are likely to be left behind.  Poverty reduction policies often 
fail to reach them unless they are specifically designed to do so. 
Social exclusion reduces the productive capacity – and rate of poverty reduction – of a society as a 
whole.  Exclusion does not cause poverty through a simple sorting of those who can or cannot 
participate in society.  Socially excluded groups often do participate but on unequal terms.  Labour 
markets illustrate this most clearly by exploiting the powerlessness of excluded groups and at the 
same time reinforcing their disadvantaged position (United Kingdom, 2005:5-6).  Some would argue 
that the elements of social exclusion have been entrenched in the Bretton Woods institutions, 
perpetuating the existence of global poverty.  Building on this argument, it has further been 
institutionalised in the unfair distribution of greenhouse gas emissions rights in terms of the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
 
2.3.2.4. SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS 
A fourth perspective is one that adopts a sustainable livelihoods approach.  It is argued that income 
poverty has assumed importance only because of its relevance to developed countries.  According to 
Chambers (as cited in Nunan, 2002:10), when the poor are asked, income deprivation is often quite 
low on their priority ranking, below self-respect and lack of domination. 
The sustainable livelihoods approach, developed by Gordon and Conway in the 1980s, stresses the 
participation of individuals and communities in defining and solving their own poverty.  Participation 
offers valuable opportunities to rectify the inequality of top-down, prescriptive approaches and 
improves the chances of achieving sustainable development. 
A core belief of this approach is that the conventional understanding of poverty does not adequately 
describe the actual experience thereof.  For the poor, poverty is a local, diverse and dynamic 
condition.  While poverty relates to a lack of physical necessities, assets and income, it is also more 
than this (Nunan, 2002:9-11).  The poor are not a homogeneous group, but experience poverty in 
Page | 40  
Copyright ©2011 Stellenbosch University 
All rights reserved 
 
different ways - they are not poor or vulnerable in the same way.  Identifying the local variations in 
poverty and deprivation is crucial in shaping effective development strategies.  By focussing on 
vulnerability or the inability to cope with hardship, rather than on poverty per se, the issues that 
emerge may not be the lack of an income or even employment, but may rather be factors such as the 
breakdown of the family or other social problems (Davids, 2005:40).  In terms of the linkages between 
poverty and environment, these are inevitably complex and diverse, reflecting the diversity of poverty 
dimensions and experiences (Nunan, 2002:9). 
As an approach to poverty eradication, the livelihoods approach “…looks to the poor themselves and 
recognises them as actors who shape their lives even under conditions of hardship and destitution.  In 
this view, poverty derives from a deficit of power rather than lack of money” (Sachs, 2000:21).  “To be 
poor was to experience ill-being in many ways and to suffer multiple disadvantages that reinforce 
each other and interlock to trap them” (World Bank, 2000:40).  Poverty is now seen as “a 
multidimensional, dynamic, complex, institutionally-embedded, and a gender- and location-specific 
phenomenon” (World Bank, 2000:4). 
 
2.3.2.5. THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 
Trainer (2002:56) argues that what matters most to the development process is not how much wealth 
(in the narrow definition) has been created or how much economies have grown, but what changes 
have occurred in the quality of life of those in most urgent need, and what improvements have 
occurred to ecosystems.  To illustrate this failure of ‘traditional development’ approaches, the Human 
Development Report of 1996 stressed that the poorest one third of the world’s people actually 
experienced a marked long-term deterioration in their real living conditions. Over 1.6 billion people 
were found to be getting poorer each year (Trainer, 2002:56). 
It has been wrongfully assumed “...that higher wealth and consumption directly translate to higher 
well-being and quality of life.  Empirical evidence seems to demonstrate that in reality there is no 
direct correlation between income and quality of life at all levels.  This creates scope for policies which 
can reduce inequalities in well-being without increasing aggregate material consumption” (McLaren, 
Page | 41  
Copyright ©2011 Stellenbosch University 
All rights reserved 
 
2003:21).  During the 1990’s, a new model came to prominence placing the emphasis on human 
development as opposed to an absolute focus on economic growth.  “Human development judges a 
society’s standard of living not just according to the average level of income, but according to people’s 
capabilities to lead the lives they value” (Dresner, 2002:70).  The human development approach 
emphasises an integrated and comprehensive view on development incorporating most of the key 
elements of the other perspectives (Davids, 2005:40). 
Based on the view that market mechanisms are essentially unfriendly to the poor, the weak and the 
vulnerable, it defines development as “a process of enlarging people’s economic, social, cultural and 
political choices” (Martinussen, 1997:303).  The concept of human development over time extended 
to basically all areas of development, such as social infrastructure and services, gender equality, 
equal opportunities for participation in political and economic development, empowerment of citizens 
and civil society organisations, enabling legal and institutional frameworks, and environmental and 
natural resource sustainability. 
The best known example of a composite measure of human development is the United Nations 
Development Programme’s Human Development Index (HDI), published for the first time in 1990 in 
the Human Development Report.  It is a weighted index that includes education, life expectancy, and 
per-capita GDP as a measurement of development progress (UNDP 2001:137).  Several nations with 
a low GDP score relatively highly in this index.  In line with the core beliefs of the human development 
approach, the index measures people’s choices in three essential areas: 
• opportunity to live a long and healthy life; 
• opportunity to acquire knowledge; and 
• opportunity to have access to the resources needed for a decent standard of living. 
Since then, three supplementary indices have been developed: the human poverty index (HPI), 
gender-related development index (GDI) and gender empowerment measure (GEM).  The concept of 
human development, however, is much broader than the HDI and these supplementary indices. 
According to Kanbur (2003:8), the conceptual foundations of the HDI are weak, because the 
conceptual foundations for multi-dimensional poverty and well-being are not yet strong enough to give 
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confidence in the deployment of operational measures such as the HDI.  It is impossible to come up 
with a comprehensive measure—or even a comprehensive set of indicators—because many vital 
dimensions of human development, such as participation in the life of the community, are not readily 
quantified.  While simple composite measures can draw attention to the issues quite effectively, albeit 
useful, these indices are no substitute for full treatment of the rich concerns of the human 
development perspective. 
 
2.4. THE CONCEPT OF LIMITS 
The modern environmental movement emerging in the 1960s was sparked off by Rachel Carson’s 
book ‘Silent Spring’, which implicitly challenged science and the notion of technological progress.  It 
essentially defined one of the two key concerns of modern environmentalism – the limits to human 
control over nature.  The other key concern being a global environmental crisis unfolding within the 
limited ecological space of planet earth; “the possibility of making the planet unfit for life.  Hitherto, 
people have known that they could do local damage.  They could farm carelessly and lose topsoil or 
deforest or overgraze or mine out a mineral.  They also contrived to live through major natural 
disasters – earthquakes, tornadoes, ice ages.  But nobody thought that the planet itself could be at 
risk” (Ward, 2003:4).  The restricted ecological space of the planet presents the limits within which 
humans can exploit nature for their own purposes. 
Initially, the emerging environmental movement operated on the fringes of the mainstream 
development policy debate, receiving far more attention in the North than in the South.  In fact, many 
governments and civil society groups from the South were deeply hostile to environmentalism, fearing 
it will wreck their legitimate desire for development.  Growing awareness has changed the 
international discourse irrevocably, drawing environmental concerns into the mainstream.  Amongst 
the many global environmental concerns, climate disruption has caught the attention of the world. 
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2.4.1. GLOBAL CLIMATE DISRUPTION 
Climate change has long-since ceased to be a scientific curiosity, and is no longer only one of many 
environmental concerns.  Rather it has become the material of rock concerts, TV talk shows and so 
forth.  The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) describes it as “...the major, overriding 
environmental issue of our time, and the single greatest challenge facing environmental regulators.  It 
is a growing crisis with economic, health and safety, food production, security, and other dimensions” 
(UNEP, 2009:unnumbered).  Changes to the climate are emerging so quickly, with such large-scale 
impact, that some commentators prefer the term climate disruption to climate change. 
Over the last ten thousand years the planet’s average surface temperature has been around 14oC; a 
temperature which suits our species superbly.  According to the eminent scientist, Tim Flannery 
(2005:5) “...we have been able to organise ourselves in a most impressive manner – planting crops, 
domesticating animals and building cities.  Finally, over the past century, we have created a truly 
global civilisation.”  For all the benefits of this remarkable development progress, human activity has 
caused major damage to the planet.  Even though initially there were much opposition to the notion 
that human activities are “changing the composition of the atmosphere and its properties” (Stern, 
2006:3), the debate seems to be settled.   
Since the industrial revolution the composition of the atmosphere has been altered significantly.  The 
term greenhouse gasses (GHG) has been coined to aptly describe gasses in an atmosphere that 
absorb and emit radiation within the thermal infrared range, causing the greenhouse effect.  The 
greenhouse effect influences the planet’s temperature; without which the average surface 
temperature would have been about 33oC lower.  Many greenhouse gasses are in some way or 
another generated by human activity.  Although scarce, and weak in its capacity to capture heat, “CO2 
is very long-lived in the atmosphere: around 56% of all the CO2 that humans have liberated by 
burning fossil fuel is still aloft, which is the cause – directly or indirectly – of around 80% of all global 
warming” (Flannery, 2005:28).   
The fact that a known proportion of CO2 remains in the atmosphere allows us to calculate a carbon 
budget for humanity.  Prior to 1800, the start of the Industrial Revolution, there were about 280 parts 
per million (ppm) of CO2 in the atmosphere, which equates to around 586 gigatonnes of CO2.  Today 
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the figures are 380 ppm or around 790 gigatonnes (Flannery, 2005: 28).  A level double that which 
existed prior to the industrial revolution (560 ppm) is considered the threshold of dangerous change.  
To avoid crossing this threshold, we must limit all future human emissions to around 600 gigatonnes, 
of which just over half will stay in the atmosphere.  Limiting all future emissions in this way will raise 
CO2 levels to around 1100 gigatonnes, or 550 ppm by the end of the century.  This will be very difficult 
to achieve, since it will allow humans to only emit 6 gigatonnes per year over the next century.  
Throughout the 1990s we emitted an average of 13.3 gigatonnes of CO2 per year, with carbon 
concentrations rising by 2.3 parts per million per year.   
The current level of atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations is the highest in at least 650 000 
years.  The predominant reasons are burning of fossil fuels, deforestation and other changes in land-
use, accompanied by rising concentrations of other greenhouse gasses, particularly methane and 
nitrous oxide. 
The result of this build-up in atmospheric greenhouse gas concentration is an increase in global mean 
surface temperatures over the past century, warming by 0.7oC since 1900.  “Over the last 30 years, 
global temperatures have risen rapidly and continuously at around 0.2oC per decade, bringing the 
global mean temperature to what is probably at, or near, the warmest level reached in the current 
interglacial period, which began about 12,000 years ago.  All of the 10 warmest years on record have 
occurred since 1990” (Stern, 2006:5).  “Climate change is a serious and urgent issue.  On current 
trends, average global temperatures could rise by 2 - 3°C within the next fifty years or so, with several 
degrees more by the end of the century if emissions continue to grow” (Stern, 2006:58).  Even based 
on conservative models, the planet may reach temperatures not seen since the middle Pliocene era - 
around 3 million years ago.  The level of warming on a global scale is far beyond the experience of 
human civilisation. 
Greenhouse gas emissions are driven by economic growth; per capita CO2 emissions have been 
strongly correlated with per capita GDP.  It represents the “greatest and widest-ranging market failure 
ever seen” (Stern, 2006:i), presenting a unique challenge to mankind.  Since it is global in its causes 
and consequences, international collective mitigating action is required in setting and regulating 
targets for change, but also in “creating price signals and markets for carbon, spurring technology 
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research, development and deployment, and promoting adaptation, particularly for developing 
countries” (Stern, 2006:i). 
Even though the consequences of climate disruption are global, the impact is not evenly distributed.  
As a result of their geographical disadvantage, poor developing countries will be affected earlier and 
more severely than rich countries.  In addition, the poor are heavily dependent on subsistence 
agriculture, the most climate sensitive of all economic sectors.  Low incomes and vulnerabilities 
complicate adaptation to climate change.  “Stern calculated that a 2oC rise in global temperature cost 
about 1% of world GDP.  But the World Bank ... now says the cost to Africa will be more like 4% of 
GDP and to India, 5%” (Economist, 2009(b):63).  The predicted 2oC rise in global temperatures may 
result in acute water shortages, food shortages resulting from lower global agricultural production, sea 
level rise of at least one meter, and the loss of one third of the world’s species, creating hundreds of 
millions of environmental refugees (South Centre, 2007:6).  Interventions to limit global warming to an 
increase of 2oC would cost $140 billion to $675 billion per annum according to World Bank 
calculations (Economist, 2009(b):64).  It is unclear at this stage how these interventions will be 
financed, especially in the developing world. 
 
2.5. MEASURING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
Despite the fact that sustainable development has become a widely used concept, the measurement 
thereof is relatively underdeveloped.  If the concept of inter-generational equity is central to the notion 
of sustainability, the “way to achieve this is by passing on to future generations a level of capital that 
is at least as high as ours today” (Ruta & Hamilton, 2007:45).  The measurement of sustainability 
would then be similar to an accounting process with capital being the object measured.  Sustainability 
then would depend upon the “maintenance of a non-declining level of a number of ecological, social 
and economic indicators” (Ruta & Hamilton, 2007:46). 
Traditionally, development progress typically measured well-being as approximated by income.  
Sustained well-being will require that the quantity of goods and services produced in an economy 
should not decline from one year to the next.  Growth of income is important to address social goals 
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such as poverty alleviation.  Income measures, however, do not say much about sustainability; higher 
income does not mean ‘higher’ sustainability.  Samuelson (1961:50) argued that a better measure of 
well-being would be wealth instead of income, in which case sustainability can be measured in terms 
of changes in wealth.  Wealth would include all the assets needed for the generation of well-being.  
Three categories of capital assets are generally acknowledged, from which goods and services are 
derived that are needed to maintain or improve well-being: 
• Natural capital refers to the “natural resources (matter and energy) and processes that are 
needed to maintain life and produce and deliver goods and services” (Hanks et al, 2005:3).  It 
includes renewable resources (such as freshwater, fisheries and wood), non-renewable 
resources (such as mineral deposits), sinks and ecological processes such as climate 
regulation. 
• Intangible capital refers to assets generally unaccounted for in wealth estimates.  It includes 
human capital, which refers to the “skills and know-how embodied in the labour force” (Ruta & 
Hamilton, 2007:52).  It also includes people’s “health, motivation and capacity for 
relationships, all of which are necessary for productive work and the creation of a better 
quality of life” (Hanks et al, 2005:3).  Human capital is a renewable resource which can be 
fostered through improving opportunities for learning, creativity, stimulation and enhanced 
health.  Social capital concerns “the amount of trust among people in a society and their 
ability to work together for common purposes” (Ruta & Hamilton, 2007:52).  It refers to the 
“institutions that help maintain and develop human capital in partnership with others” (Hanks 
et al, 2005:3), including families, communities, businesses, trade unions, schools and 
voluntary organisations.  The final element of intangible capital refers to the governance 
structure.  An economy with an efficient judicial system, clear property rights and an effective 
government will generally be wealthier than those without. 
• Produced capital includes physical capital - material goods or fixed assets “that contribute to 
the production process or the provision of services, rather than being part of the output itself” 
(Hanks et al, 2005:3); as well as financial capital.  Financial capital plays a critical role in the 
economy, enabling the other types of capital to be owned and traded.  Unlike the other types 
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of capital, it has no intrinsic value itself but is only representative of the value of other capital 
assets. 
The crisis of sustainability results from the fact that current production and consumption patterns are 
depleting stocks of natural and intangible capital, while adding disproportionately and unevenly to 
produced capital.  Looking at comprehensive wealth creates a better framework for the creation of 
well-being in an economy, reviving the ideas of classical economists. 
Since sustainable development is a multi-dimensional concept involving many different disciplines, it 
would be possible to approach it, and the measurement thereof, from many different angles.  
Traditionally sustainable development has been viewed as the intersection of the social (intangible 
capital), economic (produced capital) and environmental (natural capital) spheres as illustrated in 
figure 2.4.  The well known ‘triple bottom line’ followed this approach.  This view is extremely limited 
and do not facilitate solving the measurement problem.  Each sphere brought its own ‘language’, 
priorities and challenges, making it difficult to find commonality. 
 
Figure 2.4 | Traditional View on the Dimensions of Sustainability 
 
An alternative perspective, as illustrated in figure 2.5, integrates the spheres, recognising that human 
activity is dependent on the environment, with economic activity being a subset of human activity.  
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Figure 2.6 | Alternative View on the Dimensions of Sustainability (Source: Adapted from 
Mebratu, 1998:137) 
 
2.6. APPROACHES TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
The difficulty in finding a satisfactory definition for sustainable development and merging emotive, 
urgent and what may seem like opposing issues, makes it clear that not only is sustainability a highly 
complex moral notion, but also a highly contestable political concept (Hattingh, 2001:21).  While it 
may seem like everyone agree in broad outline on the core notions of the concept, a political and 
ideological battle exists between different conceptions of sustainable development. 
From a brief historical overview it is clear that from the start there were two opposing positions.  On 
the one side there was recognition of the serious impact of current unsustainable patterns of 
development on the environment (limits), while on the other there was recognition of the needs of the 
poor, calling for more development to lift them out of their misery (Mebratu, 1998:493-503).  While 
these two positions remain, the debate has become more complex.  The different interpretations of 
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the concept occur along what Hattingh (2001:21) calls fault lines representing internal tensions within 
the concept of sustainable development itself.  On each one of these fault lines two principally 
opposing and competing ideological positions of sustainable development can be found, with a 
continuum of possible positions between these polar extremes (illustrated in figure 2.6). 
 
 
Figure 2.6 | The Sustainability Matrix (Source: adapted from Hattingh, 2001) 
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2.6.1. WEAK OR STRONG 
The real issue according to Hattingh (2001:10) in the debate on a weak and a strong interpretation of 
the concept of sustainable development, is how much of nature needs to be conserved in order to 
achieve sustainability.  It essentially places anthropocentrism and ecocentrism in confrontation with 
each other, mimicking the classical tension leading to the birth of what some would call ‘the 
compromise’ - sustainable development.  Anthropocentrism emphasises weak sustainability; 
ecocentrists stress strong sustainable development. 
Essentially the debate is on the relative value of different types of capital and the substitutability 
thereof.  Anthropocentrists claim that the different types of capital are perfectly intersubstitutable.  
Thus a fall in one - usually natural capital - can be justified by a rise in another - usually produced 
capital.  This substitutability is assumed to be almost infinite.  The only goal would be to “maintain 
total capital intact without regard to its composition…” (Goodland & Daly, 1996:1006).  Natural capital 
is important because of the value it adds for humans.  Economic activity should not be limited by 
predetermined environmental constraints.  Environmental protection is only possible where it is 
economically viable and affordable.  Anthropocentrism inspires some economists who, in the debate 
on climate change mitigation, argue that “...mitigating climate change means spending real money 
now in exchange for uncertain benefits in a remote future” (Economist, 2006(b):14), making the 
‘investment’ unviable. 
The logical conclusion of the weak interpretation of sustainable development is that the total existing 
capital stock could be converted into produced capital and still be seen as sustainable.  Even though 
many economists believe that weak sustainability is good enough, it does not recognize the 
“unaccounted ecological services and life-support functions performed by many forms of natural 
capital and the considerable risk associated with their irreversible loss” (Wackernagel & Rees, 
1996:37). 
On the other hand strong sustainability would require different types of capital to be managed and 
maintained separately.  It assumes that “natural and human-made capital is not really substitutes but 
compliments in most production functions” (Goodland & Daly, 1996:1006).  This approach 
emphasizes a strong commitment to living within the carrying capacity of the biosphere and 
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recognizes that nature has intrinsic value, irrespective of its value to humans.  Economic activity 
should not go beyond the limits of nature’s carrying capacity.  One way of achieving strong 
sustainability is to limit the ecological footprint of an area and then to measure and manage impact 
(Wackernagel & Rees, 1996:53). 
 
2.6.2. EGALITARIAN OR NON-EGALITARIAN 
Two dimensions of sustainable development can be distinguished – intergenerational justice and 
intragenerational justice.  Intragenerational justice considers the distribution of resources between rich 
and poor countries, while intergenerational justice considers the distribution of resources between 
present and future generations (Hattingh, 2001:12).  This notion of justice reveals a set of fault lines 
that has been defined as egalitarian and non-egalitarian sustainable development. 
A non-egalitarian interpretation of sustainable development is mostly concerned with sustaining 
current patterns of resource distribution and the maintenance of the current relative standards of 
living.  This implies preserving the prevailing economic relations between rich countries and poor 
countries.  There is a preference to emphasise the conservation of nature and resources, especially 
those located in poor countries. 
Commentators of a non-egalitarian interpretation generally make no or minor reference to national or 
global resource distribution and apparently do not see the inequality in distribution patterns as a 
matter for concern.  They often argue that population growth – much higher in the South than the 
North - is more relevant to environmental damage than consumption levels.  This argument implies 
that poor countries should take the blame for environmental degradation, even though rich countries 
are responsible for the bulk of global resource consumption and emissions.  At the same time 
Northern dominated global institutions and agreements seek to perpetuate and even widen global 
inequalities.  This principle is further entrenched and institutionalised in the Kyoto Protocol, which as 
McLaren (2003:26) points out, assumes a distribution of emissions rights proportional to current rates 
of use, implying that the unequal distribution patterns must be perpetuated. 
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An egalitarian interpretation of sustainable development emphasises the needs of the poor, whether 
they are individuals, communities or nations.  Efforts would be directed at raising the living standards 
of the poor, with an accompanying redistribution of resources to ensure equitable access.  There is 
strong support for the reduction of consumption of global resources by the rich North, since it is 
recognised that it is not possible to create global consumption equilibrium at the rates currently found 
in those countries.  Practically the ecological footprint of the North should be reduced to not invade 
the ecological space appropriated by the South - a radical departure from current patterns. 
In reality the political debate is still focussed on whether international inequalities should be reduced 
and not on how it should be done.  A reason for this is that economists assume that since a measure 
of inequality at a national level can be justified, it should also be justifiable at an international level.  
There is no evidence for the relevance of this assumption (McLaren, 2003:26). 
How should a state of “just sustainability” (McLaren, 2003:22) be reached?  Several approaches have 
been proposed to give effect to the notion of justice in sustainability; amongst others the carrying 
capacity of natural systems combined with the global measurement of environmental space.  This is a 
“rights-based approach that conceptualizes sustainable development in terms of access for all to a 
fair share in the limited environmental resources on which healthy quality of life depends.  It implies 
eliminating at least international inequalities in aggregate resource consumption as well as inter-
generational ones” (McLaren, 2003:25). 
A major problem according to McLaren (2003:27) is that equity-based strategies challenge vested 
interests in the international system – particularly multi-national companies and their shareholders, 
who benefit most from them.  Compounding the problem is that reducing Northern consumption may 
actually threaten Southern well-being further, because of the dependence of Southern economies on 
the export of commodities.  Yet Sachs (2000:17) argues that “it is high time to concentrate the 
spotlight on the structural inequities that trap the majority of people around the globe into miserable 
and undignified living conditions.” 
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2.6.3. TOP-DOWN OR PARTICIPATORY 
The debate between the top-down and the participatory interpretation of sustainable development is 
essentially one of process – the way development interventions are designed and implemented.  On 
the one hand there is a commitment to full participation, which is promoted as something with intrinsic 
value.  On the other hand a top-down, stakeholder interpretation of sustainable development sees 
participation as something with instrumental value.  Although there will always be an element of 
participation in any development programme, what is at issue here is the significance of the 
participation process to the development strategy (Hattingh, 2001:15). 
Public participation is an elusive concept which acts as an umbrella term for a new style of 
development planning intervention (Theron, 2005:113). Although it is impossible to suggest a 
development strategy or intervention which is not in some way ‘participatory’, it does not mean that 
development strategists, policy-makers or the public agree on what participation is and how it should 
be implemented. 
A top-down approach views development as a process in which the public remain the recipients of 
resources allocated in a top-down blueprint fashion (Theron, 2005:111).  Although participation is 
accommodated in this process, where it is not required, it is not espoused.  Participation is typically 
only required for the implementation - not for the setting of objectives – of a development intervention.  
However, when participation is required to determine objectives, it usually takes the form of 
consultation.  In these consultative processes, participation usually is restricted to the major 
stakeholders of society - academics, specialists, business leaders, and representatives of local 
government and large organisations (Hattingh, 2001:15). 
An alternative vision argues that through participation people are enabled to determine and control 
the allocation of development resources, not merely influence its direction (Theron: 2005:111).  
People-centred participatory sustainable development promotes the idea that participation has an 
intrinsic value.  Full participation, which promotes the empowerment of people and communities, is 
therefore a good in its own right.  In this context participation is relevant for objective setting and the 
implementation of plans.  Maximum involvement of stakeholders, including ordinary members of the 
public, community organisations and grassroots groups are encouraged and facilitated. 
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According to Rahman (as cited in Theron, 2005:114) these issues “…belong to the view of public 
participation as the exercise of people’s power in thinking, acting and controlling their action in a 
collective framework.”  Participation should then lead to self-reliance.  This is based on Paulo Freire’s 
formulation of the principle of critical consciousness from the early 1970’s, which contributed greatly 
to the early body of knowledge regarding participatory development. 
 
Table 2.1 | Top-Down and Participatory Interpretations of Sustainable Development  
Top-down (Participation as a means) Participatory (Participation as an End) 
Participation is ‘used’ to achieve a predetermined 
goal or objective. 
Aim is to empower people to have a meaningful 
stake in their own development. 
Attempt to use existing resources to achieve 
programme objectives.  
Attempt to ensure increased role of people in 
development initiatives. 
Focus is on achieving the objective. Focus on improving the ability of the people to 
participate rather than just on achieving 
objectives. 
Common on Government programmes aiming to 
mobilise the community to improve the efficiency 
of the delivery system. 
NGOs usually agree with this approach at least in 
principle. 
Participation is generally short-term. Participation is a long-term process. 
Passive form of participation. Participation is more active and dynamic. 
Source | Adapted from Oakley (1991) as cited in Theron, 2005:117 
 
2.6.4. NARROW OR BROAD 
The debate relating to a narrow or a broad interpretation of sustainable development essentially deals 
with scope.  In this debate the central question is whether the protection of the environment is the 
over-riding objective of sustainable development, or is it only one among a set of equal objectives? 
Devotees of a narrow interpretation refer to the sustainability of the ecological system primarily, even 
if it means the displacement of the human component (Gallopin, 2003:14-15).  They value ecological 
sustainability above and beyond, rather than equal or subordinate to, economic and social 
sustainability.  A narrow interpretation emphasises the protection of the environment and sees the 
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process of sustainable development as primarily the maintenance and growth of the natural capital 
stock (Goodland & Daly, 1996:1005). 
In contrast, a broad interpretation of sustainable development recognises the importance of 
environmental protection, yet views it as only one goal amongst many others equal to it.  Sustainable 
development is much wider than the environmental agenda and in fact describes a new goal for 
economic, social and political life.  Advocates argue that the only option to safeguard the environment 
in the long-term is to seek the sustainability of the whole socio-ecological system.  A socio-ecological 
system is “…any system composed of a societal (or human) component (subsystem) in interaction 
with an ecological (or biophysical) component” (Gallopin, 2003:14-15).  The rationale for considering 
the whole system is based on the existence of important inter-linkages between society and nature. 
Broad sustainable development is the more modern approach.  Already the World Conservation 
Strategy of 1980, which for the first time referred to the notion of ‘sustainable development’, shifted 
the locus of sustainability from nature to development.  While sustainability previously referred to 
living resources it now refers to development (Sachs, 2000:14). 
 
2.6.5. DEEP OR SHALLOW 
At the heart of the debate between proponents of the deep ecology and shallow interpretations of 
sustainability is the question: are all species equal and does nature have intrinsic value, or is nature 
only valuable to the extent that it provides goods and services to humans, who are the superior 
species? 
Shallow interpretation of sustainable development holds that humans are exceptional and that nature 
is only a resource for humans to exploit.  Thinkers in this context describe life as mechanical, and 
nature as knowable, explainable and predictable.  There is therefore no spiritual significance in the 
way life and nature works.  It is essentially a modernistic world view in line with Western scientific 
tradition.  The shallow interpretation is complimentary to weak sustainability and would probably be in 
conflict with egalitarian thinking. 
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The deep ecological view questions western reductionist views on the environment and tries to 
promote a new ethic where existing values are replaced with new ones and with the emphasis on new 
behaviour patterns (Treurnicht, 2000:66).  Essentially a deep ecological approach to sustainable 
development holds that life is sacred; humans are part of a bigger whole.  Nature does not belong to 
humans, but we merely act as caretakers. 
James Lovelock, after discovering the self-regulating processes of the atmosphere, named it Gaia 
after the Greek goddess of the earth.  Gaia essentially refers to the Earth as a “…whole living being… 
(It) No longer is a dead rock we live upon, the Earth is a living process in which we participate. Earth, 
as a home for life, is a being that we can both harm and help to heal” (Macy & Brown, no date: 44). 
While these ideas have developed into the deep ecology platform, Macy and Brown (no date:47) 
argues that deep ecology is neither an ideology nor a dogma, but is rather about exploring the 
questions around people’s real wants and needs, their relation to life on Earth and their vision for the 
future.  “As parts of a larger living whole – be it a society, an ecosystem, or a planet – our 
comprehension of it is necessarily partial; we cannot stand aloof, blueprints in hand, and deliver final 
answers” (Macy & Brown, no date:47).  “The atmosphere, Lovelock concluded, is Gaia’s great organ 
of interconnection and temperature regulation.  He described it as not merely a biological product, but 
more probably a biological construction: not living, but … an extension of a living system designed to 
maintain a chosen environment” (Flannery, 2006:13). 
According to Flannery (2006:17), someone who believes in Gaia sees everything on Earth as being 
intimately connected to everything else, just as are organs in a body.  In such a system, pollutants 
cannot simply be shunted out of sight and forgotten; species’ extinction is seen as an act of self-
mutilation.  As a result, a Gaian world view predisposes its adherents to sustainable ways of living.  In 
our modern world, however, the reductionist world view is in the ascendant, and its adherents often 
see human actions in isolation.  It is this reductionist world view that has brought the present 
sustainability crisis upon us. 
Devall (2001:23) identified amongst others, the following principles that constitute the deep ecology 
platform: 
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• “Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs. 
• Present human interference with nonhuman world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly 
worsening. 
• Policies must therefore be changed. The changes in policies affect basic economic, 
technological and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be deeply different 
from the present. 
• The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in situations of 
inherent worth) rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be 
a profound awareness of the difference between big and great.” 
The emergence of the new environmental age provided new possibilities of questioning traditional 
religions, specifically the Judeo-Christian traditions (Mebratu, 1998:508-509).  This gave rise to the 
appearance of eco-theology, which attempts to reinterpret these old traditions according to the new 
reality.  Contemporary eco-theology articulates the “…sorrow of a broken-hearted Earth, expresses 
our despair over the past, and fear for the future” (ibid:508).  It is based on the belief that the 
ecologically relevant material in the religious texts and traditions has simply been ignored.  Therefore, 
if humans would allow themselves to be shaped by true religious virtue, it will rebalance the 
relationship between humans and nature. 
 
2.7. CONCLUSION 
There are huge disparities in the world consequent to the concentration of resources in the global 
elite, mostly resident in countries of the North.  They have managed to build their stock of produced 
and intangible capital relatively ‘cheaply’, in an era when “...natural capital was considered infinitive 
relative to the scale of human use” (Goodland & Daly, 1996:1005).  The conventional Northern model 
of  economic development, which emphasises growth in the gross domestic product of states by 
increasing per capita consumption and productivity, combined with population growth, have put an 
end to the era of ‘cheap’ natural capital. 
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Over-use of environmental resources is at the heart of the challenge of sustainable development.  
Humans are consuming and wasting resources at a rate faster than the ecological systems of the 
planet can tolerate.  Substantial cuts in resource use and emissions are required to deliver inter-
generational equity.  But this also will have dramatic implications for intra-generational equity.  Where 
there are limited resources, distributional questions cannot be avoided; “current economic inequality 
and the marginalisation of the poor by the wealthy also drive resource exploitation…Thus inequality is 
a driving force behind unsustainability” (McLaren, 2003:21). The social dimension of sustainability is 
therefore inescapable.  Goodland and Daly (1996:1009) argue that what is at issue is that of burden 
sharing.  The Global North is responsible for the “…overwhelming share of global environmental 
damage.”   
The environmental crises - and specifically the climate disruption challenge – the world faces, are too 
serious to ignore and to only focus on ‘development’.  Climate disruption will have an impact on 
people’s access to food; it will cause water stress, affect our health and well-being, and change the 
environment in which we live.  All of these are serious developmental issues.  Those who will be 
affected first and the hardest, are the poor in those countries which contributed least to the problem 
and who are least able to afford the costs of adaptation. 
Climate disruption is only one – albeit arguably the most serious – of many environmental disasters 
the world is facing.  If it is considered that the environment supports the social and economic spheres 
of activity and hence the well-being of humans, it is essential to address environmental limits as part 
of any development and re-development intervention.  Such development and re-development 
interventions must be directed by a strong sense of intra-generational, as well as inter-generational 
justice.  
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CHAPTER 3 | DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 
 
 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of Chapter 3 is to give a brief overview of the international debate on financing 
development, and the sources of development finance.  This is done by distinguishing between two 
categories of financial flows – those damaging to sustainability, and those promoting sustainability.  
Positive flows from both traditional and innovative new sources are discussed. 
 
3.2. BACKGROUND 
Even though there is no agreement on how the world should interpret its complex sustainability 
challenges and the corrective steps to take, there is a continuing debate on financing sustainable 
development interventions.  This financing debate, emerging from the wider debate on development 
finance, has been on-going for several decades.   
Even at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, convened in Stockholm in 1972, 
a fundamental concern was how to finance sustainable development.  Fundamental to the debate 
was the principal of responsibility; more industrialised countries are responsible for the damage done 
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and the subsequent risks that had arisen, to the environment.  The rich industrialised countries are 
the main beneficiaries of the economic activities that produced these problems, and thus have an 
obligation to bear the costs of dealing with them.  “This translated into the need for the more 
industrialised countries to enable ... (developing countries) to incorporate care for the environment 
into their development and to participate fully in global efforts to protect and improve the environment. 
Developing countries felt strongly that this support was not to come from existing development aid but 
should be ‘new and additional’” (Strong, 2003:22-23). 
Current climate negotiations again include a difficult debate on financing adaptation and mitigation 
interventions.  “There is broad agreement that high-income countries will transfer some funds to the 
developing world to assist specifically with adaptation - and provide separate funding for mitigation.  
But questions remain about how much financing will be available, its source, how its expenditure will 
be controlled, and on what basis it will be monitored” (World Bank, 2009:239). 
Rich country governments want climate funding granted to poor countries, to be well targeted to 
climate mitigation and adaptation, achieving real and measurable reductions in emissions or 
vulnerability.  Donor countries would like to have oversight of these funds, “particularly in the current 
tight fiscal climate, where domestic constituencies may have little appetite for sending money 
overseas.  This is particularly true for mitigation finance.  Indeed, many high-income countries see 
public funds as playing a limited role in supporting climate financing in the developing world, instead 
envisioning that a greater proportion of funds be harnessed through market mechanisms” (World 
Bank, 2009:239). 
Developing countries would like climate finance to assist them to adjust to, and contribute to, the miti-
gation of a problem they did not create.  Not surprisingly, they do not see climate finance as aid and 
strongly resist any mechanisms of conditionality. 
Policy makers’ realisation that the international development finance system (illustrated in Figure 3.1) 
need to adapt to new challenges has radically changed the context of development finance over the 
last 20 years.  Adopted at the end of the century, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have 
renewed hope for progress on development and poverty reduction, while creating a focus and an 
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impetus for searching for new and additional sources of development finance.  World leaders agree 
that they need to revitalise efforts to help unlock and more effectively use all development resources 
including domestic savings, trade and investment receipts and official development assistance.  By 
treating aid as just one of several finance flows and calling for the private sector to become more 
involved in development, it “symbolised a shift in consciousness about international development 
finance.  Indeed, important new actors, including private households, foundations and non-
governmental organisations have joined bilateral and multilateral donors in financing development” 
(OECD, 2007:11).  There are two ways in which to make additional funding available for sustainability 
interventions – by reducing damaging flows and increasing positive flows. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 | International Development Finance System (Source: OECD, 2007:12) 
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3.3. REDUCING DAMAGING FLOWS 
 
3.3.1. SUBSIDIES 
One way to finance sustainability is “the redirection of existing financial flows that are both inimical to 
economic efficiency, narrowly construed, and to environmental progress” (Pearce, 2007:454).  This 
includes economic input, as well as, output subsidies.  A substantial literature has developed on these 
topics (for example van Beers and de Moor, 2001; Porter, 2002; OECD, 1996; and Milazzo, 1998). 
Essentially subsidies involve “deadweight losses of well-being regardless of any environmental 
effects.  Once the latter are brought into consideration, the scale of the combined inefficiency can be 
substantial” (Pearce, 2007:454).  In addition, subsidies often do not, contrary to initial expectations, 
benefit the poor.  Even where they are targeted at the poor, middle income groups tend to manipulate 
the subsidy system to their advantage.  “Subsidies create rents and hence a whole ‘industry’ emerges 
which seeks to capture the rents.  It is more likely that the powerful will capture the rents, further 
marginalising the poor” (Pearce, 2007:454). 
Subsidies in agriculture, energy, water and fisheries globally may amount to more than $1 trillion 
annually (Pearce, 2007:454), of which nearly 70% are in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) member countries 3 .  These subsidies can be seen as “highly damaging 
financial flows that finance non-sustainability” (Pearce, 2007:454).  Current annual subsidies are 
approximately seventeen times the annual flow of official development aid. 
Those seeking finance for sustainable development should target subsidies since, some would argue, 
they damage rich country environments as well as the growth potential of developing countries by 
restricting or denying access to markets.  At the same time, subsidies in developing countries often 
take up a significant percentage of public expenditure, further inhibiting the provision of public goods. 
                                                     
3
 Thirty countries described as liberal democracies accepting the principles of a free-market economy.  Most 
OECD members are high-income economies and are regarded as ‘developed.’ 
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But how realistic is it to expect diversion of existing subsidies into projects and policies consistent with 
sustainability?  Removing subsidies involves losers who have a vested interest in the subsidy regime 
continuing or even expanding.  Since they are probably groups with the “power to capture the rents 
arising from subsidy regimes, it follows that removing subsidies is far from easy” (Pearce, 2007:455). 
 
3.3.2. DEBT REPAYMENTS 
A second source of negative financial flows for developing countries, and one in which there have 
been some progress over the last decade, is debt repayment.  The positive impact thereof on 
development is primarily two-fold.  First, debt repayments are made from the exchequer with funds 
that should have been used for the provision of public goods in the indebted country, hence 
investment suffers.  Second, debt has to be repaid in hard currencies4, forcing the indebted country to 
earn foreign exchange to repay its debt.  The options for poor countries to earn foreign exchange are 
limited, thus often forcing it to exploit and export natural resources in an unsustainable manner. 
In addition to bilateral debt relief efforts, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
administers a programme – the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative – providing debt 
relief and low-interest loans to service external loans.  A group of 40 countries qualified for the HIPC 
programme (see figure 3.2 for details).  “The Joint IMF-World Bank's comprehensive approach to debt 
reduction is designed to ensure that no poor country faces a debt burden it cannot manage.  To date, 
debt reduction packages under the HIPC Initiative have been approved for 35 countries, 29 of them in 
Africa, providing $51 billion in debt-service relief over time.  Five additional countries are potentially 
eligible for HIPC Initiative assistance” (IMF, 2009(a):unnumbered). 
                                                     
4
 A globally traded currency that can serve as a reliable and stable store of value, including the US dollar, euro, 
Swiss franc, British pound sterling, Norwegian kroner, Swedish krona, Canadian dollar, Japanese yen and the 
Australian dollar. 
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Figure 3.2 | Countries Participating in the HIPC Programme (Source: Wikipedia, 
2009(b):unnumbered) (Legend: Black - full relief, brown - partial relief, green - eligible, but do not meet 
necessary requirements) 
 
In addition to the HIPC the IMF initiated a second programme - the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative 
(MDRI) – which “provides for 100 percent relief on eligible debt from three multilateral institutions to a 
group of low-income countries.  The initiative is intended to help them advance toward the United 
Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which are focused on halving poverty by 2015” 
(IMF, 2009(b):unnumbered).  To date $3.35 billion have been spent on the MDRI. 
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3.4. CREATING POSITIVE FLOWS 
 
3.4.1. OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT AID 
Official Development Aid (ODA) is a statistic compiled by the OECD to measure aid by the members 
of its Development Assistance Committee (DAC)5 and is widely used as an indicator of international 
aid flow.  Development aid remains essential in international development policy.  According to 
Radelet (2006:7), most development aid is designed to either stimulate economic growth, 
strengthen provision of social services and other public goods, support subsistence 
consumption of food and other commodities, or to help stabilise an economy following 
economic shocks. 
Although direct private investment flows, from rich countries to poor countries, are more than ODA 
flows, “(ODA) remains the dominant source of foreign investment in many of the poorest developing 
countries” (OECD, 2004:14).  Private investment will generally be guided by market rates of return, 
and therefore have their justification in terms of conventional commercial criteria.  Development aid 
flows are “directed at the provision of public goods and services.  These public goods are integral to 
sustainability, including as they do, infrastructure, water, education, health, power generation and the 
environment” (Pearce, 2007:456). 
Between 1960 and 2004, DAC countries gave nearly $650 billion in aid (2004 prices) to Sub-Saharan 
African countries (Sundberg & Gelb, 2006:1).  After declining throughout the 1990s, ODA has 
increased since the turn of the century.  The OECD reports an increase of aid to $119.8 billion in 
2008, its highest level ever (OECD, 2009:unnumbered).  This represents a real increase of 10.2% 
from the previous year.  Only five nations (see figure 3.4) exceed the United Nations’ target of 0.7% of 
                                                     
5
 The DAC is a forum for selected OECD member states to discuss issues surrounding aid, 
development and poverty reduction in developing countries. 
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their gross national income (GNI).  If the 0.7% target was met, ODA would increase flows to over 
$190 billion per year (in 2008 dollars) (Pearce, 2007:456). 
 
 
Figure 3.3 | ODA by DAC Countries in Absolute Terms (Source: OECD, 2009: unnumbered) 
 
Although aid is an important source of development funding, Collier (2007:99) argues that it is not 
enough.  Its use is often dysfunctional as a result of the politicised nature thereof.  Some on the left 
see aid as “some sort of reparations for colonialism” (Collier, 2007:100).  Instead of being a tool in the 
world’s development toolbox it is turned into “a statement about the guilt of Western society” (Collier, 
2007:100).  In this perspective, the only role for the poor is as victims.  
On the other hand, observers on the right seem to equate aid with “welfare scrounging. In other words 
it is rewarding the feckless and so accentuating the problem” (Collier, 2007:100).  Between these two 
extremes there is a “narrow sliver of sanity called aid for development” (Collier, 2007:100). 
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Figure 3.4 | ODA by DAC Countries as a Percentage of their Gross National Income (Source: 
OECD, 2009:unnumbered) 
 
Evidence seems to suggest that aid does tend to speed up the economic growth process.  Collier 
(2007:100) estimates that aid added around one percentage point to the annual growth rate of the 
poorest countries.  However, it does not follow that with an increase in aid, there would necessarily be 
a commensurate increase in the growth rate, since aid is subject to the rule of diminishing returns.  
Research by the Centre for Global Development seems to suggest that when aid reaches about 16% 
of GDP it more or less ceases to be effective (Radelet, 2006:8).  Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
were not far off from that level in 2005.  “We have broadly reached the limits to aid absorption, at least 
under current modalities” (Collier, 2007:100). 
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Table 3.1 | Top Ten African ODA Recipients ($ millions) 
  2002 2003 2004 3-year average % of all recipients 
1 Congo, D.R. 1,188 5,421 1,815 2,808 11 
2 Tanzania 1,233 1,704 1,746 1,561 6 
3 Ethiopia 1,307 1,553 1,823 1,561 6 
4 Mozambique 2,203 1,039 1,228 1,490 6 
5 Egypt 1,239 988 1,458 1,228 5 
6 Ghana 650 954 1,358 987 4 
7 Uganda 712 977 1,159 949 4 
8 Cameroon 657 900 762 773 3 
9 Zambia 641 581 1,081 768 3 
10 Madagascar 373 539 1,236 716 3 
 Other 11,340 12,125 15,415 12,960 50 
 Total Africa 21,540 26,781 29,080 25,800 100 
Source | OECD, 2007:27 
 
Along with the increase in aid, considerable attention has been given to enhancing the effectiveness 
thereof.  There seems to be general agreement “that aid may well be ineffective if it is not 
accompanied by ‘good’ policies” (Pearce, 2007:456).  Many donors including the World Bank and the 
United Kingdom “have progressively moved away from individual project funding to Sector Wide 
Approaches (SWAPs).  Here donors contribute to a pool of funding for a sector on the basis of a 
sector strategy plan.  This plan has to be agreed upon with the donors who often actively participate 
in developing it through their staff or funding consultancies” (Wallace, 2006:21).  However, once 
appropriate policies are in place “both the rate of return to those policies and the effectiveness of aid 
is increased” (Pearce, 2007:456). 
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Another way of enhancing effectiveness is through output-based aid (OBA).  The Global Partnership 
on Output-based Aid (2009:1) claims that “unlike traditional approaches, OBA links the payment of aid 
to the delivery of specific services or ‘outputs.’  These can include connection of poor households to 
electricity grids or water and sanitation systems, installation of solar heating systems, or delivery of 
basic healthcare services.”  The contracted service provider is responsible for ‘pre-financing’ a 
project, with aid only paid after the services or outputs have been delivered and verified by an 
independent agent. 
 
3.4.2. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
The contribution of foreign direct investment (FDI) to the development of poor countries is 
controversial.  FDI is seen as a major stimulus to economic growth, through the provision of capital, 
technical and marketing know-how.  Conversely it is argued that FDI does not aid but undermine the 
process of development through adverse effects on employment, income distribution, and national 
sovereignty and autonomy.  “FDI can also have adverse balance-of-payments if inputs need to be 
imported.  Foreign reserves can also diminish when profits are repatriated” (Musila & Sigué, 
2006:578). 
Generally three types of FDI can be distinguished - extractive, market seeking and export-oriented 
FDI.  Traditionally, Africa attracted extractive and market seeking FDI based on its natural resources 
and the nature of domestic markets.  Market-seeking FDI, however, can lead to “conflict between 
private benefits and social benefits, especially if such FDI is protected from competition” (Musila & 
Sigué, 2006:579).  Extractive FDI is likely to be “accompanied by high social costs in the form of 
exploitation of economic rent, negative externalities in the form of pollution, and the exacerbation of 
inequality through dualistic economic structures” (Musila & Sigué, 2006:579).  As a result, most 
developing countries seek to attract export-oriented FDI, which is thought to prevent conflict between 
investors’ private benefits and the social benefits to the country.  This preference leads to intensive 
competition among developing countries in attracting such investment and to “a convergence among 
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policy and promotional environments of these countries in pursuit of FDI” (Musila and Sigué, 
2006:579). 
FDI to Sub-Saharan Africa has grown four-fold in the past decade, reaching an average of $13 billion 
per annum.  As a percentage of GDP, the stock of FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa increased from 10.2% 
in 1980 to 29.4% in 2004 (World Bank, 2007:275).  Despite this growth it lags behind the rest of the 
developing world in attracting investment, accounting for just 1% of global flows, half the level in 1980.  
Despite these dismal statistics the OECD reports that “Sub-Saharan Africa attracts almost as much 
FDI as a share of GDP as do other developing regions” (OECD, 2007:24). 
Sub-Saharan Africa does not only attract – in absolute numbers - less FDI than other regions, but the 
type of FDI it attracts do not necessarily contribute to its sustainable development.  The primary 
sector, in particular the exploitation of mineral and petroleum resources, received the bulk of FDI to 
the region.  The twenty four countries in the region classified by the World Bank as oil- and mineral-
dependent have, on average, accounted for close to 75% of annual FDI flows over the past two 
decades (World Bank, 2007:276).  FDI inflows only recently began to diversify.  Resource-rich 
countries continued to receive the bulk of FDI, but the reach of FDI flows across Africa is broadening, 
rising in 40 of the 53 countries on the continent.  At the same time there has been “greater 
diversification of investment sectors with manufacturing, finance and tourism the key areas of 
concentration outside the resources sector” (OECD, 2007:32). 
A significant recent development has been the growth of South-South FDI, primarily from Asian 
countries investing in Africa.  Of these, China is the biggest investor on the continent.  South Africa 
has emerged as the second major source of investment, especially in the service and manufacturing 
industries. 
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3.4.3. REMITTANCES 
Remittances from private households received a lot of attention recently as a significant source of 
capital to poor countries.  Even though some argue that remittances cannot be considered 
development resources (OECD, 2007:15), the evidence suggests that remittances can: 
• “Reduce poverty, even where they appear to have little impact on measured inequality; 
• Help smooth household consumption by responding positively to adverse shocks (for 
example, crop failure, job loss, or a health crisis); 
• Ease working capital constraints on farms and small-scale entrepreneurs” (World Bank, 
2006:117). 
There is also growing evidence that remittances go partly to fund education, nutrition and health 
(Katseli, Lucas & Xenogiani, 2006:23 ; Cox & Ureta, 2003:23).  It is “an efficient, market-driven means 
of pushing money towards people who are hard-pressed.  Crucially cash is not channelled through 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil servants, who absorb (and waste) a big chunk of 
aid” (Economist, 2009(a):60). 
Despite significant discrepancies in the data, several surveys have shown that in some countries 
remittances account for 15% or more of GDP and can even be as high as 31%, as in the case of 
Tonga (World Bank, 2006:90).  “In six Sub-Saharan African countries - Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Lesotho, Mauritius, Swaziland, and Togo - remittances were higher than ODA flows.  In Lesotho, 
Mauritius, Swaziland, and Togo, remittances were also greater than foreign direct investment” (Ratha, 
Mohapatra & Plaza, 2009:154). 
Based on data from governments tracking cross-border flows of money from migrants, as part of their 
post-2001 anti-terrorist surveillance, the World Bank estimates the 2008 total at $328 billion in 
remittances (Economist, 2009(a):60).  These flows are shown in Figure 3.5. 
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Figure 3.5 | Remittance Flows per Region 2000 - 2010 (Source: Economist, 2009(a):60) 
 
3.4.4. COMPANIES AND FOUNDATIONS 
Although their contribution to international development is difficult to quantify, companies and 
foundations play an increasingly important role.  As an example of the size of private philanthropy, 
according to the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations, 
contributions from ten companies donating products to the Partnership for Quality Medical Donations 
amounted to $2.7 billion between 1998 and 2006 (OECD, 2007:15). 
Foundations have emerged as significant role-players in global development over the last few 
decades.  Of the many philanthropic organisations active in developing countries, the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation is perhaps the best known, having committed $20.5 billion in grants by June 2009 
(Gates Foundation, 2009:1).  In terms of funds spent abroad, the Ford Foundation is the largest 
American foundation involved in development (OECD, 2007:15). 
 
 
 
Page | 73  
Copyright ©2011 Stellenbosch University 
All rights reserved 
 
3.4.5. SPECIALIST FUNDS 
Specialist funds have been set up over recent years as public-private partnerships to spark action 
around specific global challenges such as health and education.  Their budgets are now considerable.  
In the education sector, the ‘Education for All Fast Track Initiative’ (EFA-FTI) focuses on achieving the 
education millennium development goal.  According to the EFA-FTI (2009:2) it received pledges worth 
$1.2 billion between 2003 and 2009.  The Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
(commonly known as ‘The Global Fund’) and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (‘The 
GAVI Alliance’) operate in the health sector.  Up to January 2009, the GAVI Alliance committed $2.6 
billion for various programmes globally (GAVI Alliance, 2009:2), while the Global Fund has committed 
$15.6 billion of which $8.538 billion has been disbursed (Global Fund, 2009:165). 
In the environmental sphere the Global Environment Facility (GEF) - a United Nations Agency – 
initially focused on biodiversity, climate change, ozone layer depletion and ‘international water’ – seas 
and lakes shared by two or more nations.  It soon took on the role of being the financing mechanism 
for the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the 
Stockholm Treaty on Persistent Organic Pollutants and the Convention to Combat Desertification. 
The GEF’s raison d’être is to assist mainly poor countries in “financing activities that would be of 
benefit to the global community but which the relevant countries do not undertake as part of their 
normal development activities.  Put another way, the GEF seeks to internalise the ‘global externality’ 
arising from development activity” (Pearce, 2007:459).  Over the last eighteen years the GEF invested 
$8 billion directly and leveraged an additional $33 billion in co-financing (GEF, 2009:1). 
Despite these large volumes, there is uncertainty about whether specialist funds have increased 
overall flows to poor countries since their funding is still largely composed of conventional bilateral 
and multilateral ODA.  “Private contributions to the Global Fund constituted only 3% of total pledges in 
2004, coming from foundations, multinational companies and private individuals” (OECD, 2007:15-
16). 
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3.5. SUGGESTED NEW SOURCES OF FINANCE 
 
3.5.1. GLOBAL TAXES 
A number of groups favour the creation of global taxes to fund development interventions, arguing 
that the world needs to finance “a global public good by imposing a tax on a global public ‘bad’ – such 
as hot-money movements, cross-boundary pollution or global arms sales” (OECD, 2007:71). 
“A tax on the consumption of goods that harm the environment has a positive allocation effect, 
switching spending away from polluting goods towards those causing less or no environmental 
damage.  In these circumstances, switching behaviour is desirable.  Moreover, if the revenue is used 
to reduce other taxes that have a negative allocation effect, we have a double dividend” (Atkinson, 
2003:15).  According to Atkinson this ‘double dividend’ can occur in two ways.  If revenue is used as 
an alternative for ODA, it has the potential for efficiency gains as well as a commensurate reduction in 
taxes used to finance ODA.  On the other hand, new revenue may be a net addition to development 
resources, which may lead to reduced environmental damage while enabling the attainment of stated 
development goals. 
A new tax stream works most effectively if it is easy to collect and difficult to evade.  “It should be 
neutral in its impact on market incentives and on income distribution unless it is deliberately designed 
to influence consumption or redistributive wealth.   Priority should go to taxes that discourage 
inappropriate consumption, excessive resource control, environmentally damaging activities and 
social inequities” (OECD, 2007:72). 
Normally national governments determine the nature and rates of taxation.  Taxpayers pay taxes to 
the government; sometimes taxes are collected by intermediaries.  Governments must enforce 
payment but then is accountable – at least in democracies - to the electorate for the way it uses tax 
revenue.  This complicates global taxation since the same principle – no taxation without 
representation - cannot be applied. 
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The question that demands answering is if new revenue sources can generate a positive sum 
outcome, why have national governments not already adopted this?  There may be several reasons 
for this.  A reason may be that the dividend is global rather than national, in which case “governments 
may not impose corrective taxes because the benefits accrue disproportionately outside their 
boundaries” (Atkinson, 2003:16).  Another reason may be due to the political economy of taxation and 
government finance.  The revenue calculations of governments take account only of receipts and 
payments to the national treasury.   
Proposals for global taxes have focussed on three possible types – environmental taxes, currency 
transaction taxes and global arms sales taxes. 
 
3.5.1.1. GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES 
Using a wide definition, the OECD describes environmental tax as “any compulsory payment to 
general government levied on a tax base deemed to be of particular environmental relevance” 
(OECD, 2007:73).  Agnar Sandmo (2005:5-6) argues that a system of global pollution taxes may 
spawn a ‘triple dividend’, by making a positive contribution to the global environment, by reducing the 
efficiency loss of financing public expenditure and by enhancing resources for global development. 
Taxes of this nature yielded an average of 2.5% of GDP in OECD member countries in 2000, the bulk 
of which originated from taxes on transport fuels (OECD, 2007:73).  If a uniform tax of more or less 
€0.01 per litre of fuel is charged, it may yield annual revenue of $130 billion. 
“Some pessimism concerning the political realism of introducing such taxes is justified.  Carbon taxes 
have also been opposed as allegedly regressive, hurting lower-income families” (OECD, 2007:73). 
 
3.5.1.2. CURRENCY TRANSACTION TAXES 
Some groups, in particular the ‘Stamp out Poverty’ coalition, promote the introduction of a so-called 
‘Tobin tax’ to raise revenue for global development.  Proposed by James Tobin in 1972 as a way to 
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overcome market volatility, it suggests penalising short-term speculation in global currency 
transactions by adding a surcharge to each transaction.  Its appeal lies in the fact that a very small tax 
rate (suggestions range from 0.01% to 1%) imposed on a large tax base - the foreign exchange 
market (average of $250 trillion per annum) – may yield sizable revenues. 
Tobin taxes are problematic, since it is “divorced from activities that contribute to non-sustainability.  
Currency transactions are either counterparts to real transactions which are likely already to attract an 
element of externality tax, or they are designed for arbitrage and a smooth functioning of financial 
markets.  There is no obvious link to activities detrimental to sustainability and hence no link to the 
polluter pays principle” (Pearce, 2007:457).  Essentially it is problematic to argue that foreign 
exchange transactions contribute to non-sustainability, while in fact the converse seems to be true, in 
which case ‘Tobin tax’ becomes “a tax on sustainable development, not a tax to deliver sustainability” 
(Pearce, 2007:457). 
It will also be difficult to prevent tax avoidance through the possible relocation of foreign-exchange 
markets to tax-free jurisdictions.  Relocation to tax havens could occur unless all jurisdictions with 
major market turnover adopted the tax.  Coordinated adoption will be difficult to achieve. 
 
3.5.1.3. GLOBAL TAXES ON ARMS SALES 
Global arms sales reached $1.3 trillion in 2007 (Erwin, 2008:1).  Sales taxes could therefore 
potentially make a significant contribution to development.  A major limitation is that “the legal and 
documented arms trade is tax-elastic” (OECD, 2007:76).  In addition there is a “high risk that taxation 
of documented trade would stimulate illicit trade” (OECD, 2007:76).  This effect is illustrated in the 
results of arms trade embargoes against several countries.  “A UN report on arms transfers to 
embargoed Liberia during the summer of 2002 demonstrates the depth and comprehensiveness of 
lawbreaking” (OECD, 2007:76). 
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3.5.2. GLOBAL LOTTERY 
Various proposals to establish a global lottery to fund development interventions have been around 
since the early 1970s.  According to McQueen (2008:1), the total size of world lottery sales was $230 
billion in 2007.  The amount potentially available for global development interventions would be 
dependent on the total generated by new lottery operators and their rate of success in capturing 
spend from existing lotteries.  In typical lotteries operated in the United States, 50% of earnings are 
distributed to winning players, 20% to administration and 30% to beneficiaries.  If the same 
distribution profile is retained for global lotteries, a substantial amount could be generated for 
development projects.   
There are several concerns around the establishment of global lotteries.  They “may face political 
opposition if they are seen to take money away from national charities” (OECD, 2007:78).  Also, since 
low-income groups tend to spend proportionally more of their income on gambling than higher-income 
groups, global lotteries may be regressive. 
 
3.5.3. GLOBAL PREMIUM BONDS 
A global premium savings bond, based on similar schemes operating in Bangladesh, Ireland and the 
United Kingdom, has been suggested as a new source of development finance.  “A premium bond is 
like a lottery ticket in that the return depends on a random prize draw, but otherwise it is a bond, 
hence a savings instrument where the capital is not at risk” (OECD, 2007:78).  Savings bonds in the 
United Kingdom each has a unique number which is entered in a monthly prize draw.  Investors never 
lose their initial investment, although the return on that investment depends on luck.  Annual premium 
bond sales presently run at £35 billion in the United Kingdom (National Savings and Investment, 
2009:33). 
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3.5.4. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE FACILITY 
The International Finance Facility (IFF), a temporary funding mechanism proposed by the United 
Kingdom, intends to generate additional resources to close the funding gap for the Millennium 
Development Goals.  It will be based on “long-term donor commitments comprising a series of 
pledges (each lasting 15 years) for a flow of annual payments to the IFF.  Annual commitments would 
start from the $15-16 billion of aggregate Monterrey and post-Monterrey additional sums pledged and 
would rise by 4% (in real terms) per year” (OECD, 2007:81).  Pledges would serve as security against 
which the IFF would issue bonds.  “For prudential reasons, therefore, the IFF will have to limit the 
degree to which the donor commitments may be levered; at each disbursement, the Facility will 
allocate to it a fixed proportion of the donor commitment, taking into account the prevailing cost of 
long-term debt for the IFF in the donor country’s currency and the leverage limit” (OECD, 2007:81).  
Funds will be quickly disbursed as grants rather than loans using existing aid delivery channels acting 
as agents of the IFF.  Grants would be provided exclusively to low-income countries. 
Despite being a concrete proposal offering the possibility of doubling existing ODA, there are some 
mortal weaknesses which make it difficult to realise.  Its requirement for political coordination amongst 
donor countries may be unrealistic.  The Facility is based on the assumption that donors will be 
committed to it over a period of 30 years.  With “growing pension and social security burdens in 
ageing OECD countries ... the opportunity cost of aid will rise in most donor countries; hence, a 
continuous commitment towards the IFF might be difficult to sustain” (OECD, 2007:82). 
 
3.5.5. SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS 
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) are “a form of money that the International Monetary Fund’s Board of 
Governors can create by crediting accounts of the Fund’s member states at an exchange rate 
determined by a basket of major currencies.  Countries that run current-account deficits can transfer 
their SDRs to surplus countries, and the latter must provide them with convertible currencies in 
exchange” (OECD, 2007:82).  The idea of issuing SDRs for development has been around since the 
1970s, but has never been tried. 
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SDRs can be issued for “investment in ‘global public goods’ such as health initiatives and 
humanitarian assistance.  Today, with trillions of dollars sloshing around the world bailing out the 
financial sector and ailing industries, it is time to direct a portion of this money to create ‘green gold’ to 
help finance a global war on climate change” (Smith, 2009:unnumbered). 
Recent proposals focus on developed countries creating new SDRs which would be deposited into 
trust funds.  Trustees would identify a portfolio of projects with global or regional benefits from which 
donors would select those they wish to support.  Donor countries would charge their public budgets to 
convert the SDRs to hard currency.  This would require a change in the Articles of Agreement of the 
IMF, requiring ratification by 100 member countries with 85% of the voting power.  This has so far 
never happened. 
 
3.5.6. PUBLIC GUARANTEES 
Winpenny (2003:16) argued that ODA should not be used to replace or discourage private 
investments flows, but should rather enable and facilitate it.  Grants in aid have the potential to ‘crowd 
out’ other forms of financing.  To avoid this, public guarantees may be “the better instrument to 
mobilise other flows and empower local players” (Winpenny, 2003:18). 
During 2003 the World Panel on Financing Water Infrastructure - through the Camdessus Report - 
emphasised the importance of public guarantees to stimulate private investment in infrastructure.  
Investments in infrastructure are characterised by “high capital intensity, long gestation periods and, 
where they are ODA financed, front-loading.  The inherent sovereign risks are not covered by 
commercial banks, at least not for long maturities in the poorest countries” (OECD, 2007:83).   
Public guarantees could stimulate risk taking in high-risk environments, in which case steps must be 
taken to prevent excessive risk taking.  Public guarantees may leverage the use of savings in projects 
with potentially high social returns and foster a sense of ownership in the recipient communities and 
countries.  Care must be taken to avoid political interference by rent seeking elites, “unsustainable 
debt burdens and misallocated resources” (OECD, 2007:85). 
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3.5.7. PAYMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES 
The creation of markets in current non-market goods and services, generate a flow of finance that 
mimics the financial flows for market goods.  Since these goods and services will have significant 
public good characteristics, those paying for it will probably be governments or organisations with 
altruistic goals.  An example of this is ‘debt-for-nature’ swaps (DfNSs) initiated in the late 1980s.  
Normally an investor purchases secondary international debt denominated in hard currencies and 
then offer to cancel or convert it in exchange for a desired outcome.  Even though swaps are mainly 
linked to environmental products or services, some involve health, education or other social initiatives.  
Despite the loss of sovereignty of resources, swaps are attractive to indebted countries since it 
reduces foreign exchange commitments.  They are also appealing to investors since it typically 
involves modest costs for potentially large scale benefits.  At the same time it provides donor 
governments – under pressure to forgive debts – with the opportunity to cancel debts with generally 
benevolent consequences. 
Swaps are limited to commercial and official bilateral debt and exclude multilateral debt.  Bilateral 
debt deals tend to operate through the Paris Club; a group of bilateral lenders dedicated to reducing 
and converting debt that threatens poor country development.  The Paris Club agreed to allow “a 
considerable portion of international debt to be dealt with via debt-for-development swaps.  In the 
event, only a limited number of creditor countries have operated such schemes” (Pearce, 2007:458). 
 
3.6. CONCLUSION 
It is clear from this discussion that the current sources of development finance are inadequate when 
compared with the massive amounts needed for sustainable development interventions in both rich 
and poor countries.  Realising this, world leaders have floated some interesting proposals focussing 
on securing new sources of finance.  Some of these could make a significant contribution. 
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The main obstacle seems to be political will to make it work.  Unprecedented levels of public debt as a 
result of the 2007 - 2009 credit crises, combined with the demographic transition in rich countries with 
aging and shrinking populations, may lead to most donor countries reducing development finance 
flows to poor countries.  Market mechanisms, already favoured by donor countries, may prove to be a 
solution.  Experience gained from carbon markets over the last decade may point the way.  Chapter 4 
will review this closer 
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CHAPTER 4 | CARBON TRADING 
 
 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Carbon finance, a relatively recent development, is viewed by some as an innovative market-creating 
tool to achieve sustainability.  It can be seen “as a form of an output-based aid approach to mitigating 
climate change” (Bishop & Johannes, 2006:1), intended to help project sponsors close the financing 
gap between emissions-efficient projects and conventional ones. 
In theory markets for emissions reduction are a cost-effective means of creating an incentive to 
achieve two important things.  On the one hand it creates a demand for new technologies, which is “of 
the utmost importance for sustainability since it provides the means of improving human well-being 
without depleting natural resources at unacceptable rates” (Pearce & Barbier, 2003:178-179).  At the 
same time it is “putting a price on pollution and thereby providing incentives for people to emit less” 
(Bayon, Hawn & Hamilton, 2007:3). 
Carbon markets are able to do this by channelling resources toward the most cost effective ways of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions; monetarily punishing entities that emit more than their quota and 
rewarding those who emit less.  This encourages entities to emit less, changing the economics of new 
emissions-efficient technologies, making them more competitive vis-a-vis emissions inefficient ones.  
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Since carbon is central to the functioning of the global economy, “decarbonising the economy was not 
going to be easy.  It was extremely unlikely that it would happen with the traditional regulatory 
policies” (Pearce & Barbier, 2003:174).  Carbon markets offer the possibility of achieving this. 
 
4.2. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT 
The intellectual origins of carbon trading can be found in the work of the Canadian economist John 
Dales.  He built on the work of his contemporary Garret Hardin, who argued that “natural resources in 
their unrestricted common property form would face tragic overexploitation by people acting in their 
rational self-interest” (Hardin, 1968:1245).  Dales proposed to control pollution by “setting a total 
quota of allowable waste for each waterway and then set up a ‘market’ in equivalent ‘pollution rights’ 
to firms to discharge pollution rights up to this level” (Dales, 1968:81).  “These rights, referred to as 
‘transferable property rights... for the disposal of wastes’ would be sold to firms which could then trade 
them amongst themselves” (Dales, 1968:85).   
Dales’ ideas resurfaced in the 1980s with the initiation of voluntary carbon offset projects in the United 
States.  These voluntary markets originated in the desire of conservation organisations to find new 
ways of financing their projects (Hamilton et al, 2007:10).  A basic argument was that “in order to save 
the world’s forests, society needed to value standing forests at least as highly as it values soy beans, 
cattle ranches, logging operations, and the other alternatives driving deforestation. As the saying 
goes, in the end we will protect what we value” (Bayon et al, 2007:xviii).  The first of its kind involved 
Applied Energy Services investing in a carbon sequestration project in Guatemala.  Since there were 
no regulatory requirement for emissions offsets the motivation was “primarily (promoting a) good 
corporate image and learning how the market would operate” (Pearce, 2007:462).     
Following these early pioneering projects, the United States Congress passed the Clean Air Act in 
1990, creating a national emissions-trading scheme in sulphur dioxide (SO2) (Bond, Dada & Erion, 
2007:14).  This highly successful trading scheme aims to reduce acid rain through capping SO2 
emissions by electric power plants.  Those finding it too expensive to reduce their own emissions are 
permitted to purchase allowances from plants that make extraordinary cuts at lower cost.  The 
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programme is very successful with emissions reducing faster than required at costs far below most 
forecasts.  According to the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX, 2008:unnumbered) registered traded 
values reached approximately $2 billion annually with an additional $2 billion a year in SO2 allowance 
derivatives such as options, forwards and other unregistered trades. 
Until 1997, the United States was the only country with any significant pollution trading scheme.  This 
changed following the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol.  Even though carbon trading was initially met 
with hostility from some European countries and environmental NGOs during the third Conference of 
the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 
Kyoto, it was eventually adopted and appears in three separate articles of the final text of the 
Protocol.   
 
4.3. THEORY OF CARBON MARKETS 
“Greenhouse gasses are, in economic terms, an externality: those who produce greenhouse-gas 
emissions are bringing about climate change, thereby imposing costs on the world and on future 
generations, but they do not face the full consequences of their actions themselves” (Stern, 2006:xvii).  
The economic problem is “untaxed and or unpriced emissions of greenhouse gasses.  The externality 
requires a price for emissions: that is the first task of mitigation policy” (Stern, 2006:35).  Putting an 
appropriate price on carbon explicitly through tax or trading, or implicitly through regulation, means 
that polluters are faced with the full social cost6 of their actions.  Bearing the cost of pollution, polluters 
will have an incentive to switch away from high-carbon goods and services, and to invest in low-
carbon alternatives. 
Carbon trading is based on the work of Dales on transferable property rights for the disposal of 
wastes.  The theory supporting what Perman (2003:224) called ‘marketable permits’, Tietenberg 
(2001:255) called ‘transferrable emissions permits’, and what Field and Field (2002:257) referred to 
as ‘transferable discharge permits’ is that “a cost effective means of internalisation of externalities 
                                                     
6
 Total damage of emitting greenhouse gasses 
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such as CO2 emissions can be achieved through a market system of certificates trading” (Silayan, 
2005:3).  Pollution rights represented by ‘certificates’, can be bought and sold at market prices 
amongst market participants who are also polluters themselves.  Market forces will ensure that cost 
efficient emissions reductions will be achieved. 
Permits or certificates representing pollution rights may be viewed as a newly created property right 
giving holders or owners the permission to discharge specified pollutants (Field & Field, 2002:257).  
Thus, in the same way as no one may build a structure on a piece of land without the necessary 
permission, permits or land titles, no one may emit pollution without discharge certificates. 
In addition, polluters who discharge more than their allowed amount will have to pay a fine for the 
additional emissions.  The total amount of emissions allowed should be less than the total emissions 
emitted in a market, thus creating a shortage, which forces efficiency in the market.  The shortage of 
allowances compels the market to create efficient ways and means to reduce emissions and comply 
with the amount allowed. 
It may be possible for a country to reduce its emissions using a Command-Control approach with 
regulation, direct and indirect taxes.  Emission taxes are a price instrument - it fixes the price while the 
emission level is allowed to vary according to economic activity.  A major drawback of emission taxes 
is that the environmental outcome (i.e. the amount of emissions) is not guaranteed.  A price 
instrument may cost the economy more to reduce the same amount of pollution compared to using 
emissions trading - a quantity instrument. 
“Economic efficiency points to the advantages of a common global carbon price: emissions reductions 
will then take place wherever they are the cheapest” (Stern, 2006:xvii).  The cost difference is the 
result of the different marginal abatement costs (MAC) for taking action in different countries.  The 
marginal abatement cost refers to the costs incurred in reducing a unit of greenhouse gas emissions.  
Taking advantage of the difference in the MAC between different countries and installations is the 
principle behind the international emissions trading markets. 
The overall goal of an emissions trading plan is to reduce emission, by directing resources towards 
the most cost effective means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, while punishing those emitting 
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more than an established quota and rewarding those emitting less.  Because it uses markets to 
determine how to deal with the problem of pollution, it is often touted as an example of effective free 
market environmentalism. 
The textbook emissions trading programme can be called a ‘cap and trade’ approach in which an 
aggregate cap on all sources is established and these sources are then allowed to trade amongst 
themselves to determine which sources actually emit the total pollution load.  While the cap is usually 
set by a political process, individual companies are free to choose how or if they will reduce their 
emissions.  In theory, firms will choose the least-cost way to comply with the pollution regulation, 
creating incentives that reduce the cost of achieving a pollution reduction goal. 
An emissions cap and permit trading system is a quantity instrument; it fixes the overall emission level 
(quantity) and allows the price to vary.  An alternative quantity approach is a baseline and credit 
programme, in which polluters not under an aggregate cap can create credits by reducing their 
emissions below a baseline level of emissions as applied in the Clean Development Mechanism, 
where each project must declare a ‘baseline’ used for future crediting of emissions reductions.  The 
baseline is calculated at business-as-usual.  Any savings on emissions below the baseline for a 
specified period, receives credits for the reduced emissions.  These credits can be purchased by 
polluters that are under a regulatory limit. 
One problem with quantity instruments is the uncertainty of the cost of compliance as the price of a 
permit is not known in advance and will vary over time according to market conditions.  This price 
instability and unpredictability can be resolved, to some degree, by the creation of forward markets7 in 
caps. 
Nevertheless, it is easier to make a tax predictable than the price of a cap.  The problem of passing 
quota rents to businesses is a political one which may be avoided by auctioning permits instead of 
giving them away.  Governments often are compelled to give permits away in order to make these 
schemes politically acceptable. 
                                                     
7
 A forward market is an over-the-counter financial market in contracts for future delivery. 
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As a result of the high uncertainty in the compliance costs of firms under a quantity instrument, some 
argue that the optimum choice is the price mechanism. However, scientists warn of a threshold in 
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide beyond which a run-away warming effect could take 
place, with a large possibility of causing irreversible damages.  As a result, a quantity instrument is 
the better option; the quantity of emissions may be capped with a higher degree of certainty. 
A third option is to combine the price and quantity instruments, creating a system which is essentially 
an emission cap and trade system, but where the price of permits is only allowed within a prescribed 
band.  Polluters may purchase emissions permits either in the marketplace, or from the government at 
a specific trigger price, which can be adjusted over time.  The system is sometimes recommended as 
a way of overcoming the fundamental disadvantages of the price and quantity systems by “giving 
governments the flexibility to adjust the system as new information comes to light.  It can be shown 
that by setting the trigger price high enough, or the number of permits low enough, the safety valve 
can be used to mimic either a pure quantity or pure price mechanism” (Pizer, 2002:411). 
All three of these instruments are currently in use as policy instruments in controlling greenhouse gas 
emissions.  The European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) is a good example of a 
quantity system.  The United Kingdom's Climate Change Levy is a price instrument employing a direct 
carbon tax.  China uses the carbon market to fund its Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
projects, but imposes a safety valve of a minimum price per tonne of CO2e. 
 
4.4. WHAT IS CARBON TRADING? 
Carbon trading refers to the process of “buying and selling of emissions permits that have been either 
distributed by a regulatory body or generated by greenhouse gas emission reduction projects” (Bayon 
et al, 2007:4).  Thus an “entity buys an emissions credit or allowance for a given amount of (carbon 
dioxide equivalent) CO2e from another entity in order to meet its target quantity of emissions.  This 
target may be set voluntarily or through a regulatory regime” (Taiyab, 2006:4).  In addition to carbon 
dioxide (CO2), five gasses contributing to the greenhouse effect (listed in table 3) are recognised 
under the Kyoto Protocol and generally traded.  This is based on a schedule developed by the 
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) determining “the global warming potential (GWP) 
of each gas in terms of its equivalent in tons of CO2 over the course of 100 years” (Bayon et al, 
2007:4). 
 
Table 4.1 | Greenhouse Gasses 
Gas  Global Warming Potential (GWP) 
Carbon Dioxide CO2 1 
Methane CH4 23 
Nitrous Oxide N20 296 
Hydrofluorocarbons HFCs 1,300 
Perfluorocarbons PFCs 5,600 
Sulphur Hexafluoride SF 22,200 
Source | Adapted from Bayon et al, 2007:4-5 
 
Greenhouse gas emissions reductions are traded in carbon credits.  Each carbon credit represents 
the reduction of GHGs equal to one metric ton of carbon dioxide (tCO2e), the most common 
greenhouse gas.  Payment can range from cash, equity and debt to the sharing of technologies to 
abate greenhouse gas emissions. 
Carbon markets enable the trading of greenhouse gas emissions “across temporal as well as 
geographic boundaries” (Bayon et al, 2007:4).  It also allows third-party players to get involved by 
taking on market risks in exchange for possible paybacks.  Greenhouse gas emissions reductions 
credits may be accrued through two different types of transactions – allowance-based transactions 
and project-based transactions. 
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4.4.1. ALLOWANCE-BASED TRANSACTIONS 
Allowance-based transactions involve “the trading of issued allowances created and allocated by 
regulators under a cap-and-trade regime” (Bayon et al, 2007:5).  The regulatory authority “caps the 
quantity of CO2e that each participant is permitted to emit and issues tradable allowance units 
equivalent to the size of the individual caps” (Taiyab, 2005:4). 
Participants must reduce their emissions internally to comply with the cap.  Those who can 
successfully reduce their emissions beyond the required levels are allowed to trade with other 
participants any unused allowances at a price acceptable to the market.  “Participants are free to buy 
and sell their allowances such that at the end of the compliance period, each participant holds a 
quantity of allowances equivalent to their actual emissions.  This trading activity creates a ‘carbon 
market’” (Taiyab, 2006:5). 
 
4.4.2. PROJECT-BASED TRANSACTIONS 
Carbon credits can be created through carbon offset projects, which cancel out greenhouse gas 
emissions by either avoiding emissions or by sequestering existing greenhouse gasses (Taiyab, 
2005:5).  Project-based transactions allow buyers to acquire credits from projects demonstrating 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions (Capoor & Ambrosi, 2007:8).  On issuing, project-based credits 
are essentially the same as allowances and can be traded on the carbon market in the same way as 
allowances.  The main difference is that “project-based credits are compliance assets that need to be 
‘created’ through a process that has certain risks inherent with it (regulation, project development and 
performance, for instance) and can involve significantly higher transaction costs” (Capoor & Ambrosi, 
2007:8). 
The emissions-efficiency of a project is measured by calculating a clear and credible baseline of 
projected greenhouse gas emissions in the absence of the project.  The difference between the 
baseline emissions (Be) and the carbon emissions (Ce) with the offset project, equal the volume of 
carbon credits (TV) available for trading (Be – Ce = TV).  Offset projects undergo a verification 
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process, proving the realisation of claimed emissions reductions, normally by an accredited 
independent third party. 
 
4.5. ADDITIONALITY 
The defining characteristic of carbon offsets is the additionality rule.  Additionality requires that “the 
emissions reductions must be additional to those that would have otherwise occurred under a 
business-as-usual scenario” (Taiyab, 2006:3).  It is “the most fundamental − and contentious − issue 
in the carbon offset market.  In theory, additionality answers a very simple question: Would the activity 
have occurred, holding all else constant, if the activity were not implemented as an offset project?  Or 
more simply: Would the project have happened anyway?  If the answer to that question is yes, the 
project is not additional” (Kollmuss, 2008:15).  If an offset project is not ‘additional’, payment for any 
credits generated in effect becomes a subsidy for an activity that would have happened anyway.  It is 
therefore critical to the environmental integrity of project-based schemes, “...as loose additionality 
requirements could result in a host of projects receiving carbon financing without actually reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere” (Taiyab, 2006:4). 
Additionality is very difficult to determine in practice.  Project based additionality testing evaluates 
individual projects on a case by case basis.  A number of ways have been developed to demonstrate 
additionality.  These include a: 
• Legal and regulatory test.  A basic test of additionality is to determine whether the 
project is implemented to fulfil official policies, regulations, or industry standards.  “If the 
project goes beyond compliance (‘regulatory surplus’), it may be additional” (Kollmuss, 
2008:15). 
• Investment test.  The most common test of additionality is investigating the economic 
viability of the project without carbon finance.  Therefore “the revenue from the carbon offsets 
must be a decisive reason for implementing a project” (Kollmuss, 2008:15). 
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• Barriers test.  This test considers implementation and institutional barriers such as lack of 
capacity.  “If a project is successful in surmounting significant non-financial barriers that the 
business-as-usual alternative would not have had to face, the project is considered additional” 
(Kollmuss, 2008:15). 
• Common practice test.  Where a project employs commonly used technologies, it may 
not be considered additional, since carbon offset benefits may not be a decisive issue in 
project viability.   
The main problem with additionality testing is the subjective nature thereof.  A project developer may 
claim that a project’s internal rate of return is too low without a carbon revenue stream, making the 
project unviable.  Since the project developer determines the level of an acceptable internal rate of 
return it is easy to question the validity of the additionality demonstration.  The only way to test the 
additionality claims will be through unhindered “access to internal company information relating to the 
financing of the project, yet this information is in most cases confidential” (Kollmuss, 2008:16). 
 
4.6. CARBON MARKETS 
Carbon markets can be segmented in a number of different ways; the most common is to differentiate 
between compliance and voluntary markets.  Compliance markets are “large, well-funded, and 
followed by dozens of media outlets, hundreds of traders, and countless businesses” (Hamilton et al, 
2007:10).  Most compliance markets are somehow underpinned by the Kyoto Protocol.  Voluntary 
markets, even though a lot older are much smaller and much more flexible. 
There is also a growing retail carbon segment that sells emission reductions to individuals and 
companies seeking to offset their own carbon footprints.  “Reports of increased interest of banks, 
credit cards issuers, private equity funds and others in this segment suggest that it could grow 
exponentially if only there were a credible, voluntary standard for such assets” (Capoor & Ambrosi, 
2007:9). 
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4.7. CRITIQUE 
It is widely recognised that the Kyoto Protocol was a first attempt to deal rationally with an extremely 
complex problem.  It would therefore be strange if it did not encounter difficulties.  Yet the regime has 
been criticised harshly. 
“However, attitudes to the use of market mechanisms in general are mixed, and these debates apply 
not just to the compliance market but to the voluntary sector as well. Some far-sighted concerns 
revolve around the carbon market support of the wider project of neo-liberalism, with its devotion to 
market forces, the self-regulating market and the requisite commoditisation of nature” (Harris, 
2007:26).  These critics argue that rather than solving anything, assigning property rights using 
market mechanisms, actually provides participants with a right to pollute, contributing to increased 
corporate power.  This permits the rich to “buy their way out of their obligations, sanctioning their 
wasteful lifestyles” (Harris, 2007:26). 
Critique of carbon trading tends to focus on the following issues: 
 
4.7.1. EMISSIONS TARGETS 
“As every government strives to minimize the restraints upon the lives of its citizens, international 
climate negotiations have so far been detached from what the science is saying” (Monbiot, 2006:48).  
Reductions agreed under the Kyoto Protocol – averaging 5.2 % on 1990 levels by 2012 – bear no 
relationship to the reductions required to begin addressing the problem of climate disruption.  “Guy 
Brasseur, head of the Hamburg-based Max Planck Institute for Meteorology, told the European 
Parliament in November of 2005, ‘Kyoto won’t be enough.  Emissions need to fall by 80% or 90%, 
rather than 5 or 10%’” (Bayon et al, 2007:10). 
“Stabilising at or below 550ppm CO2e would require global emissions to peak in the next 10 – 20 
years, and then fall at a rate of at least 1 – 3% per year.  By 2050, global emissions would need to be 
around 25% below current levels.  These cuts will have to be made in the context of a world economy 
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in 2050 that may be 3 – 4 times larger than today – so emissions per unit of GDP would need to be 
just one quarter of current levels by 2050” (Stern, 2006:xi). 
Instead of agreeing on an international target for annual emissions to begin adequately addressing 
the problem, the current system perpetuates global inequity by linking a “country’s entitlement to 
pollute to the amount of pollution it already produces.  The dirtier you are, the bigger your entitlement” 
(Monbiot, 2006:48).  This creates “one of the largest and most regressive schemes for creating 
property rights in history” (Bond et al, 2007:5).  A far more equitable way of allocating pollution rights 
would be to award rights equally on a per capita basis globally,  and then to allow trading between 
countries to enable those who are more emissions intensive to meet their obligations. 
Although serious, these weaknesses cannot be blamed on carbon markets.  The market does not set 
the level of a cap, policy-makers do.  The market can only be a tool to accomplish the goal. 
 
4.7.2. MARKET INTEGRITY 
Market integrity depends on the clarity and simplicity of its rules, the transparency of information and 
on institutions that guard against fraud and manipulation.  While the regulated markets to a certain 
extent attempt to address these concerns, the voluntary market is vulnerable to such criticism.   
Questioning the integrity of markets, some critics accuse carbon markets of allowing companies to 
“‘greenwash’ previously tarnished environmental reputations without changing their behaviour in 
important ways.  Carbon offsets are based on fictitious carbon accounting, and can by themselves not 
make a company carbon neutral” (Bayon et al, 2007:4).  Nick Davies, in an article published in the 
British newspaper The Guardian (16 June 2007), described carbon offsets as “an imaginary 
commodity created by deducting what you hope happens from what you guess would have 
happened.”   
Land-use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) projects have drawn much of the attention from 
critics questioning the integrity of carbon offsets.  Since fossilised carbon and biological carbon 
originate from different pools, claims of reducing the climate impact of “the release of fossil carbon 
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with increased storage of biological carbon is unsubstantiated.  On this basis alone, tree planting 
offset claims are misleading and it should be unacceptable to treat credits from tree planting offset 
projects as equivalent to fossil carbon releases” (FERN, 2007:3). 
Forestation projects provide considerable measurement and accounting challenges based on limited 
insight into terrestrial carbon cycling.  “As a result mathematical formulae used to calculate carbon 
values in tree planting offset projects make widespread use of default values which may or may not 
reflect the true nature and volume of carbon interactions triggered by a tree planting offset project. In 
fact, the gaps are so significant that accounting for the true fluxes of carbon in complex ecosystems 
like forests and over long periods of time is not possible today” (FERN, 2007:3).   
A steady stream of research confirms this.  For example Schiermeier (2006:128) reported that “the 
planet’s plant-life was responsible for far greater methane emissions than had previously been 
anticipated.”  Methane, being a potent greenhouse gas, contributes significantly to climate change.  
This contradicts calculations about the net climate benefit of biomass.  It is not possible to reasonably 
claim to have swapped fossilised carbon for biological carbon. 
Critique on the quality of offsets is particularly important to the voluntary market, being criticised for 
false claims about emissions reductions.  Much of this is attributable to the lack of regulated 
standards negatively impacting credibility and producing inconsistent quality.  The basic problem is 
that with more regulation costs rise, but the less “you regulate, the greater the openings for chancers 
who claim that they are generating offsets from any old nonsensical scheme” (Smith, 
2008(a):unnumbered). 
In addition the market is characterised by “fragmentation and a lack of widely available impartial 
information.  The fragmented and opaque nature of the voluntary market can, in large part, be 
attributed to the fact that it is partially composed of deals that are negotiated on a case-by-case basis, 
and that many of these deals neither require the carbon credits to undergo a uniform certification or 
verification process nor register them with any central body” (Bayon et al, 2007:12).  This situation 
leads some environmentalists to allege that the voluntary market is a “game of smoke and mirrors 
rather than an engine of actual environmental progress” (Bayon et al, 2007:12).   
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The lack of transparency in the voluntary offset market leaves the door wide open for fraudulent 
accounting practices and unsubstantiated claims.  Consumers report to feel concerned about the fact 
that projects often carry the real risk of non-delivery.  “Most offset companies issue legal disclaimers 
absolving them legally from responsibility for their project partner’s inability to implement projects in 
such a way that the carbon savings/extra carbon storage is ensured” (FERN, 2007:5). 
Stern argues that “establishing credibility takes time.  The next 10 to 20 years will be a period of 
transition, from a world where carbon-pricing schemes are in their infancy, to one where carbon 
pricing is universal and is automatically factored into decision making” (2006:xix). 
 
4.7.3. ADDITIONALITY 
Many critics have focused on the question whether the Kyoto Protocol, and specifically the CDM 
regime, is providing actual climatic benefits.  One of the thorniest problems with this is the 
additionality requirement.  If the additionality rule is not met and a project that was going to happen 
anyway is used to justify emissions elsewhere, it can result in a net increase in atmospheric carbon. 
In order to trade carbon credits, project developers must prove that in the absence of the project, 
more greenhouse gasses would be emitted into the atmosphere.  Therefore, project developers 
calculate the volume of tradable credits as the difference between ‘business-as-usual’ emissions and 
the emissions in the presence of the offset project.  This is done by theorizing on what would have 
happened without the offset project.  “Every carbon offset project does not only pretend to know the 
answer to this unanswerable question – they pretend to be able to give an exact figure.  This figure 
will determine how many carbon credits the project can sell as saving over ‘what would have 
happened otherwise’ and evidence is plentiful of projects inflating this baseline figure in order to 
maximise the volume of credits the project will be entitled to sell” (FERN, 2007:6).  Even though 
mathematical formulas developed to determine this figure may limit the range of possible answers, it 
will remain an unverifiable estimate.  Consequently no carbon offset project can actually verify the 
claimed reductions. 
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“Despite the regulatory procedure that is supposed stringently to guarantee that emissions reductions 
under the CDM are all additional, the market seems riddled with examples to the contrary.  An adviser 
to the executive board of the CDM in 2006 conducted an investigation into CDM projects in India and 
concluded that one third of them were non-additional” (Smith, 2008(b):2). 
Some argue that this conceptual defect of carbon offsets cannot be rectified by additional project 
oversight or by addressing what is often described as ‘offset market design’ shortcomings.  “There is 
no remedy to this underlying flaw and emission reduction claims by offset projects will always remain 
unverifiable” (FERN, 2007:7).  Bond (2007:1) refers to the abuse of the additionality rule a “blatant 
scamming.” 
 
4.7.4. TRANSACTION COSTS 
“Complex and evolving regulations, regulatory inefficiencies, and capacity bottlenecks have caused 
delays that have negative financial impact on projects.  It now takes an average of 572 days for a 
CDM project to go through validation and registration and another 607 days until first issuance” 
(Kossoy & Ambrosi, 2010:47).  These delays and uncertainties lead to an escalation of transaction 
costs. 
It can cost anywhere from $50,000 to $250,000 to get a carbon offset project approved and registered 
under the Kyoto Protocol.  When the clean development mechanism (CDM) Executive Board registers 
“a typical small-scale CDM project (essentially creating the CERs that can be sold on the CDM 
markets), the United Nations Development Programme calculates that the project’s total up-front 
costs will account for 14-22% of the net present value of its revenue from carbon credits” (Bayon et al, 
2007:12).  Many projects, especially small projects in poorer countries, find it incredibly difficult to 
come up with the start-up capital to register a project for the compliance carbon market. 
Registering CDM projects involves a number of fixed costs including project idea note (PIN) and 
project design document (PDD) development, advisory services, validation, registration, verification 
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and issuance.  To be profitable and attractive to investors a project requires sufficient scale as 
illustrated in figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1 | Project revenues compared with size (Source: South Pole Carbon as cited in 
Murove, 2009:12) 
 
One way to overcome the high fixed costs is for entities to register a group of similar CDM activities as 
a programmatic CDM (pCDM).  This can take place in many different locations (including multiple 
countries) over a long period of time. 
 
4.7.5. INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES 
Criticism about institutional weaknesses tends to focus on either too much or too little regulatory 
involvement.  The United Nations admitted that there is “’a clear and perceived risk of collusion’ 
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between the project developers and the private, third-party auditors, who are supposed to be verifying 
the quality of the credits” (Smith, 2008(b):2).  If it would become apparent in the next decade that the 
CDM regime has failed because a majority of traded CERs were based on questionable 
methodologies or even outright fraud, “the impact could be even more catastrophic than the recent 
financial instabilities caused by the credit crunch.  And unlike the global credit crisis, no injection of 
capital will be able to turn the clock back on an ever-decreasing window of opportunity to meaningfully 
address the climate crisis” (Smith, 2008(b):2). 
The carbon market is only a tool to achieve the objectives regulators set for it.  They will determine 
how effective the market will be in this process.  The immaturity of the carbon market and hence the 
regulatory process, has certainly caused some problems.  For example during April 2006, the 
European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme market crashed thanks to the over allocation of 
pollution rights to targeted installations.  At the same time the carbon spot market price lost more than 
half its value in one day, “destroying many CDM projects earlier considered viable investments” (Bond 
et al, 2007:2). 
 
4.7.6. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
Most of the criticism against carbon trading and the clean development mechanism specifically, seem 
to focus on its apparent inability to deliver on the sustainable development objective the Protocol 
tasked it with.  “In practice, host governments need only rubber stamp their approval to this condition, 
and genuine developmental benefits on the ground have proven to be elusive to the point of non-
existence” (Smith, 2008(b):1).  Smith mentions a report published in January 2007 indicating that 
close to 200 studies on the CDM have been carried out since its birth in 1997.  The main finding is 
that, left to market forces, the CDM does not significantly contribute to sustainable development. 
Not only do projects not contribute to sustainable development, they may sometimes cause other 
environmental and social problems.  In some cases, the recipients of carbon money are big polluting 
industries responsible for adverse environmental impacts.  It may also cause or exacerbate existing 
local conflicts.  “In order to generate carbon credits from trees or energy crops, plantation companies 
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have to maintain and expand their hold on land that ordinary people may need for other purposes.  In 
order to generate carbon credits from burning the methane released from landfill sites, authorities 
have an incentive to keep them open.  In order to keep track of the carbon their agro-forestry 
schemes generate, rural development organisations have to divert resources from their traditional 
work.  In order to get carbon credits for halting flaring, oil companies have to go on drilling and 
polluting” (FERN, 2007:5). 
Although responsible to define sustainability criteria used in the process of approval of CDM projects, 
host countries are not “responsible for the monitoring of sustainable development.  This is a major 
gap in the CDM process.  Even countries such as South Africa, with a very detailed and robust set of 
sustainability criteria, have not implemented the kind of monitoring procedures which might establish 
whether a project has met its CER requirements but failed to achieve the promised SD benefits” 
(Pfeifer & Stiles, 2009:4). 
 
4.8. CONCLUSION 
Greenhouse gasses are an externality: those who produce greenhouse-gas emissions are bringing 
about climate change, thereby imposing costs on current and on future generations.  Up to recently 
polluters did not face the full consequences of their actions themselves since their greenhouse gas 
emissions were untaxed and unpriced.  The situation was directly responsible for the current climate 
disruption crisis.  
The economic solution to the problem requires a price for emissions, since bearing the cost of 
pollution polluters will have an incentive to switch away from high-carbon goods and services, and to 
invest in low-carbon alternatives.  There are two options to putting a price to emissions – employing a 
price mechanism (typically carbon taxes) or a quantity instrument (limiting allowable emissions).  
Because scientists warn of a threshold in atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide beyond which 
a run-away warming effect could take place, a quantity instrument is the better option; the quantity of 
emissions may be capped with a higher degree of certainty.  The first and most important purpose of 
carbon trading is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, which has a direct impact on the ability of 
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especially the poor to secure their livelihoods.  Despite the criticism over, that is the most important 
contribution it can make to sustainable development. 
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CHAPTER 5 | VOLUNTARY MARKETS 
 
 
 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter voluntary carbon markets will be investigated.  Project classes, the voluntary carbon 
market supply chain, the growth and development of the market, price trends and consumers of the 
voluntary carbon market are discussed. 
 
5.2. BACKGROUND 
As the name indicates, “voluntary (carbon) markets are defined by a lack of regulatory drivers” 
(Hamilton et al, 2007:12).  They operate along with and are heavily influenced by compliance 
markets, with buyers purchasing carbon credits for purposes other than meeting regulatory targets, 
including voluntarily purchasing credits from a CDM project.  “The action is defined as voluntary as 
long as the credits will not be used to meet a regulatory target” (Taiyab, 2006:8). 
Like credits traded in a regulated scheme, voluntary offset projects generate credits – Verified 
Emissions Reductions (VERs) - equivalent to the removal or avoided emission of one metric tonne of 
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carbon dioxide.  Since the voluntary market does not operate under a universal regulated cap, all 
VERS are project-based.  The only exception is trading under the Chicago Climate Exchange.  
Buyers purchasing VERs either set caps on themselves, or decided to offset some or all of the 
emissions related to their activities.  Credits purchased to offset greenhouse gas emissions must be 
retired. 
Although voluntary markets are small compared to the compliance markets, Hamilton (2007:10) 
argues that “their value and potential lies elsewhere.  It cannot be measured merely in tonnes of CO2e 
transacted.  There is, for instance, a unique indicative component: because buyers engage in their 
own volition, participation can provide insights into public interest in climate change, as well as where 
the broader market may be headed.”  An inherent advantage of these markets is their flexibility and 
the potential for innovation. 
The voluntary carbon market is fragmented, incorporates a complex supply chain, and lack a set of 
consistent standards.  As a result “the market operates under the principle of caveat emptor: let the 
buyer beware... There are signs, however, that the market is beginning to consolidate around a few 
guiding practices and business models from which conclusions can be drawn about market direction 
and opportunities” (Bayon et al, 2007:17). 
 
5.3. PROJECT CLASSES 
“Offset project type and location is an important differentiating factor for credits in the voluntary market 
since suppliers are facing increasing pressure to be transparent about offset sources and it is widely 
assumed that the story behind an offset may influence customer choice” (Hamilton et al, 2007:25).  
Table 5.1 reflects project classes generating VERs commonly traded on voluntary markets (see also 
Addendum 2 for more detail). 
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Table 5.1 | Recorded ‘Over the Counter’ Transactions 
ktCO2e Asia Africa North 
America 
South 
America 
Europe 
and 
Russia 
Australia/
Other 
Total % 
Forestry 19 328 2,343 659 128 28 3,505 36% 
Afforestation/ 
reforestation 
Plantation 
18 4 6 193 0 0 221 2% 
Afforestation/ 
reforestation 
mixed native 
1 308 2,337 157 128 26 2,957 31% 
Avoided 
deforestation 
0 16 0 309 0 2 327 3% 
Methane 28 0 184 1 39 0 253 3% 
Livestock 28 0 42 1 39 0 110 1% 
Landfill 0 0 39 0 0 0 39 0% 
Coal 0 0 103 0 0 0 103 1% 
Renewable 1823 188 296 456 300 111 3173 33% 
Off-grid 
renewable energy 
823 148 0 205 300 11 1487 15% 
Renewable 
energy credits 
(RECs) 
1000 40 296 251 0 100 1686 17% 
Energy Efficiency 251 40 28 7 106 87 518 5% 
Industrial Gas 0 0 1183 800 0 0 1983 20% 
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Mixed/Other 27 0 141 0 16 60 244 3% 
Total 2147 556 4175 1923 589 286 9676  
Percentage 22% 6% 43% 20% 6% 3% 100%  
Source | Hamilton et al, 2007:25 
 
5.3.1. LAND-USE, LAND-USE CHANGE AND FORESTRY 
From Table 5.1 it is clear that land-use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) projects dominate 
the voluntary market.  “This predominance of forestry credits in voluntary carbon markets is not 
surprising...  Compared to Kyoto markets, it’s clear that the voluntary carbon markets play a critical 
role in financing sequestration projects... Moreover, the EU ETS, the largest potential market for 
carbon offsets currently does not accept LULUCF credits of any kind” (Hamilton et al, 2007:29). 
LULUCF projects are often valued more highly for the co-benefits it provides.  It may include benefits 
for hosting communities and local biodiversity, as well as other values consumers in this market care 
about.  Not all forestry projects include sustainable development co-benefits; several have had 
negative social and/or environmental impacts. 
 
5.3.2. INDUSTRIAL GASSES 
Mimicking the CDM market, a significant part of the voluntary markets concentrated on the destruction 
of industrial gasses with high global warming potential.  “...trends appear to indicate that their use in 
the voluntary markets may decrease.  This could be due to issues such as the treatment of new HFC 
facilities under the CDM, lack of sustainable development co-benefits and/or because of a 
theoretically limited supply of these types of credits” (Hamilton et al, 2007:28). 
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5.3.3. RENEWABLE ENERGY PROJECTS 
Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) and other renewable energy projects accounted for about a third 
of the voluntary carbon market (Hamilton et al, 2007:29) and will probably grow in importance.  Market 
share increased to 51% in 2008 (Hamilton et al, 2009:iii). 
 
5.4. SUPPLY CHAIN 
Even though it is difficult to accurately illustrate the supply chain linearly, it is still useful to produce a 
simplified model to understand how carbon credits generally get to market.  Figure 5.1 shows a 
simplified model of the voluntary carbon market supply chain. 
Normally “...a project or project idea is generated, the resulting emission reductions are verified to 
some standard to create carbon credits, the credits are sold to middlemen, and the middlemen sell 
them on to businesses and individuals” (Bayon et al, 2007:18).  Brokers and exchanges may facilitate 
transactions but do not usually buy or sell credits themselves.  Some project developers may decide 
to omit stage two and/or three, selling credits - either verified or unverified - directly to buyers. 
 
Figure 5.1 | Simplified Supply Chain of the Retail Carbon Market (Source: Adapted from Bayon 
et al, 2007:18) 
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5.4.1. VERIFICATION 
Verification is the key to creating a marketable product – verified emissions reductions (VERs), used 
as a de facto currency in the voluntary carbon market.  It embodies the ideal of legitimate third party 
verification. 
Various accounting methodologies are utilised in establishing credits in the voluntary carbon market 
(see Addendum 3 for more detail).  Regardless of the preferred methodology, according to Hamilton 
(2006:20 - 21) a few key considerations guide offset quality.  These are: 
• Additionality; 
• Permanence - the ability to guarantee greenhouse gas mitigation over an agreed period of 
time; 
• Leakage - avoiding transferring emissions to another site; 
• Double counting – avoiding double counting emissions reductions by for example retiring 
credits once only; 
• Ex-ante and ex-post accounting - ex-ante accounting (traded before production) involves 
higher risk, commands lower prices and requires rigorous guarantees; and 
• Co-benefits - additional benefits, besides the mitigation of greenhouse gasses, like 
contributions to local economic development. 
For reasons of credibility, buyers prefer independent third party verification to in-house verification.  In 
an attempt to mitigate high transaction costs and confusion resulting from the variety of projects in this 
market, several organisations have developed standards or certification programmes (see Addendum 
4 for more detail), which can potentially be extremely valuable in ensuring a consistent level of quality.  
It could also reduce transaction costs for consumers and build customer trust. 
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5.4.2. DISTRIBUTION 
Distribution of VERs is normally done by middlemen - retailers, brokers and exchanges (as illustrated 
in figure 5.2). 
 
 
Figure 5.2 | Common types of transactions in the voluntary carbon market (Source: Adapted 
from Bayon et al, 2006:29) 
 
5.4.2.1. RETAILERS 
It is estimated that there are 30 to 40 carbon retailers globally (Taiyab, 2006:14).  As in other 
industries, the quality of product traded by retailers varies.  “Aside from varying levels of quality, 
another problem with the retail market is the size of the mark-up added on to the VERs and the 
percentage of revenue that is spent on marketing and administrative costs rather than the project 
itself” (Taiyab, 2006:14).  In order to keep costs down, some retailers operate as non-profit 
organisations. 
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5.4.2.2. BROKERS 
Brokers facilitate transactions between parties, most often in CERs purchased under the CDM, but 
also in VERs.  They generally charge a fee-for-service of around 7.5% (Taiyab, 2006:9). 
 
5.4.2.3. EXCHANGES AND REGISTRIES 
The Chicago Climate Exchange is the primary example of a trading platform for voluntary carbon 
credits.  Access is restricted to members who voluntarily committed themselves to a legally binding 
emissions reduction schedule. 
 
5.4.3. CONSUMPTION 
Consumers either do once-off purchases, or may choose to enter into an ongoing relationship with a 
middleman, buying VERs from a project or a portfolio of projects annually.  They purchase credits to 
offset one of several types of emissions: 
• Internal emissions generated by their facilities and staff in the course of doing business.  
• Product life cycle emissions generated by the use of a company’s products.  These products 
may carry a price-premium being marketed as carbon neutral. 
• Individual emissions involving individual consumers purchasing carbon credits to offset their 
activities. 
 
5.5. GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 
Despite the fact that voluntary markets have been operating much longer than compliance markets, 
they remain small and fragmented, “representing only about 2.2% volume-wise of the size of the 
regulated markets” (Hamilton et al, 2008:25).  Although the fragmented nature of the voluntary market 
complicates an accurate estimation of its size, indicators seem to confirm that it has been growing 
rapidly over the last few years.  Taiyab (2006:20-21) contributes this to the increasing role of 
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corporate social responsibility responding to the rise in environmental reporting which raised 
awareness. 
“Some investors think that, as regulation comes online in the US and more sectors are included in the 
EU ETS, voluntary carbon credits will see a jump in value not unlike that experienced by CDM credits 
once the Kyoto Protocol went into effect” (Bayon et al., 2007:35). 
 
Table 5.2 | Voluntary Carbon Market Size 
Year Estimated/projected market volume (million tons/year) 
2004 3 – 5 Mt 
2005 10 – 20 Mt 
2006 20 – 50 Mt 
2007 100 Mt 
2008 123.4 Mt 
Source | Adapted from Bayon et al, 2007:14 
 
During 2008, the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) overtook the over the counter (OTC) market in 
traded volumes for the first time.  According to Hamilton (2009:i) the CCX traded 69.2 MtCO2e or 56% 
of total volumes, while the OTC market traded 54 MtCO2e or 44% of total volumes.  The total market 
was valued at $705 million during 2008, more than twice their 2007 value of $335 million. 
 
5.6. PRICE TRENDS 
The nature of the voluntary market complicates tracking trends in the wholesale price of carbon 
credits.  Unit prices range between $2 and $16 (Barry, 2007:9).  “Prices can be compared at two 
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levels: the cost of the offset project and the market price of the credit sold.  Project cost is influenced 
by three major factors: technical reduction costs (influenced by factors such project type, size, 
location, upfront costs vs. length of return, profits from co-benefits and additionality), 
transaction/administration costs, and seller’s profit” (Butzengeiger, 2005:11).  Market price is 
determined amongst others by the stages followed from project conceptualisation to consumption.  
Brokers, retail sellers, verification, certification and marketing may increase the price.  Other factors 
influencing price are: 
5.6.1. PROJECT SIZE 
Similar to other commodities, and following the principles of the economies of scale, the size of a 
purchase influences the price.  Thus the unit price is lower for larger volumes.  Hamilton (2007:36) 
found that “micro-scale projects of less than 5,000 ton have a volume weighted price of around $5/t, 
whereas very large projects show a volume weighted price of around $2/t” (Hamilton et al, 2007:36). 
  
5.6.2. PROJECT TYPE 
As can be seen from Table 5.3, the unit price is heavily influenced by project type. 
 
Table 5.3 | VER Prices by Project Type 
Project Type Price Range ($/tCO2e) 
Afforestation/reforestation monoculture  10 – 13 
Afforestation/ reforestation mixed native 0.5 – 45 
Avoided deforestation 10 – 18 
Methane - Livestock 6 
Methane - Landfill 0.75 – 26 
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Methane – Coal Mines 20 
Industrial Gas 4 
Direct Fossil Fuel Reduction 0.5 – 20 
Off-Grid Renewable 5 – 18 
Renewable Energy Certificates 0.75 – 20 
Mixed 7 - 10 
Source | Hamilton et al, 2007:34 
 
5.6.3. PROJECT AND CUSTOMER LOCATION 
Credits originating from the European Union traditionally fetches higher prices than credits from other 
regions, while “credits from New Zealand, South Africa, Malaysia and Australia fetched a premium 
over other countries, earning $19.20, $15.40, $14.40, and $13.30 per tCO2e respectively” (Hamilton et 
al, 2009:v). 
“When purchasing from a retailer, it seems, and without taking exchange rates into account, there is 
relatively little difference between the prices by location of the buyer, although EU buyers do tend to 
pay slightly more than buyers in the US or Australia” (Hamilton et al, 2007:34 - 35). 
 
5.6.4. OTHER FACTORS 
Credits assessed according to more stringent standards fetch higher prices, as well as credits which 
are better marketed. 
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5.7. CONSUMERS 
 
 Figure 5.3 | Consumers in the Voluntary Carbon Market (Source: Adapted from Bayon et al, 
2007:31) 
 
Buyers of voluntary carbon credits generally fall into five categories - business, non-governmental 
organisations, government agencies, event organisers and individuals (Taiyab, 2006:15).  Business is 
by far the biggest consumer category in this market.   
The most important consideration for buyers is credibility and integrity of credits.  In the absence of a 
central verification and registration body enforcing standards, it is difficult to determine the quality of 
offsets offered.  In addition buyers are concerned about the sustainable development benefits of 
projects, the availability of information about projects and the price of VERs. 
 
5.8. CONCLUSION 
Voluntary carbon markets, defined by a lack of regulatory drivers, created the current market for 
carbon emissions.  Operating alongside compliance markets, buyers purchase carbon credits through 
this market for purposes other than meeting regulatory targets.  Although voluntary markets are small 
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compared to the compliance markets, their value and potential probably lies not such much in their 
ability to reduce large amounts of greenhouse gas emissions.  An inherent advantage of these 
markets is their flexibility and the potential for innovation.  Their flexibility and relatively low transaction 
costs holds the potential to be of more direct benefit to the poor. 
A major problem with this market is that it is highly fragmented with no clear set of consistent 
standards.  As a result the market’s integrity is vulnerable to criticism.  As a result of the market 
fragmentation and the consequent difficulty in accessing information, the remainder of this study will 
focus on compliance markets and specifically the clean development mechanism. 
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CHAPTER 6 | COMPLIANCE MARKETS 
 
 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter compliance carbon markets will be investigated.  The Kyoto Protocol and its three 
flexibility mechanisms – emissions trading, joint implementation and the clean development 
mechanism – is reviewed.  The clean development mechanism is then discussed in more depth by 
looking at its institutional arrangements, the CDM project cycle, asset classes, standards, its growth 
and development, price trends, project distribution, and its contribution to sustainable development. 
 
6.2. BACKGROUND 
In response to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), an 
international environmental treaty, a number of compliance carbon markets have emerged around the 
world, of which the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is by far the largest.  The 
UNFCCC resulted from the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development – the 
so-called Earth Summit - in Rio de Janeiro.  Even though the UN Convention intended to stabilise 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous climate 
disruption, it made no provision for mandatory limits on greenhouse gas emissions for individual 
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countries.  It did require Parties to negotiate and adopt protocols setting mandatory emission limits.  
The Kyoto Protocol, adopted at the third Conference of the Parties (COP), resulted from this process.  
Ratified by 184 countries, the Protocol is a legally binding treaty. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 | Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (Source: UNFCCC, 2009(a):unnumbered). (Green | 
ratified) (Grey | not decided on ratification) (Red | do not intend ratifying)  
 
6.3. THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 
In response to the success achieved to curb the emissions of ozone depleting substances through the 
Montreal Protocol, Parties negotiated a new treaty to achieve similar success with greenhouse 
gasses. The result of this process was the Kyoto Protocol, whose main objective is the “stabilisation 
of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (United Nations, 1998:2).  In recognition of the 
fact that rich industrialised countries are primarily responsible for the high levels of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere, these countries are expected to shoulder the burden in dealing with 
the problem. 
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The main achievement of the Kyoto Protocol is its requirement for meeting an average reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions of 5.2% against 1990 levels for thirty-seven industrialised countries and 
the European Community during the UNFCCC’s first commitment period from 2008 to 2012  (see 
Addendum 5 for more detail on individual country commitments).  “This group target will be achieved 
through cuts of 8% by the European Union, most Central and Eastern European countries, and 
Switzerland; 7% by the United States; 6% by Canada, Hungary, Japan and Poland.  Russia, New 
Zealand and Ukraine are to stabilize their emissions, while Norway may increase emissions by up to 
1%, Australia by up to 8% and Iceland 10%.  The six gasses are to be combined in a ‘basket’, with 
reductions in individual gasses translated into CO2 equivalents (CO2e) that are then added up to 
produce a single figure” (Arquit Niederberg & Saner, 2005:2). 
The Kyoto Protocol, adopted on 11 December 1997, only entered into force on 16 February 2005.  Its 
implementation rules – the Marrakesh Accords - were adopted in 2001.  It is widely accepted that the 
Protocol represents a first step in the process of establishing a global regime to stabilise greenhouse 
gas emissions.  Implementation offered an important opportunity to learn lessons and establish the 
essential architecture of a new system. 
In terms of the Protocol, countries’ real emissions are monitored.  Parties are responsible for 
submission of emission inventories and national reports to the United Nations’ Climate Change 
Secretariat, who administers a registry system recording trades and transactions under the 
mechanisms.  The Secretariat keeps an international transaction log to prevent transactions 
inconsistent with Protocol requirements. 
Countries are obligated to meet their targets primarily through internal interventions.  Three market-
based flexibility mechanisms were included to assist countries in meeting their obligations; these are 
Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism. 
Norway and Germany proposed the idea of a Joint Implementation mechanism during 1991.  Met with 
virtually no resistance, the concept introduced the idea that “the transfer of technology to other 
countries to reduce greenhouse gasses could be counted towards the benefit of the source country of 
the technology” (Dutschke & Michaelowa, 1998:10).  Later on, developing countries became 
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concerned that such mechanisms would allow rich countries to “buy their way to compliance.  
Environmentalists were also uncomfortable with the notion of ‘pollution rights’ given by the issuance of 
certificates or permits from JI” (Dutschke & Michaelowa, 1998:10). 
Towards the end of the Kyoto process – during May 1997 - Brazil proposed the introduction of a clean 
development fund “financed by industrialised countries non-compliant to the protocol.  Due to the 
‘geographic flexibility’ of the proposal, the United States took the opportunity to exercise further 
flexibility in the implementation of their commitments.  The Brazilian proposal would later be 
transformed into something very closely resembling the JI concept.  However, the name Clean 
Development Mechanism made the concept more palatable to sceptics because of the emphasis on 
sustainable development in its implementation” (Silayan, 2005:9). 
The Brazilian proposal for a clean development fund would have been available for the benefit of all 
developing nations.  Instead, the final agreement mandated the creation of a mechanism to primarily 
achieve emissions reductions in non-Annex 1 Parties.  “Because of this subtle transformation, the 
CDM concept has been understood by many developing countries that such a mechanism would be 
available and beneficial to not only a few but to all developing nations” (Silayan, 2005:10).  This 
misunderstanding may be the source of much of the criticism against the CDM relating to its 
contribution – or lack thereof - to sustainable development. 
This issue raises the question on equity in climate change policy which has been debated since the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was crafted.  Initially it was known as the 
so-called North-South debate about whose responsibility it was - based on historical emissions - to 
lower greenhouse gas emissions.  Many poor countries are legitimately concerned that they will be 
most affected by the impacts of climate change, despite the fact that they have not been responsible 
for large historical emissions, or will not likely be in the future.  “Moreover, current patterns of 
development have been largely dependent on the use of fossil fuels and any action to limit and/or 
reduce GHG emissions in developing countries has been seen as a threat to economic development” 
(Silayan, 2005:19). 
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6.4. EMISSIONS TRADING 
In terms of Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, countries with mandatory quantitative targets (Annex 1 
Countries), “may participate in emissions trading” (United Nations, 1998:15).  It requires emissions 
trading to be “supplemental to domestic actions” (United Nations, 1998:15) to meet obligations.  
Article 17 carbon trading - known as ‘emissions trading’ - is an “allowance-based transaction system 
that enables developed countries and countries with economies in transition to purchase carbon 
credits from other developed countries and countries with economies in transition to fulfil their 
emissions reductions commitments” (Hamilton et al, 2007:12). 
Emission trading is a typical ‘cap-and-trade’ scheme.  A central authority assigns “...an emission limit 
for the country, and each source has an emission limit given to it in a national allocation plan.  The 
permits are freely tradable but each source must not, at some designated date, emit more pollutants 
than it has permits for” (Pearce, 2007:463).  Units of trade are called ‘assigned amount units’ (AAUs). 
The inclusion of eastern European countries like Russia and the Ukraine in this scheme has been 
controversial.  With the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequently the regional economy during 
the 1990s, emissions shrank by 40%.  As a result, these countries have been able to trade AAUs 
without making any deliberate effort to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions – hence the reference 
to trading ‘hot air’ by many critics.  The emissions trading mechanism has resulted in the 
establishment of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the world’s largest multi-
national greenhouse gas emissions trading regime. 
 
6.5. JOINT IMPLEMENTATION 
In terms of Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, Annex 1 countries are allowed to partake in a project-based 
transaction system trading carbon credits from greenhouse gas reduction projects implemented in 
another Annex 1 country.  The investing country earns the credits for the host country’s reductions.  
Projects are known as joint implementation (JI) projects, while credits “generated under this scheme 
are referred to as Emission Reduction Units (ERUs)” (Bayon et al, 2007:7). 
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Trades cover emission sources as well as sinks8.  Joint implementation trades must be additional and 
“must be supplemental to domestic actions, implying that despite trading, the emphasis must be on 
domestic reduction activities” (Pearce, 2007:463).  The joint implementation scheme has thus far not 
played a significant role in the international carbon market. 
 
6.6. CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) defined in article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, is one of the 
flexibility mechanisms designed to eliminate or reduce greenhouse gasses that are or will be emitted 
in developing countries.  In the process, participating developing countries benefit by being placed on 
“a development path involving reduced emissions.  The objectives of the CDM are both the cost-
effective reduction of GHGs and the sustainable development of the host country” (Silayan, 2005:12).  
Article 12 of the Protocol defines three objectives for the CDM.  These are to: 
• Contribute to the overarching goals of the Framework Convention; 
• Encourage sustainable development in non-Annex 1 Parties; and 
• Reduce the compliance cost for Annex 1 Parties. 
Inclusion of the CDM in the Kyoto Protocol achieved the following goals: 
• It provides Annex 1 Parties increased flexibility in achieving their targets by allowing them to 
earn emission credits through project-based activities in developing countries.  It thus 
introduced and mainstreamed the concept of geographical flexibility, as well as flexibility in 
implementing compliance. 
• The CDM promotes greater involvement of non-Annex 1 Parties in climate change 
negotiations “by linking the concerns of global climate change to the concerns of local 
sustainable development.  In the end, developing countries benefit from the transfer of 
                                                     
8
 Sinks refer to the growing of biomass which absorbs, or ‘fixes’, carbon dioxide from the atmosphere at a faster 
rate than it emits it. 
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financial and technological resources while industrialised countries benefit from the 
certification of emission reductions” (Silayan, 2005:10). 
• Added to this is the achievement of the principles set out in article 3 paragraph 4 and 5 of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change whereby “Parties have the right to, 
and should promote sustainable development” (United Nations, 1992:5) and “Parties should 
cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to 
sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, particularly developing country 
Parties” (United Nations, 1992:5). 
 
6.6.1. BACKGROUND 
The CDM concept expands on the ideas of the ‘baseline-credit system’ for emissions reductions, to 
include other countries and in particular poorer countries.  The CDM “functions by delivering a subsidy 
to the developing world in return for lower emissions of GHGs.  The subsidy offsets the costs of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, thereby encouraging less developed countries to emit less 
greenhouse gas than they otherwise would.  As such, it represents the first attempt to address a 
global atmospheric commons problem using a global market” (Wara, 2006: unnumbered). 
Since climate change is a global issue and the atmosphere a globally shared resource, it does not 
matter where emissions reductions occur, as long as the total global amount of greenhouse gas 
emissions is reduced.  It would therefore be more efficient to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in 
countries or markets where such reductions would be cheaper.  For a variety of reasons, and in 
particular the price of labour, it is cheaper to meet reduction targets in poorer countries.  Therefore 
“when a developed country invests in certified emission reduction units in a developing country, it is 
maximising the reduction cost-efficiency by creating emissions reductions in other countries where 
reduction is less costly.  The targeted amount of reduction is efficiently achieved thereby increasing 
overall social welfare” (Silayan, 2005:7).    
Like Joint Implementation, the CDM is a project-based transaction system.  The only difference 
between JI and the CDM being that the CDM “establishes a principle of self-interest from the 
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developing countries’ point of view, namely that trades must contribute to their sustainable 
development” (Pearce, 2007:463-464).  “This mechanism is the critical link between developed and 
developing countries under Kyoto and is the flexible mechanism participants in the voluntary market 
most often seek to imitate.  Accepted CDM projects have become a major influence on ‘setting the 
bar’ for offset projects in developing countries” (Hamilton et al, 2007:12). 
Carbon offsets originating from registered and approved CDM projects are called Certified Emissions 
Reductions (CERs).  CERs may either be used by Annex 1 Parties to meet their emissions reduction 
obligations under the Kyoto Protocol (see Addendum 5 for more detail), or by operators of 
installations covered by the European Union Emission Trading Scheme to comply with their emissions 
reduction obligations to surrender European Union Allowances (EUAs).  CERs may be held by 
governments or private entities on electronic accounts with the United Nations, and may be 
purchased on the primary market (i.e. from the original party making the reduction) or the secondary 
market (resold from a marketplace). 
 
6.6.2. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
To ensure compliance to CDM rules, domestic and international governance structures have been 
established. 
On the international front, the mechanism is directed by the Conference of the Parties and managed 
by an Executive Board (EBCDM) include one representative from each UN region (Asia, Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Africa, Central and Eastern Europe, and the OECD), one from small 
island developing states, and two each from Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 Parties.  The Executive 
Board’s main responsibilities include: 
• “Establishing the ground rules for the implementation of the CDM among participating 
countries and organisations; 
• Accreditation of independent operational entities tasked with validation and verification of 
project activities; and 
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• Reporting and dissemination of pertinent information relating to all aspects of the CDM” 
(Silayan, 2005:12). 
Host countries appoint a designated national authority (DNA), acting as the first point of contact for 
project developers.  The DNA is usually housed in a government department, staffed with public 
sector employees and is responsible for the initial review and approval of proposed CDM projects. 
The CDM’s complex institutional arrangements have been criticised for escalating transaction costs 
associated with the approval process.  “Transaction costs and institutional rigidities will reduce the 
attractiveness of the Kyoto Protocol flexibility mechanisms compared to domestic greenhouse gas 
abatement options.  The CDM in particular is likely to entail considerable costs of baseline 
development, project registration, verification and certification” (Michaelowa & Jotzo, 2005:511). 
Transaction costs influences the number of approved CDM projects.  Early evidence indicates that 
transaction costs can account for a significant share of the total cost of CDM projects.  “Transaction 
costs tend to increase as one move to project categories with higher implementation costs, and 
smaller projects will be at a disadvantage because fixed costs become a major factor” (Michaelowa & 
Jotzo, 2005:521-522). 
 
6.6.3. THE CDM PROJECT CYCLE 
The CDM project cycle essentially involves six steps as illustrated in figure 6.2. 
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Project participants draw up the project design document (PDD), which must include:
Description of project and its boundary
Proposed GHG baseline methodology
Statement of operational life and selection of crediting period
Statement on emissions
Environmental impact analysis/assessment
Information on public funding
Public consultation summary
Monitoring plan
Calculations
Authorisation is required from the Designated National Authority (DNA) in the host country.  It is 
the responsibility of the DNA to confirm that a CDM project activity will help the country achieve 
sustainable development.
Validation is done by an independent Designated Operational Entity (DOE), which 
Reviews the PDD against the requirements of the CDM;
Tests assumptions; and
Requests revisions of the PDD if required.
The project is registered by the Executive Board (CDM EB) in a formal acceptance of the 
validated project as a CDM project activity.
The project is financed, implemented and becomes operational.
Monitoring is undertaken by the project participants in accordance with the plan described in the 
project design document.  Monitoring allows the performance of the project activity in terms of 
mitigating GHG emissions to be assessed annually.
A Designated Operational Entity (DOE) is appointed to review project performance against the 
project design document.  The DOE verifies the monitored reductions in GHG emissions that 
have occurred during the verification period as a result of the CDM project.
Certification is the written assurance of these reductions by the DOE.
The Executive Board issues Certified Emission Reductions (CERs)
CERs can be traded by project participants after issuance
DESIGN
AUTHORISATION, 
VALIDATION AND 
REGISTRATION
MONITORING
VERIFICATION AND 
CERTIFICATION
TRADING
ISSUANCE
Figure 6.2 | Sequential steps in the CDM project cycle (Source: Energy Research Institute, 
2002:16) 
 
6.6.2.1. PROJECT DESIGN 
Project developers are expected to submit a project design document (PDD) to the DNA for review.  
“The project design document sets the context for all the following steps and sets the amount of CERs 
likely to arise from the project” (Energy Research Institute, 2002:18). 
 
The PDD includes information on: 
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• The purpose of the project; 
• The technical aspects of the project; 
• The proposed baseline methodology, including 
• The approved methodology selected and how it will be applied; or 
• A new methodology and a justification of the choice; 
• The estimated operational lifetime of the project and the selected crediting period;9 
• How anthropogenic emissions of GHGs will be reduced; 
• Environmental assessments; 
• Public funding from Annex 1 Parties, together with an declaration that such funding will not 
divert official development aid; 
• Comments by local stakeholders; 
• The monitoring plan; and 
• Calculations, including a description of formulae used to calculate and estimate 
anthropogenic emissions of GHGs. 
 
Some jurisdictions, such as South Africa, allow project developers to submit a project identification 
note (PIN) as a first step, giving the developer a sense of how the DNA will view the proposed project 
before incurring the cost of  submitting all the information required by the PDD. 
 
6.6.2.2. AUTHORISATION, VALIDATION AND REGISTRATION 
The proposed CDM project must be authorised by the host country.  Once the PDD is approved by 
the DNA, it issues a letter of approval and forwards the application to a Designated Operational Entity 
(DOE).  Unlike DNAs, DOEs are all private sector entities accredited to authorise a specific portfolio of 
                                                     
9
 Project participants may select a crediting period from the following options 
• A maximum of 7 years with the option to renew; or 
• A maximum of ten years with no option to renew. 
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methodologies.  The DOE decides whether “the project’s methodology is in line with approved 
methodologies, the claimed emissions reductions and baseline scenarios are accurate, and the 
project is ‘additional’.  In making its determination, the DOE will also post the PDD on the internet for 
a 30-day public comment period” (Bond et al, 2007:16). 
On approval by the DNA and the DOE, the CDM Executive Board reviews their findings and makes a 
final decision whether to allow the project to start generating Certified Emissions Reductions.  
Registration follows a final thirty day period for public comment.  With limited available resources the 
Executive Board are not in a position to closely scrutinise every project submitted for approval, relying 
heavily on the decisions and recommendations of DOEs.  In practice the Executive Board only deals 
with problem cases. 
 
6.6.2.3. MONITORING 
Monitoring is an essential part of the CDM project cycle, enabling the measurement of the 
greenhouse gas emissions from the project “to be determined against both the plan and the baseline” 
(Energy Research Institute, 2002:22). 
The monitoring plan included in the project design document, must use a methodology that is 
considered appropriate by the DOE, has been successfully used on other projects and is considered 
good monitoring practice.  It must provide for: 
• “The collection and archiving of all necessary data for measuring or estimating GHG 
emissions occurring within the project boundary10 during the crediting period. 
• The collection and archiving of all necessary data for determining the baseline of GHG 
emissions occurring within the project boundary during the crediting period. 
                                                     
10
 “The project boundary includes all emissions of greenhouse gasses under the control of the project participants 
that are significant and reasonably attributable to the CDM project activity” (Energy Research Institute, 2002:19). 
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• The identification of all potential sources of, and the collection and archiving of data on, 
increased GHG emissions outside the project boundary that is significant and reasonably 
attributable to the project activity. 
•  Quality assurance and control procedures for the monitoring process. 
• Procedures for the periodic calculation of reductions in GHG emissions and leakage effects” 
(Energy Research Institute, 2002:22). 
Provision is made for the use of simplified procedures for small-scale projects. 
 
6.6.2.4. VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION 
A DOE will review and determine the monitored reductions in emissions of greenhouse gasses that 
have occurred as a result of a registered CDM project during the verification period.  The project 
participants will generally select and contract a different DOE to the one involved in the earlier stages 
of the project cycle. 
Verification involves: 
• Determining whether project documentation follows the requirements of the project design 
document; 
• Determining the reductions in emissions that have occurred as a result of the project using 
the procedures described in the project design document and in the monitoring plan; 
• Reviewing the monitoring results and verifying that monitoring methodologies have been 
applied correctly, and documents are complete and transparent; 
• Conducting on-site inspections; and 
• Providing a verification report which will be available publically. 
“Verification and issuance are repeated several times during the crediting period, which can be 
chosen as fixed (duration 10 years) or renewable (up to three times 7 years, with obligation to 
reassess the baseline after 7 and 14 years).  The rhythm of verifications is defined by the project 
owner; it is mostly conducted annually” (Muller, Zerzawy & Wirth, 2010:6). 
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Certification is the written assurance by the DOE that a project achieved verified reductions in 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions during a specified period. 
 
6.6.2.5. ISSUANCE 
The DOE’s certification report will request the Executive Board to issue CERs equal to the amount 
verified, who in turn will instruct the CDM registry administrator to issue the specified quantity of 
CERs.  Following this issuance, the administrator will: 
• Transfer an appropriate share of the CERs to cover administrative and help meet adaptation 
costs, to the appropriate accounts in the CDM registry; and 
• Transfer the balance to the accounts in the CDM registry of country investors and project 
participants. 
Unless the Board or a project participant requests a review, the issuance is considered final after 
fifteen days.  A review may only be requested on suspicion of fraud, illegal action or incompetence by 
the DOE. 
 
6.6.2.6. TRADING 
CERs represent the carbon income from a project.  Most trades involve a simple transaction between 
the owner of the CERs and the buyer.  Various other types of transactions may take place in the 
market similar to other traded commodities.  Purchases of yet-to-be-generated CERs can be done 
through forward contracts or call options to purchase a specified amount of CERs generated by a 
CDM project upon delivery, sometimes with some up-front payment.  Trading in CERs on secondary 
markets includes spot or options transactions in existing CERs. 
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6.6.4. ASSET CLASSES 
In addition to carbon dioxide (CO2), five gasses contributing to the greenhouse effect (listed in table 
4.1) are recognised under the Kyoto Protocol and generally traded.  This is based on a schedule 
developed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) determining “the global 
warming potential (GWP) of each gas in terms of its equivalent in tons of CO2 over the course of 100 
years” (Bayon et al, 2007:4). 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change deals with 5 economic sectors 
responsible for the majority of anthropogenic greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere.  These are 
energy, industrial processes, agriculture, land-use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) and 
waste (see Table 6.1 for an overview of eligible CDM projects under the Kyoto Protocol). 
 
Table 6.1 | Eligible CDM projects under the Kyoto Protocol 
Energy Supply (CO2, CH4 and N20) 
1. Cleaner-coal power generation technology 
2. Hydro-electricity to replace coal-fired power generation 
3. Co-generation (hybrid systems e.g. biomass or fossil-fuel based) 
4. Renewable energy 
a. Wind 
b. Photovoltaic 
c. Biomass 
d. Coal to gas 
e. Methane from landfill sites 
5. Use of forest and agricultural wastes to generate electricity and heat 
Manufacturing (CO2, N2O, HFC5, PFC5 and SF6) 
1) Conversion of boilers from coal to gas 
2) Industrial energy efficiency 
3) Structural change to less energy- and emissions-intensive industries 
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Mining (CO2, CH4) 
1. Industrial energy efficiency 
2. Reducing methane emission from coal mines 
3. Control of coal dump fires 
4. Agriculture and forestry 
5. A forestation and reforestation 
Transport and Communications (CO2) 
1. Improved public transport 
2. Improved urban planning and traffic management 
3. Improved fuel switching 
4. Switching from road to rail transport 
Residential, Commercial and Government Buildings (CO2) 
1. Energy-efficient appliances 
2. Solar water heating 
3. Fuel switching in households and commercial boilers 
4. Energy efficient building design 
5. Energy management 
Source | adapted from UNDP, 2003:6&7 
 
A significant trend in the compliance carbon markets is the predominance of non-carbon related 
projects.  While the majority of projects are in renewable energy, they have accounted for only a small 
percentage of issued CERs.  By contrast, industrial gas destruction projects, in particular nitrogen 
(N2O) and hydroflorocarbons (HFC23), represent less than 2% of the total number of projects yet are 
responsible for the vast majority of issued CERs (Bond et al, 2007:18).  It is projected to “represent 
40% of expected deliveries by 2012 in the CDM pipeline” (Capoor & Ambrosi, 2007:28). 
This may not be surprising since they do represent the ‘low-hanging fruit’ in greenhouse gas 
concentration abatement.  HFC23 - 11,700 times more effective as a greenhouse gas than CO2 - are 
particularly profitable.  Since CERs are measured in CO2 equivalent (CO2e) a relatively small amount 
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of HFC23 captured, can create a large amount of credits.  These types of projects “...are attractive 
since they are less capital intensive than for example, renewable energy projects and they are 
generally ‘quick and common practice additions to existing facilities’” Taiyab (2006:6). 
Trade in methane is equally split between coal mine methane and landfill gas.  A third asset class – 
clean energy – has become the biggest in recent years.  It includes renewable energy, energy 
efficiency and fuel switching projects. 
“As the sectors are defined, greenhouse gas removals from the atmosphere occur only in LULUCF, 
because of biomass growth.  This results in specific accounting characteristics which make the 
LULUCF sector distinct from the rest” (Schlamadinger, 2007:273).  Their regulatory complexity and 
limited market access to the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme is problematic, even 
though their reported community benefits and competitive cost may result in some additional demand 
from buyers.  “Large classes of LULUCF assets including possibly soil sequestration, fire 
management and avoided deforestation, among others, remain attractive opportunities to promote 
sustainable development in Africa and in other natural resource-based economies” (Capoor & 
Ambrosi, 2007:28-29).  Demand for carbon assets from LULUCF is marginal, representing less than 
1% of trades in 2008. 
 
6.6.5. STANDARDS 
The CDM Executive Board requires projects to comply with its additionality and project design rules, 
as well as host country standards of sustainable development.  “Fearful that this arrangement would 
lead to an inconsistent standard of quality in terms of sustainable development, as some governments 
may be less stringent in their criteria, a group of NGOs, led by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), have 
created the CDM Gold Standard” (Taiyab, 2006:10-11).  Projects must pass through three screens in 
order to meet the Gold Standard: 
• The project type screen, restricted to renewable energy and end-use energy efficiency 
projects; 
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• An additionality and baseline screen; and 
• A sustainable development screen, which involves costs and benefits associated with other 
environmental, economic and social impacts. 
The Gold Standard certification process is done by a DOE on completion of the standard CDM 
verification process, using the additional Gold Standard guidelines.  Voluntary projects may also apply 
for Gold Standard certification by following the guidelines and receiving validation from an accredited 
organisation. 
Gold Standard certification offers a competitive advantage to projects by assuring buyers of a 
project’s credibility and its contribution to sustainable development.  It also reduces reputational risk 
arising from criticism by regulators and NGOs scrutinising companies claiming emissions credits.  
This will theoretically translate into “a price premium for sellers, as it is expected that buyers will pay 
more for higher quality credits.  Adopting the Gold Standard certainly assures an even higher level of 
quality, but, of course, is even more expensive than following the normal CDM guidelines” (Taiyab, 
2006:11). 
Since the Gold Standard excludes LULUCF projects, the Climate, Community, and Biodiversity 
Alliance developed a Gold Standard equivalent - called the Climate, Community, and Biodiversity 
Standards - for projects in this asset class. 
 
6.6.6. GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 
During the short period carbon markets have been operating, they have grown exponentially.  An 
important reason for this was the establishment of compliance markets in response to the Kyoto 
Protocol.  Regulation forced polluters to carry the full social cost of their actions.  By putting a price on 
pollution, it created an incentive to pollute less.   
With Joint Implementation playing a minimal role, CDM projects dominate the global project-based 
carbon market.  “The CDM pipeline now consists of over 4,500 projects in about 80 countries, with an 
increasing number from countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The biggest contribution of CDM has been 
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to capture the imagination and ingenuity of governments and companies in developing countries to 
view climate change mitigation as an opportunity instead of a constraint to growth” (Capoor & 
Ambrosi, 2009:45).  The pipeline grew to 5 354 by October 2010, as demonstrated in table 6.2. 
 
Table 6.2 | Global CDM pipeline 
Status of CDM projects Number of Projects 
At validation  2954 
Request for registration  56 
Request for review 36 
Correction requested 57 
Under review  26 
Total in the process of registration 175 
Withdrawn 49 
Rejected by EB 173 
Validation negative by DOE 162 
Validation terminated by DOE 751 
Registered, no issuance of CERs 1622 
Registered. CER issued 778 
Total registered 2400 
Total number of projects (incl. rejected & 
withdrawn) 
6664 
Source | UNEP, 2010:11 
 
Demand for the primary CDM market contracted during 2008 and 2009 (as seen in table 6.3) as a 
result of the global financial turmoil.  As emissions contracted in line with the contraction in the global 
economy, demand for Kyoto assets fell, since most Annex 1 Parties are now on course to meet or 
surpass their emissions reductions commitments (Kossoy & Ambrosi, 2010:37).  “On the supply side, 
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origination activity declined in 2009 as the financial crisis spurred financial institutions and private 
investors to deleverage and redirect their positions away from risky investments” (Kossoy & Ambrosi, 
2010:37).  Developers thus found it difficult to initiate new projects. 
“CDM continued to leverage clean energy investments in 2008 through projects in renewable energy, 
fuel switching and energy efficiency.  Transacted volumes in these three broad project categories 
alone totalled 323 MtCO2e (slightly down from 359 MtCO2e in 2007), accounting for 82% of volumes 
contracted in 2008” (Capoor & Ambrosi, 2009:40). 
 
Table 6.3 | Annual volumes and values (2007-08) for project-based transactions 
 2007 2008 2009 
 Volume 
(MtCO2e) 
Value 
(Million $) 
Volume 
(MtCO2e) 
Value 
(Million $) 
Volume 
(MtCO2e) 
Value 
(Million $) 
Primary 
CDM 
552 7,433 404 6,511 211 2,678 
Secondary 
CDM 
240 5,451 1,072 26,277 N/A N/A 
Total 792 12,884 1,476 32,788 N/A N/A 
Sources | Adapted from Ambrosi & Capoor, 2009:31; Kossoy & Ambrosi, 2010:37. 
 
6.6.7. PRICE TRENDS 
In total 221 million tons were contracted on the primary CDM market in 2009, which represented a 
48% decline on 2008 volume and a 62% decline on 2007 volume.  However, since the Great 
Recession affected both supply and demand, the pressure on prices were not as significant as on 
volumes. 
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Figure 6.2 | CER price movements (Source: Climate Progress, 2009:unnumbered)  
 
“Prices averaged $12.7 per ton (€9.1), a still relevant 21% decline compared to the $16.1 average in 
2008” (Kossoy & Ambrosi, 2010:39).  This is roughly in line with the price band reported by the South 
African DNA for South African assets of €12 to €22 per tCO2e (Rambau, 2010). 
CER prices are determined by prevailing market dynamics as well as various risk factors influencing a 
specific project.  Sellers in a position to take on project risk may reap the benefits of a higher 
CER price, while buyers who are willing to invest in project with a higher risk profile, may benefit from 
lower prices. 
According to TFS Green11 (2010:unnumbered), specific factors affecting CER prices include: 
                                                     
11
 TSF Green is a subsidiary of ‘Compagnie Financière Tradition’, one of the world's three largest brokers in 
financial and commodity-related products. 
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• The price of European Union Allowances (EUAs).  The European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme, being the most established emissions trading system, provides the pricing 
benchmark for many purchasers. 
• Credit.  As a result of the long-term nature of CER contracts, the supplier and purchasers’ 
financial position is important.  Since role-players from non-Annex 1 Parties may not always 
have the necessary credit rating, and since “both parties are often reluctant to foot the 
additional expense of a Letter of Credit (in many cases with good reason), it is not surprising 
that price negotiations often depend on how this issue is approached and managed.  A good 
credit rating by a recognised agency is often beneficial, as it is perceived as an indication of 
the effectiveness of the seller in successfully executing project activities outside of the CDM” 
(TFS Green, 2010:unnumbered). 
• Terms and conditions of the sales agreement, including “delivery guarantees offered by the 
seller, volumes likely to be generated, the use of an established methodology, who bears the 
costs of developing CDM documentation (the PDD), project validation and registration, and 
any upfront payments which may be required” (TFS Green, 2010:unnumbered). 
• Stage of project development.  Projects more advanced in the project cycle are more likely to 
generate CERs and would probably attract higher prices. 
• Risk factors such as: 
• Sovereign risk, including factors such as the host country’s conventional investment 
risk profile, and the efficacy of the designated national authority.  Not only does the 
DNA determine if projects will obtain national approval, but is a determining factor in 
whether a project are likely to meet the Executive Board’s standards for registration. 
• Quality risk, where the project may run into problems like sustainability or additionality 
concerns.  Standards like the CDM Gold Standard indicate high-value, high-quality 
projects, since it is likely to have addressed potential problems. 
• Delivery risk, where the project may fail to generate the expected number of CERs.  
This may happen for a variety of reasons, such as lower than anticipated efficiencies, 
leading to an under-delivery of committed volumes. 
• Registration risk resulting from the CDM approval process. 
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• Access to market.  In the main, more market exposure lead to higher bids, as a result of the 
competitive nature thereof. 
 
6.6.8. CDM PROJECT DISTRIBUTION 
“Applying the economic theory of emissions trade on an international scale involving a variety of 
nations in varying stages of development manifests a complex problem.  Imposing a market 
mechanism on countries with different levels of competitiveness creates a trading environment 
conducive to imperfect competition whereby only a few nations benefit, and overall social welfare 
decreases” (Silayan, 2005:8).  This can be seen in the global distribution of CDM projects (illustrated 
in figure 6.4) which is heavily concentrated in large developing countries led by India, China and 
Brazil.  China, India and Brazil also dominate in the number of CERs issued as reflected in table 6.4. 
 
Table 6.4 | Countries with the most CERs issued 
Top countries by issued CERs Total CERs (million) Share 
China 153 46% 
India 72 22% 
South Korea 44 13% 
Brazil 35 10% 
Source | Müller, Zerzawy & Wirth, 2010:8 
 
Page | 137  
Copyright ©2011 Stellenbosch University 
All rights reserved 
 
 
Figure 6.4 | Distribution of CDM projects (Source: UNFCCC, 2009:unnumbered)  
 
CDM project distribution is influenced by a number of factors.  The most fundamental are the entry 
conditions for a country’s participation in the CDM which have been “explicitly negotiated and written 
in the context of climate change negotiations.  These conditions can be regarded as the official 
conditions for participation, namely: (1) a country’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, and (2) a host 
country’s establishment of a CDM focal point, known as the Designated National Authority” (Silayan, 
2005:22).  Countries which do not comply with these will not be able to participate and therefore 
benefit from the CDM. 
Besides the official conditions there are unofficial conditions for participation, including a minimum 
amount of annual emissions, the existence of baseline data, and in-country capacity. 
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Table 6.5 | Implementation conditions and their impact on CDM project distribution 
Participation Conditions Effect on CDM Project Distribution 
O
ffi
ci
al
 
Co
n
di
tio
n
s 
Kyoto Protocol ratification Excludes countries from participation in the Kyoto 
Protocol mechanisms 
DNA establishment Excludes countries from participation in the CDM 
N
o
n
-
o
ffi
ci
al
 
Co
n
di
tio
n
s
 
Reasonable amount of annual 
GHG emissions 
Countries with low annual emissions excluded, 
because of optimal size for projects necessitated by 
high transaction costs 
Existence of baseline data Countries with no baseline data excluded 
Local capacity • Ability to initiate local project development 
• Increased competence in project implementation 
• Minimise risk perception by investors 
• Investors attracted to countries with better overall 
competence in project execution and delivery 
• Efficient project evaluation procedure minimise 
transaction costs 
• Lower transaction costs attract investors 
Source | Silayan, 2005:32 
 
“If CDM can indeed be understood as a market mechanism, simply put, projects will go to countries 
with the best opportunities for emissions reduction.  Since success in the case of the CDM framework 
is measured in terms of reduced emissions, the first investment option will be to countries with high 
reduction potential” (Silayan, 2005:24).  Jung (2005) assessed 114 countries on their attractiveness to 
host CDM projects.  The criteria included “emission reduction potential, institutional CDM capacity and 
general investment climate” (Jung, 2005:4).  The results of the study indicated that China, India, 
Brazil, South Korea, Indonesia, Mexico and South Africa have the highest potential for CDM projects 
(see Addendum 6 for a comprehensive list).  A significant finding from this study was the general 
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unattractiveness of African countries, other than South Africa, as CDM investment destinations (Jung, 
2005:19). 
“It is generally accepted that Africa will not be a major earner of CERs on a global scale” (Lotz et al, 
2009:230).  Despite this, the African CDM market was expected to “grow from 34 projects in 2009, to 
well over 100 projects by 2015” (Prinsloo, 2010:unnumbered).  It is estimated that Africa may 
eventually attract between 4% en 14% of the global CER market during the first commitment period 
(Lotz et al, 2009:230). 
The distribution of CDM projects is consistent with current flows of foreign direct investment.  The 
correlation between flows of FDI and CDM project development is not accidental, since “larger 
countries with more stable investment climates and greater capacity are logically more attractive to 
profit driven investors” (Taiyab, 2006:6).  In keeping with this trend, South Africa dominates the 
African scene, with small poor countries entirely left behind. 
Although it was generally assumed that CDM investments will follow the pattern of foreign direct 
investment flows, Arquit Niederberger and Saner (2005) criticises the assumption as to simplistic.  
They argue that “current trends in FDI flows give some indication of the preference of foreign 
investors.  One element in common with the CDM is the quality of the general business environment.  
However, for a number of reasons, FDI flows do not necessarily reflect CDM market potential” (Arquit 
Niederberger & Saner, 2005:16).  A factor they argue will influence this is the fact that CDM demand 
originates from governments as well as the private sector.  Their motivations and preferences may 
differ. 
The reason for Chinese leadership of the CDM process may be, according to Szymanski (2002:27), 
because China in particular sees the CDM “...as a way to attract more foreign investment, with the 
added (though perhaps secondary) benefit of obtaining a cheap fix for some of its domestic 
environmental problems.”  The favourable carbon investment climate characterised by strong 
institutional support and experienced project developers, combined with economies of scale in 
exploration, sourcing and transaction costs, makes the large emerging markets attractive, making it 
difficult for poor countries to compete. 
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6.6.8. CDM AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
Since the CDM is a market based instrument, it was expected to follow the “dynamics of foreign direct 
investment and be governed (and constrained) by the forces which apply to FDI in general.  However 
as the CDM has an explicit goal of promoting sustainable development (unlike general FDI) there may 
be some innovative investments driven by the sustainable development goals as well as the 
greenhouse gas reduction goals” (Huq, 2002:10).  The sustainable development requirement in 
Article 12 (2) represented a “hard fought victory by many of the countries and environmental NGOs 
that were initially against the CDM” (Bond et al, 2007:16).  Of the three goals the Kyoto Protocol 
established for the CDM, its contribution to the sustainable development of poor countries remains the 
most controversial. 
This controversy may be the result of a difference in understanding of the term sustainable 
development, complicated by the fact that the Protocol is silent on the meaning thereof.  In 
subsequent meetings of the Conference of the Parties, countries have been allowed to set their own 
definition of and criteria for sustainable development.  Thus the debate on whether the CDM is 
fulfilling this objective is problematic, since often host countries have “very different criteria for 
assessing the sustainable development contribution of CDM projects.  These can range from a 
‘minimal compliance’ approach to a ‘context specific’ approach where concerns are focussed on 
national priorities, to a more ‘operationalised or comprehensive’ approach assessing all types of 
sustainability (economic, social, environmental)” (Pfeifer & Stiles, 2009:4). 
A ‘minimal compliance’ approach would involve a host country assessing a project’s contribution to its 
sustainable development exclusively against national targets for renewable energy to reduce 
dependence on fossil fuels.  It may also simply define sustainability as “meeting the country’s 
environmental impact assessment guidelines” (Pfeifer and Stiles, 2009:4). 
A context specific approach  is reflected in the Chinese experience where Zheng (2004:229) argues 
that even though “...the climate change issue may not be given a high priority on the political agenda 
in China, greenhouse gas emission reduction measures such as projects under the CDM can be 
Page | 141  
Copyright ©2011 Stellenbosch University 
All rights reserved 
 
consistent with national development goals and relevant policies” (Zheng, 2004:299).  It is attractive 
since “CDM is perceived as a new, market-oriented, innovative and flexible financing instrument” 
(Gantsho & Karani, 2007:1).  The result of this is a situation in which the “CDM project portfolio is 
mainly determined by the economic attractiveness and potential and risk of the mitigation options” 
(Schneider, 2007:10). 
Some African countries, such as Morocco and South Africa, have followed the ‘comprehensive’ 
approach and developed “complex, multi-criteria screening systems, and included priority sectors and 
project types as part of the DNA assessment process” (Pfeifer & Stiles, 2009:4). 
Many countries established and published project assessment criteria; some of which are very 
ambitious.  In most countries, projects do not need to comply with all or the majority of the criteria for 
sustainable development.  Even complying with one of them – for example creating employment - 
would be acceptable. 
Even though many commentators criticise the CDM for failing to sufficiently fulfil its objective of 
assisting host countries in achieving sustainable development, “...a number of projects have indirect 
benefits for the overall economy, as many projects create employment, indirectly improve the 
infrastructure or at least provide CER revenues to the economy” (Schneider, 2007:47).  “A recent 
survey of DNA representatives has shown that the CDM can contribute to SD in many different ways: 
through the diversification of energy supply, reduced dependence on fossil fuels, increased reliability 
of energy supply, increased access for rural populations to modern energy sources and job creation, 
and improving the social livelihoods in the region where the project is taking place” (Pfeifer & Stiles, 
2009:4).  Ultimately, the most important contribution the clean development mechanism is making to 
sustainable development is contributing to a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
6.7. CONCLUSION 
In response to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), resulting 
from the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, and the subsequent 
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Kyoto Protocol, a number of regulated carbon markets emerged.  The main purpose of the 
Convention and the Protocol is to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a 
level that would prevent dangerous climate disruption.  
The main achievement of the Kyoto Protocol is its requirement for meeting an average reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions of 5.2% against 1990 levels for thirty-seven industrialised countries and 
the European Community.  Even though it is generally recognised that this level is far too low to 
prevent the dangerous disruption of the global climate, it is nevertheless important because it 
represents the first step towards a comprehensive global climate regime. 
Towards the end of the Kyoto process Brazil proposed the introduction of a clean development fund 
to be financed by industrialised countries non-compliant to the protocol.  This idea, which was 
generally acceptable to poor countries, later morphed into the Clean Development Mechanism, 
designed to primarily achieve emissions reductions in non-Annex 1 Parties.  Misunderstanding or 
resentment of this change may be the source of much of the criticism against the CDM relating to its 
contribution – or lack thereof - to sustainable development. 
Of the three flexibility mechanisms, the CDM is the most successful.  It has grown to be the world’s 
largest project based carbon transaction system.  The CDM is characterised by complex institutional 
arrangements, which has a negative impact on transaction costs.  Despite that the CDM market has 
grown rapidly over the last several years.  Like other economic activity, it has been severely affected 
by the Great Recession, leading to a contraction in traded volumes in both 2008 and 2009. 
The most controversial issue is still the CDM’s contribution to sustainable development.  The fact that 
host countries define their own criteria for measuring sustainable development is problematic, 
complicating the debate.  Ultimately, the CDM’s role in avoiding or reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions is the most important contribution it can make to sustainable development. 
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CHAPTER 7 | SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the South African experience with the Clean Development Mechanism will be 
investigated.  South Africa’s emissions profile, CDM role-players, the country’s sustainability criteria, 
its strengths and weaknesses as an investment destination and the potential size of the CDM market 
is discussed.  Lastly social housing and the possible contribution of the CDM to social housing 
delivery is briefly examined. 
 
7.2. BACKGROUND 
The global events of the early 1990s, lead to a radical political change in South Africa in 1994.  This 
had the added advantage of allowing the country to take a decisive step away from some long terms 
trends impacting its sustainability.  Sweeping political, economic and social changes attempted to 
reverse long-terms trends created during the 19th and 20th centuries.  This has been accompanied by 
what the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism calls an “increasing commitment to 
sustainable development” (South Africa, 2006(a):16). 
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Section 24 of the South African Constitution obligate stakeholders to “secure ecologically sustainable 
development” (South Africa, 1996:1251).  The Constitution set in motion a process to develop a range 
of policies and procedures to give effect to this requirement. 
As part of this process, South Africa ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002.  The country is considered a 
non-Annex 1 Party with no binding emission reduction targets for the first commitment period between 
2008 and 2012.  However, South Africa is one of the largest emitters of greenhouse gasses globally 
relative to the size of its population and economy (SAICA, 2009:3).  Thus action to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by the country will likely be required in the near future. 
 
7.3. SOUTH AFRICA’S EMISSIONS PROFILE 
In comparison with other major emerging markets, South Africa’s greenhouse gas emissions intensity 
is relatively high; it emitted 0.96 kg of CO2 per dollar of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1999 
compared to the non-OECD average of 0.66 kg (UNIDO, 2003:9).  In fact the country is among the 
top five developing world emitters (Carbon Positive, 2008:1), contributing 1.2% of global greenhouse 
gas emissions.  South Africa is ranked 13th globally in terms of total CO2 emissions (Ehlers & Wiekert, 
2006:5), 47th on a per capita basis, and as a ratio of GDP 21st. 
 
Figure 7.1 | Countries by total CO2 emissions (Blue highest) (Source: Wikipedia, 
2009(b):unnumbered). 
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In the African context, South Africa is responsible for 41.9% of the greenhouse gas emissions on the 
continent, making it the worst African emitter by far (Goldblatt et al., 2002:24).  Carbon dioxide 
contributed about 80% of South Africa’s total greenhouse gas emissions in 2004 (Energy Information 
Administration, 2006:unnumbered).  The country’s reliance on its abundant coal resources as a 
source of energy (electricity and synthetic fuels) is the main reason behind this emissions profile.  The 
reliance on coal is compounded by a relatively high proportion of energy intensive industry and 
mining, as well as the inefficient use of available energy. 
 
7.4. CDM IN SOUTH AFRICA 
South Africa is classified as a developing country for the purposes of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change.  From the developing country perspective, the CDM offers the 
following opportunities: 
• “It can attract capital for projects that assist in the shift to a more prosperous but less carbon-
intensive economy. 
• It encourages and permits the active participation of private and public sectors. 
• It can be an effective tool of technology transfer if investment is channelled into projects that 
replace old and inefficient fossil fuel technology or create new industries in environmentally 
sustainable technologies. 
• It can help developing countries define investment priorities in projects that meet their 
sustainable development goals” (South Africa, 2010(c):9-10) 
In South Africa, the CDM may provide additional investment for the development of activities that 
reduce the combustion of fossil fuels, reduce methane emissions and improve land use patterns.  
This investment, which is directly related to the extent to which emissions are reduced, could make 
some businesses in South Africa more viable (South Africa, 2010(d):10). 
Bond (2007:79) argues that South Africa should be a preeminent carbon finance investment 
destination for three main reasons.  Since South Africa is the only African country seriously engaged 
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in the CDM project development process, it is enormously important to make a success of these 
projects.  Failure will have serious implications for the carbon market on the rest of the continent.  
Also “South Africa’s variety of methodologies and project developers is relatively representational of 
the global carbon market even though it has much fewer projects than some other countries” (Bond, 
2007:79).  The variety of methodologies employed creates an absorption capacity often lacking in 
most emerging markets.  A third reason relates to South Africa’s heavy reliance on dirty fossil fuels to 
satisfy its energy needs.  Jung (2005:22) confirmed South Africa’s competitiveness, rating the country 
as ‘very attractive’, placing fifth globally (see Addendum 6 for more detail).  
According to the Department of Energy (DoE), which houses the South African Designated National 
Authority, 171 CDM projects have been submitted for their approval by the end of October 2010 (see 
Addendum 7 for a complete list).  Of these, 17 have completed the process of registration with the 
CDM Board, of which 4 have issued CER’s, with the balance still at various stages of the project 
cycle.  Projects submitted for review and approval to the DNA include the following types: 
• bio-fuels, 
• energy efficiency, 
• waste management, 
• cogeneration, 
• fuel switching, and  
• hydro-power. 
They involve the manufacturing, mining, agriculture, energy, waste management, housing and 
residential sectors (South Africa, 2010(a):1). 
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7.4.1. ROLE-PLAYERS 
 
7.4.1.1. PRIVATE SECTOR 
Information on the private sector CDM role-players in South Africa is not readily available.  The 
Designated National Authority published a database of 49 private sector project developers on its 
website (South Africa, 2010(e):unnumbered). 
An industry association - the South African Clean Development Mechanism Industry Association 
(SACDMIA) - was formed on 9 November 2007 (25 Degrees in Africa, 2007:unnumbered).  It was 
intended to be a mechanism through which CDM industry role-players could promote their interests, 
including marketing of CDM, investment promotion and capacity development.  It would seem like the 
association has never really gotten off the ground, since no further activities or information is listed for 
it. 
 
7.4.1.2. GOVERNMENT 
Government’s role is central to the effective functioning of the CDM.  The country’s ability to engage 
with the CDM process is a direct result of Government’s decision to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.  This 
political commitment by government “creates the necessary legal basis for the property rights South 
Africa now has over its emissions.  In other words previously valueless emissions now have a 
(negative) value attached to them and hence now reductions in these emissions now have a positive 
value” (Goldblatt et al, 2002:115). 
A fundamental requirement of the CDM is the need for projects to contribute to achieving sustainable 
development based on host governments’ definition of the concept.  Government is the only institution 
“that has the authority to weigh up public benefits and costs in an assessment of whether a project 
contributes to sustainable development or not” (Goldblatt et al, 2002:115).  Government thus 
determines the nature and scope of CDM projects, as well as the allocation of property rights over 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions. 
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The national government must thus perform a set of key functions to facilitate the creation of credible 
CDM projects.  These include: 
• CDM project evaluation and approval; 
• Assessment of project verification reports; and 
• Governance of the sale and transfer of CERs. 
To allow CDM projects to occur, host countries need to designate national authorities.  A regulation 
under Section 25 of the National Environmental Management Act, 1998 (Act 107 of 1998) establishing 
the DNA was gazetted on 24 December 2004 by the Minister of Environment and Tourism.  South 
Africa’s DNA is the Director General of the Department of Energy, with delegated authority to a 
structure within the Department (see figure 7.2 for more detail).  The main task of the DNA is to 
assess potential CDM projects to determine whether they will assist South Africa in achieving its 
sustainable development goals and to issue formal host country approval where appropriate.  The 
DNA also provides support to project developers and facilitate promotion of South Africa as an 
attractive location for potential CDM investors. 
 
Figure 7.2 | South Africa’s Designated National Authority (Source: Rambau, 2010) 
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The DNA has developed a set of sustainable development criteria to guide the approval process, as 
well as a procedure for evaluating a project’s fulfilment of the defined sustainable development 
criteria. 
 
7.4.2. SUSTAINABILITY CRITERIA 
It is one of the core objectives of the CDM to contribute to the sustainable development of host 
countries.  There are no common guidelines for sustainable criteria guidelines used by countries, but 
rather each had to develop its own.  The criteria, based on social, economic and environmental 
considerations, should be in line with national development criteria (Brent et al, 2005:633).   
South Africa defined sustainable development in the National Environmental Management Act 
(NEMA) (Act 107 of 1998) as “the integration of social, economic and environmental factors into 
planning, implementation and decision making so as to ensure that development serves present and 
future generations” (South Africa, 2008(b):1).  Decisions by the DNA are informed by this definition. 
The definition of sustainable development in NEMA introduces three core criteria used to assess the 
contribution of proposed projects.  The core criteria are: 
• “Economic:  Does the project contribute to national economic development? 
• Social:  Does the project contribute to social development in South Africa? 
• Environment:  Does the project conform to the National Environmental Management Act 
principles of sustainable development?” (South Africa, 2008(b):1) 
The principles of sustainable development in the Act requires “the consideration of all relevant factors” 
(South Africa, 2008(b):1), which includes: 
• Avoiding, minimising or remedying the disturbance of ecosystems; 
• Avoiding, minimising or remedying the degradation of the environment; 
• Avoiding, minimising or remedying the disturbance of landscapes and sites that constitutes 
the nation’s cultural heritage; 
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•  Avoiding or if not possible to avoid, then minimising, reuse or recycle waste where possible, 
or otherwise dispose of in a responsible manner; 
• Using and exploiting non-renewable resources responsibly and equitably, taking into 
consideration the consequences of the depletion of the resource; 
• Developing, using and exploiting renewable resources and the ecosystems of which they are 
part, without exceeding the level beyond which their integrity is jeopardised; 
•  Applying a risk averse and cautious approach, taking the limits of current knowledge about 
the consequences of decisions and actions into consideration; and 
• Anticipating and preventing, or minimising and remedying negative impacts on the 
environment and people’s environmental rights. 
The three core criteria are “supported by additional indicators to allow the DNA to effectively regulate 
CDM project activity in South Africa” (South Africa, 2008(b):1).  These additional indicators are listed 
in Table 7.1. 
 
Table 7.1 | Indicators in support of project approval criteria 
Category Indicator 
En
vir
o
n
m
e
n
ta
l 
Impact on local 
environmental quality 
• Impact of the project on air quality 
• Impact of the project on water pollution 
• Impact of the project on the generation or disposal of 
solid waste 
• Any other positive or negative environmental impacts of 
the project (such as impacts on noise, safety, visual 
impacts or traffic) 
Change in usage of natural 
resources 
• Impact of the project on community access to natural 
resources 
• Impact of the project on the sustainability of use of 
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water, minerals or other non-renewable natural 
resources 
• Impact of the project on the efficiency of resource 
utilisation 
Impacts on biodiversity and 
ecosystems 
• Changes in local or regional biodiversity arising from the 
project 
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic 
 
Economic impacts 
• Impact of the project on foreign exchange requirements 
• Impact of the project on existing economic activity in the 
area 
• Impact of the project on the cost of energy 
• Impact of the project on foreign direct investment 
Appropriate technology 
transfer 
• Positive or negative implications for the transfer of 
technology to South Africa arising from the project 
• Impacts of the project on local skills development 
• Demonstration and replication potential of the project 
So
cia
l 
Alignment with national, 
provincial and local 
development priorities 
• How the project is aligned with provincial and national 
government objectives 
• How the project is aligned with local developmental 
objectives 
• Impact of the project on the provision of, or access to, 
basic services to the area 
• Impact of the project on the relocation of communities if 
applicable 
• Contribution of the project to any specific sectoral 
objectives (for example renewable energy targets 
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Social equity and poverty 
alleviation 
• Impact of the project on employment levels (specify the 
number of jobs created/lost; the duration of time 
employed, distribution of employment opportunities, 
types of employment, categories of employment 
changes in terms of skill levels and gender and racial 
equity) 
• Impact of the project on community social structures 
• Impact of the project on social heritage 
• Impact of the project on the provision of social 
amenities to the community in which the project is 
situated 
• Contribution of the project to the development of 
previously underdeveloped areas or specifically 
designated development nodes 
G
e
n
e
ra
l General project 
acceptability 
• Is the distribution of project benefits deemed to be 
reasonable and fair? 
Source | South Africa, 2005:10-13 
 
7.4.3. SOUTH AFRICA AS A CDM INVESTMENT DESTINATION 
As an investment destination South Africa has some advantages over other non-Annex 1 countries.  
According to Ehlers and Wiekert (2006:1) these include “favourable macroeconomic parameters, a 
‘mature’ economy with a very advanced service and financial sector and infrastructure to OECD 
standards.”  Some disadvantages Ehlers and Wiekert identified are the special requirements placed 
on business in terms of the rules on black economic empowerment, a shortage of qualified specialists 
and security concerns.  Despite its strengths and potential, South Africa lags other major emerging 
markets in attracting foreign direct investment; during 2008 only managing to attract $9 billion and 
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during 2009 $5.7 billion – 0.83% and 0.96% respectively of total FDI for G-20 countries (Source: 
OECD, 2010:2). 
In a study by Jung (2005) on country potential for the CDM, the results indicated that South Africa 
was a favourable CDM investment destination (see Addendum 6 for more details).  Despite being 
rated “very attractive” (Jung, 2005:20), South African industry has been slow to use the CDM.  “This 
seems to be changing as the process becomes clearer and more streamlined and project costs are 
reduced” (Gilder & Parramon, 2009:7).  As table 7.2 and figure 7.3 indicate, the number of projects 
presented to the DNA shows a steady upward trend.  A factor which may have contributed to this, is 
final clarity given by the Government on renewable energy feed-in tariffs, which created an incentive 
for investors to consider projects which previously may have been unprofitable. 
 
Table 7.2 | Number of projects submitted to DNA per year 
Year Number of projects 
2004 1 
2005 8 
2006 24 
2007 21 
2008 39 
2009 36 
201012 42 
Source | South Africa, 2010(a):unnumbered 
 
 
                                                     
12
 Till end of October 2010 
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Figure 7.3 | Number of projects submitted to DNA: total and per project category (Source | 
South Africa, 2010(a):unnumbered) 
 
Despite this, South Africa is not a “major investment destination for the global carbon market, lagging 
many of its comparable non-Annex 1 counterparts involved in the CDM” (Little, 2006:99).  South 
Africa’s 17 registered projects represents just 0.7% of the 2400 CDM projects registered with the 
CDM Executive Board, as of October 2010 (UNEP, 2010:11).  When comparing CERs brought to 
market, South African exports of 1 023 000 CERs in 2009, represent just 0.3% of the global market of 
333 069 100 CERs issued (Fay, Kapfudzaruwa & Na, 2010:5).  
Realising the potential will depend on South African competitiveness in the CDM market including 
factors such as cost, “institutional support and marketing of the country and its CDM options” 
(Goldblatt, 2002:81).  Little, Maxwell and Sutherland (2007:396-398) identified several facilitating and 
inhibiting factors influencing the growth and development of the CDM in South Africa.  Among the 
facilitating factors are: 
• the availability of finance for capital investments in projects that would not otherwise be 
considered if traditional channels of finance had to be used; 
• the trade in CERs is seen as being economically profitable; 
• technology transfer as one of the fundamental goals of the CDM; and 
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• the South African regulatory regime encouraging companies to implement measures to 
respond to climate change. 
The most important factors inhibiting the growth and development of the CDM in South Africa include 
capacity constraints and local legislative requirements. 
 
7.4.3.1. CAPACITY 
‘Capacity’ and skills shortages has often been regarded as South Africa’s greatest weakness 
inhibiting investment, growth and development (South Africa Info, 2009:unnumbered).  The CDM 
process can be severely inhibited by a lack of sufficient capacity in all its various facets.  Various 
United Nations agencies have been involved in building local capacity over the past few years.  
Starting off from a low base, the “capacity among proponents of CDM in South Africa has grown 
considerably over the past two years” (Little, 2006:26). 
The capacity of the DNA to process project applications plays an important role in attracting 
investment and minimising investor risk perception.  According to Silayan (2005:26) the performance 
of a country’s DNA is indicated by the number of CDM projects it offers to the market.  Ehlers and 
Wiekert (2006:3) described the South African DNA as a “rather weak institution that evidently suffers 
from capacity problems.  On the other hand, the person in charge of the authority ... gave 
unbureaucratic and speedy answers to enquiries made.”  Evidently between 2006 and 2009, its 
capacity has been improved considerably since Fay et al (2009:12) reported that the South African 
DNA is “well organised, effective and highly regarded”, confirming impressions gained during 
interaction with staff from the DNA for the purpose of this study. 
South Africa’s DNA claims that project approval will be completed within a maximum of 45 days of 
receipt of the project design documentation.  It further claims to have been able to keep to this period 
for all project applications for which it received complete documentation (Ehlers & Wiekert, 2006:3).  
In an interview with the DNA on 26 October 2010, Takalani Rambau (Deputy Director, Clean 
Development Mechanism) confirmed that the DNA managed to keep to this commitment. 
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A significant capacity constraint, not only reported in South Africa, relates to the designated 
operational entities.  With only one DOE represented locally, it has the potential to present a 
considerable bottleneck in the project approval process. 
 
7.4.3.2. LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS 
Local CDM projects must comply with domestic legal provisions and make a contribution to national 
and sustainable development objectives including job creation and poverty alleviation (Brent as cited 
in Walker, 2006:27).  The DNA reports that it “adopts a very flexible approach to the criteria.  A project 
does not, it says, have to meet all requirements to obtain host country approval” (Ehlers & Wiekert, 
2006:3).  However, according to Rambau (2010), any project that may lead to job losses will not be 
considered to meet the sustainability criteria, even if it would present significant environmental 
advantages. 
Little (2006:104) found that “ineffective government procedures hinder industrial CDM implementation 
and growth rather than facilitating the implementation of industrial CDM projects.”  His study on what 
may be done to accelerate the implementation of the CDM in South African industry reported that “two 
thirds of stakeholders mentioned the additional governmental requirements over and above the 
normal CDM project cycle.  These include the need for environmental impact assessments (EIA)” 
(Little, Maxwell & Sutherland, 2007:406). 
The Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH (German Investment and Development 
Company – DEG) viewed the need for environmental impact assessments for certain projects as a 
major hurdle, since delays are “possible in some provinces as the authorities in charge lack sufficient 
capacities to vet these” (Ehlers & Wiekert, 2006:3).  Since not only national government departments 
are involved in the process, but often approvals from provincial and local government structures are 
also required, it further complicates the process.  “If government could align these processes it would 
help to streamline the registration of more industrial CDM projects” (Little, Maxwell & Sutherland, 
2007:406). 
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CDM projects are “capital intensive projects and starts off with negative income” (Engineering News, 
2008:1).  “To realize profit from the CDM and sell CERs to the open market, the investor must wait 
until the project delivers CERs.  Technical knowledge and costs must be established before an 
investor can take ownership of the CERs...  This is a risk for a party without substantial experience 
and knowledge of the market and industry, as most projects have no guarantee of funding, 
completion, and validation, with the result that CERs may not be created or registered” (Tucker & 
Gore, 2008:3). 
An important way to reduce costs is to “minimize the time required for development and for obtaining 
necessary regulatory approvals.  The need to undertake an environmental impact assessment (EIA) 
prior to project development is one aspect which may attract significant cost” (Gilder & Basterfield, 
2007:1).  Costs include both direct costs (e.g. hiring an environmental assessment practitioner) and 
indirect costs (e.g. extended timeframes). 
 
7.4.4. POTENTIAL SIZE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CDM MARKET  
There is considerable variation in the estimates of the potential size of the South African CDM market.  
In the South African National Strategy Study on the Clean Development Mechanism of 2002 it was 
estimated that on the supply side “between 20 and 25 MtCO2 per year of emission reductions may be 
achievable at reasonable cost through already identified CDM options.  About half of these reductions 
appear to be from projects that would be of interest to private sector investors” (Goldblatt et al, 
2002:80). 
In Goldblatt’s study, at the average predicted price for CERs of $11 per ton of CO2e, the estimated 
amount of reductions of 10 to 12.5 MtCO2e for the private commercially viable projects alone, would 
translate into annual value of between $110 million (ZAR759 million13) and $137.5 million (ZAR 
948.75 million). 
                                                     
13
 Exchange rate US$1 = ZAR6,9 
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When the demand side is considered, South Africa has the potential to satisfy demand for CERs of 
between 2.4 MtCO2e and 15.6 MtCO2e, with an average predicted amount of 9 MtCO2e (Goldblatt, 
2002:80).  This would realise, at the average predicted price of $11 per tCO2e, between $26.4 million 
and $171.6 million (ZAR182.16 million to ZAR1 184.04 million) per annum, or on average $99 million 
(ZAR683.1 million) per annum.  Estimates for the potential demand was based on two assumptions: 
• That South African CDM projects can at least match the costs of emission reductions of other 
CDM supplier countries; and 
• That the country would be able to satisfy the same proportion of CDM investment demand as 
of other FDI. 
The potential demand would roughly be in line with the estimated annual supply of commercially 
viable CERs.  As a result of the limitations on the mitigation study reported by Goldblatt, which 
excluded the mining and industrial sectors, South Africa should be able to easily exceed the 
estimated supply. 
 
Table 7.3 | 2002 Projected CER sales from South Africa 
CDM volume Price per ton ($ per annum) 
$4 $11 $18 
2.4 mtCO2e 9 600 000 26 400 000 43 200 000 
9 mtCO2e 36 000 000 99 000 000 162 000 000 
15.6 mtCO2e 62 400 000 171 600 000 280 800 000 
Source | Goldblatt, 2002:175 
 
The South African DNA listed a CDM pipeline of 171 projects as of 28 October 2010 (see Addendum 
7 for a complete list).  Of these, 137 are Project Idea Notes (PINs) and 34 Project Design Documents 
(PDDs), 17 of which have been registered by the CDM Executive Board as CDM projects and 4 
issued with CERs.  Renewable energy (27.5% of pipeline), energy efficiency (15.2%) and fuel 
switching (13.45%) are the project categories with the largest number of projects.  Energy efficiency 
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and fuel switching projects are responsible for the bulk of the projected emissions reductions, 
representing 66 MtCO2e or 66% of the total.  Whereas in most other markets N2O reduction and 
industrial process projects had the largest average emissions reductions per project, in South Africa 
fuel switching and energy efficiency projects has the largest average emissions reductions per 
project. 
 
Table 7.4 | South Africa’s CDM project portfolio by project type  
Project Type Number of Projects 
(registered) (submitted to 
DNA) 
Estimated annual 
emissions reductions 
(tCO2e) 
Estimated average 
annual emissions 
reductions (tCO2e per project) 
Bio-fuel production 5 (0)(5) 958 000 191 600 
Biomass 4 (0)(4) 204 482 51 120 
Co-generation 22 (2)(20) 4 229 419 192 246 
Energy efficiency 26 (2)(24) 34 899 953 1 342 305 
Fuel switching 23 (3)(20) 31 525 500 1 370 674 
Industrial process 5 (0)(5) 556 954 111 391 
Methane recovery and 
flaring 
14 (4)(10) 4 060 921 290 066 
N2O Reduction 4 (4)(0) 1 700 000 425 000 
Renewable energy 47 (2)(45) 17 581 781 374 080 
Transport 3 (0)(3) 2 172 148 724 049 
Waste management 18 (0)(18) 2 347 473 130 415 
Total 171 (17)(154) 100 236 631 586 179 
Source | South Africa, 2010(a):unnumbered 
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Of the 171 projects in the South African CDM pipeline, 4 have been issued with CERs by the CDM 
Executive Board.  This represents annual emissions reductions of 1 023 000 tCO2e.  The South 
African DNA reported a CER price range of €12 to €22 (or $16.8 to $30.8)14 per tCO2e for South 
African assets (Rambau, 2010).  Thus the projected annual income for projects issued with CERs 
should be between $17 186 00 and $31 508 400. 
 
Table 7.5 | Projected revenue of CDM projects issued with CERs 
CDM volume Price per ton 
$16.8 
ZAR115.92 
$23.8 
ZAR164.22 
$30.8 
ZAR212.52 
Annual 
17 186 400 24 347 400 31 508 400 
118 586 160 167 997 060 217 407 960 
Till end 2012 
264 045 600 374 064 600 484 083 600 
1 821 914 640 2 581 045 740 3 340 176 840 
Life of projects 
322 828 800 457 340 800 591 852 800 
2 227 518 720 3 155 651 520 4 083 784 320 
 
 
The 17 registered South African CDM projects projected an annual emissions reduction of 2.97 
MtCO2e or taken over the life of the 17 projects a combined total of 38.601 MtCO2e.  Projected 
revenue from CER exports from these projects could be between US49 896 000 and $91 476 000 per 
year. 
 
 
                                                     
14
 Exchange rate €1 = US1.4 
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Table 7.6 | Projected revenue of registered CDM projects 
CDM volume Price per ton 
$16.8 
ZAR115.92 
$23.8 
ZAR164.22 
$30.8 
ZAR212.52 
Annual 
49 896 000 70 686 000 91 476 000 
344 282 400 487 733 400 631 184 400 
Life of projects 
648 496 800 918 703 800 1 188 910 800 
4 474 627 920 6 339 056 220 8 203 484 520 
 
 
If all 171 projects in the South African CDM pipeline are considered, the total annual emissions 
reductions will amount to 100.24 MtCO2e, which is substantially more than the 20 to 25 MtCO2e 
reported in the 2002 South African National Strategy Study on the Clean Development Mechanism 
(Goldblatt, 2002:80).  Emissions over the life of these projects may amount to between 1, 711.8 
MtCO2e and 1, 921.13 MtCO2e.  Projected revenue from CER exports could be between 
$1 683 975 401 and $ 3 087 288 235 per year. 
 
Table 7.7 | Projected revenue of total CDM pipeline 
CDM volume Price per ton 
$16.8 
ZAR115.92 
$23.8 
ZAR164.22 
$30.8 
ZAR212.52 
Annual 
1 683 975 401 2 385 631 818 3 087 288 235 
11 619 430 266 16 460 859 543 21 302 288 820 
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Life of projects15 
(minimum timeframe) 
28 757 816 438 40 740 239 954 52 722 663 470 
198 428 933 425 281 107 655 685 363 786 377 946 
Life of projects 
(maximum timeframe) 
32 274 935 330 45 722 825 051 59 170 714 772 
222 697 053 780 315 487 492 855 408 277 931 930 
 
 
When comparing projected annual revenue for South Africa’s 4 projects issued with CERs, with other 
South African exports, the export of CERs could constitute a small but significant part of total South 
African exports.  Exports of between $17 million and $31 million of CERs would amount to between 
0.03% and 0.05% of total South African exports of $58.3 billion16 (Economist, 2010:215).  If the 17 
registered projects are considered, the percentage rises to 0.09% to 0.16%, and for the total pipeline 
it could amount to between 2.89% and 5.3%. 
 
Table 7.8 | CER exports as a percentage of South African exports (2008 figures) 
 
 CER  exports % of total exports (2008 = $58.3 billion) 
Projects 
with CERs 
issued 
 $17  186  400  0.03% 
 $24  347  400  0.04% 
 $31  508  400  0.05% 
Registered 
projects 
 $49  896  000  0.09% 
 $70  686  000  0.12% 
 $91  476  000  0.16% 
CDM  $1 683  975  401  2.89% 
                                                     
15
 Some projects have the option of renewing for further periods.  The minimum timeframe refers to the initial 
period, while the maximum timeframe includes all possible renewals. 
16
 2008 figures 
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pipeline  $2 385  631  818  4.09% 
 $3 087  288  235  5.30% 
 
7.5. CDM AND SOCIAL HOUSING 
 
7.5.1. BACKGROUND 
Housing has been at the top of the South African government’s agenda since the start of the 
democratisation process in the early 1990s, and forms an important part of the country’s attempts to 
alleviate poverty. 
Section 26 (1) of the Constitution mentions access to adequate housing as a basic right for all South 
Africans, compelling the Government to take all “reasonable measures within its available resources, 
to achieve the progressive realisation of this right” (South Africa, 1996:1254). 
The 1996 Census revealed a backlog of 2 202 519 houses (South Africa, 2010(c):unnumbered).  
Over the last 15 years, the government has managed to build 1, 4 million housing units (South Africa, 
2010(c):unnumbered).  This included 161 854 during the 2009/2010 financial year and 239 533 during 
the previous financial year (South Africa, 2010(b):unnumbered). 
 
7.5.2. KUYASA CDM PROJECT 
The project is located in Kuyasa, a neighbourhood in Khayelitsha, approximately thirty kilometres from 
the centre of Cape Town.  Khayelitsha was established in the mid-1980s as a dormitory settlement to 
accommodate people migrating from the Eastern Cape to Cape Town in search of employment 
opportunities.  It is an area with a complex social, economic and political history, with the majority of 
its residents trapped in chronic poverty.  As part of the Government’s scheme to relocate residents 
from informal to formal housing, low cost housing units have been constructed in Kuyasa using the 
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once-off Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) national housing subsidy.  Each 
housing unit is thirty square metres (30 m2) in area.  Even though they are electrified they have 
neither ceilings nor water heaters, while lighting is provided employing incandescent light bulbs.  
According to SouthSouthNorth (2005(b):2) “energy service bench marks such as thermal comfort and 
warm water on demand are not met.  The energy profile of the resident of Kuyasa is characterised by 
multiple fuel use (e.g. paraffin, wood) for space and water heating.” 
The project is a partnership between the City of Cape Town, SouthSouthNorth (an NGO) and the 
community of Kuyasa.  On conclusion of a three year process of project design in partnership with 
SouthSouthNorth and the local beneficiary community, the City of Cape Town, as project owner, 
registered Kuyasa as a CDM Project with the CDM Executive Board in August 2005. 
 
7.5.2.1. PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
“Certified by the CDM Executive Board on 27 August 2005, Kuyasa is the first Gold Standard project 
in the world to generate certified emissions reductions credits and has been widely applauded both 
nationally and internationally” (Bond, 2007:74).   
The ‘Kuyasa low-cost urban housing energy upgrade project’ (the project) “demonstrates sustainable 
energy interventions as being appropriate and effective in meeting the energy service needs of low-
income communities” (SouthSouthNorth, 2005(a):1).  It also demonstrates how a mechanism like the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) can be linked to poverty alleviation and sustainable 
development. 
Project planning started in 2002.  The pilot phase, launched in July 2003, involved 8 homes and 2 
crèches.  Phase II expanded the target group from 10 to 2 309 units throughout Kuyasa.  The project 
involves retrofitting the low-cost housing units with solar water heaters, ceilings and ceiling insulation, 
as well as replacing the existing incandescent light bulbs with compact fluorescent lights.  Two 
thousand three hundred existing low-income houses in Kuyasa, Khayelitsha were identified and 
selected for inclusion in the project, which produced significant savings in future CO2 emissions 
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calculated over a period of 21 years, by reducing the reliance on fossil fuels both directly and 
indirectly. 
“A world first in the Kuyasa project is that the CDM methodology being applied interprets the rules 
compiled through the UNFCCC in a manner which allows for the crediting of greenhouse gas 
reductions against a baseline that is equivalent to a projected level of energy service (a warm house, 
sufficient warm water and light) rather than the current level of energy poverty, characterised by 
‘suppressed demand’ for energy services.  Rather than waiting for these households to become ‘dirty’ 
as a result of increased energy consumption before they qualify to get ‘clean’, they are ‘leap-frogged’ 
to the cleaner technologies through the CDM mechanism, thus linking climate change to poverty 
alleviation” (SouthSouthNorth, 2005(b):3).  The project developer calculated that in total 2.85 tonnes 
of CO2 emissions are saved per household per year as a result of the project.  Over the life of the 
project of 21 years, emissions of 138,180 tCO2e will be prevented. 
In addition to the physical needs that are satisfied through infrastructure upgrading, the project 
involves other sustainable development benefits.  The City of Cape Town, the project owner, lists the 
following: 
• “A saving in the cost of energy services to households by approximately $100 per household 
per year. 
• Health cost benefits due to increases in the ambient temperature and reduced reliance on 
heat sources holding fire-related dangers and negative respiratory health impacts (~800 000 
hospitalisation incidents related to fire and ingestion of paraffin). 
• Employment creation of approximately 100 person years for installation of technologies and 
associated infrastructure (this is not inclusive of the local manufacture of the technologies, 
which would add to this figure). 
• Potential for replication across all low-income housing in South Africa. 
• The Net Present Value of the income from the emissions reductions will  
cover ~30% to 40% of the capital costs of the installation of these technologies, based on the 
current nature of the carbon market. 
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• Building human capacity around various aspects of the project design, most notably around 
energy efficiency and renewable energy and the development of a social awareness and an 
understanding of the link between the environment and energy consumption, by drawing 
marginalised people into a global environmental issue” (Cape Town, 2009:unnumbered). 
SouthSouthNorth (2005(b):3) reported a strong emphasis on community engagement throughout the 
process.  The municipal ward development forum formed a broad-based steering committee involving 
community members in project design.  In addition the steering committee is responsible for: 
• beneficiary selection; 
• mapping out the project through its different phases; and 
• facilitating contact and a flow of ideas between the community and the project developers. 
Design and technical problems were communicated through regular meetings by the community 
based steering committee.  As a result the project is actively supported by local residents and scored 
a particularly high Gold Standard rating in terms of social sustainability and local development.   
The project created local jobs in installing and maintaining the locally manufactured solar water 
heaters.  Furthermore, the ZAR685.00 average annual savings on electricity expenses is retained in 
the local economy with the resultant possibility of further economic spin-offs. 
 
7.5.2.3. PROJECT FINANCE 
An analysis of project cost versus projected revenue over the life of the project shows a net profit of 
$983,634.00, as indicated in table 7.9. 
 
Table 7.9 | Balance sheet of Kuyasa CDM project 
Upfront Cost 
Per house $771.00 
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Number of houses 2,309 
Total $1,780,239.00 
Revenue 
Emissions reduction per household 
(tCO2/hh/year) 2.85 
Credit price $20.00 
Revenue per household $57.00 
Number of households 2,309 
Revenue per year $131,613.00 
Revenue over project lifespan $2,763,873.00 
Net Profit $983,634.00 
Source | Manning, 2008:11 
 
On completion of the pilot phase, the project team had to secure the necessary finance for full project 
implementation.  Upfront costs included capital costs, labour, ongoing maintenance, project 
management, as well as the CDM transaction costs.  This equated to $771.00 per house. 
Sources of revenue for the project were limited.  Beneficiaries could only contribute an estimated 15% 
of the project costs, based on their historical energy expenditure.  The sale of CERs – the carbon 
income – added up to a further estimated 15 to 20% of the project’s financing needs.  As a result a 
significant amount of grant finance was required to close the gap between revenues and costs.  Grant 
funding from the South African Government as well as the Western Cape Provincial Government, 
plugged the gap.  “These sources of funding are generally once off grants and are thus not 
considered to be sustainable, as they cannot be counted on for other similar projects in the future.  At 
the current price of carbon, carbon revenues are insufficient to fulfil the project’s financing needs.  As 
a result there is a need for a financial model to enable replication of the project in other areas of South 
Africa.  Access to sustainable financing is central to the replicability of the project” (SouthSouthNorth, 
2005(b):4).  “With the vast majority of funding for this project now secured through the government, 
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SouthSouthNorth is now referring to the project as ‘a public sector project, relying on government 
grant funding for its implementation’” (Bond, 2007:95). 
 
7.5.3. CDM SOCIAL HOUSING PROGRAMME  
The Kuyasa CDM project was developed with the intention to serve as a model for similar projects 
involving South Africa’s low cost housing stock.  Unfortunately this has not yet materialised.  A main 
reason for this is the complete absence of the Government (other than some municipalities) in CDM 
project development, despite the fact that Government is South Africa’s largest property owner and 
initiator of new property developments through its social housing delivery strategy.  There is no 
apparent good reason for this absence.  The DNA reported that despite their best efforts to market the 
advantages of the CDM to Government, no progress can be reported (Rambau, 2010). 
When social housing is considered, the Kuyasa CDM project should point the way forward.  If the 
project design for Kuyasa is taken as model, and is replicated to the 1.4 million low cost houses 
Government has delivered over the last 15 years, the potential income to supplement Government’s 
budget for housing delivery of ZAR13 033 695 000 in 2009/2010 (South Africa, 2010(b):22) can be 
significant. 
If a projection is done using the amount of emissions savings calculated for the Kuyasa CDM project 
as a baseline, a CDM programme involving Government’s current stock of social housing may yield 
3.9 MtCO2e per year.  Over the life of the programme of 21 years, it may save 83.7 MtCO2e.  
Potential revenue from the export of CERs may yield between $67 million and $122 million per year, 
or $1.4 billion (ZAR9.66 billion) to $2.5 billion (ZAR17.25 billion) over 21 years. 
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Table 7.10 | Projected revenue for a Social Housing CDM Programme 
Social Housing CDM Programme 
Period 
CDM 
Volume 
(tCO2e) 
Price per ton ($) 
16.8 23.8 30.8 
Annum 3 990 000       67 032 000          94 962 000        122 892 000  
Period 83 790 000  1 407 672 000     1 994 202 000     2 580 732 000  
Period 
CDM 
Volume 
(tCO2e) 
Price per ton (ZAR) 
115.92 164.22 212.52 
Annum 3 990 000     462 520 800        655 237 800        847 954 800  
Period 83 790 000  9 712 936 800   13 759 993 800   17 807 050 800  
 
If expenditure on the Kuyasa project is used as a guideline, the balance sheet for a potential social 
housing CDM programme may be decidedly positive.  Admittedly the balance sheet calculation is 
optimistic since it is based on data for costs per housing unit dating from 2005.  Despite this, the 
calculation is still useful as an indicator of the potential of such a programme. 
 
Table 7.11 | Balance sheet of a Social Housing CDM programme 
Upfront Cost 
Per house $771.00 
Number of houses 1.4 million 
Total $1 079 400 000 
Revenue 
Emissions reduction per household 
(tCO2/hh/year) 2.85 
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Credit price $16.80 to $30.80 
Revenue per household $47.88 to $87.78 
Number of households 1.4 million 
Revenue per year $67 million to $122 million 
Revenue over project lifespan $1 407 672 000 to $2 580 732 000 
Net Profit $328 272 000 to $1 501 332 000 
 
Over and above the financial returns on the investment, the social returns in terms of improved quality 
of life will make a significant contribution to the sustainability of South Africa’s poor communities. 
 
7.6. CONCLUSION 
South Africa ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, thus enabling it to participate in Clean Development 
Mechanism project development as a non-Annex 1 Party with no binding emission reduction targets 
for the first commitment period between 2008 and 2012.  South Africa is one of the largest emitters of 
greenhouse gasses globally relative to the size of its population and economy.  This combined with its 
sophisticated business environment, means that the country should be a significant CDM role-player. 
For a variety of reasons it is not yet, although the number of CDM projects in its pipeline is steadily 
increasing.  Important contributing factors to the slow start may be the initial capacity constraints at 
the DNA and the numerous delays in finalising the regulatory environment for renewable energy, at 
long last creating an incentive for investors to consider projects which previously may have been 
unprofitable. 
The 171 projects currently in the South African CDM pipeline should result in annual emissions 
reductions of 100.24 MtCO2e or emissions savings over the life of these projects of between 1 711.8 
MtCO2e and 1 921.13 MtCO2e.  Projected revenue from CER exports could be between $1.6 billion 
and $ 3 billion per year or between $32 billion and $59 billion over the period. 
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A significant opportunity Government has been slow to capitalise on, is the country’s low cost housing 
stock of 1.4 million units.  Based on the experience of the Kuyasa CDM project, Government could 
earn revenues of between $67 million and $122 million per year, or $1.4 billion to $2.5 billion over 21 
years, while significantly improving the quality of life of its poorest citizens. 
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CHAPTER 8 | CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
8.1. AIM OF THE RESEARCH 
In the renewed focus on poverty alleviation in the international development arena, there has been an 
emphasis on development assistance from rich donor countries to poor developing countries.  This 
however may not be a reliable or adequate source of development finance. 
In the context of sustainable development, poor countries will not be the only ones requiring 
development finance.  It is clear that rich countries need to undergo a process of ‘redevelopment’ to 
adjust to a more sustainable development trajectory.  This will place unprecedented demands on the 
international financial system, which is still in the process of recovering after the recent financial crisis.  
It may therefore be necessary to look at alternative sources of development finance.  There are some 
interesting proposals around.  One alternative, which has received a lot of attention lately, is carbon 
finance and the possible contribution thereof to sustainable development. 
This paper sought to examine alternative sources of finance for sustainable development in South 
Africa.  It specifically investigates carbon trading, as an alternative, market-based mechanism to raise 
development finance, while making direct positive contributions to sustainability. 
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In this research an exploratory research methodology reviewing the existing literature appropriate to 
the topic was used.  In this way the 5 questions guiding the research has been answered.  
 
8.2. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
1) WHAT CONSTITUTES THE MORE TRADITIONAL SOURCES OF 
DEVELOPMENT FINANCE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES? 
 
Traditional sources of development finance for poor countries include official development aid, foreign 
direct investment, private companies and foundations, remittances, and specialist funds like the 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the GAVI Alliance and the GEF. 
ODA has historically been the main source of investment.  Despite the fact that ODA are at historically 
high levels, FDI is currently the most important source of development finance.  There is fierce 
competition to attract export-oriented FDI.  Africa seems to be more successful at attracting extractive 
and market seeking FDI, which does not necessarily contribute to sustainable development. 
 
2) WHAT ARE SOME ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF DEVELOPMENT FINANCE? 
 
Many interesting ideas have been raised over the last few years to raise alternative sources of 
development finance.  The most significant of these will be to reduce damaging flows such as 
subsidies and debt repayments.  Although much progress have been made on international debt 
repayments, any reductions of national subsidies seem politically impossible. 
On the other hand there are some interesting ideas on how to create positive flows.  These include 
global taxes on currency transactions and arms sales, as well as global environmental taxes.  Some 
other ideas are the creation of a global lottery, global premium bonds, an International Finance 
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Facility, the issuing of Special Drawing Rights for public goods, public guarantees and payment for 
environmental services. 
3) HOW MUCH SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT CAN BE EXPECTED FROM 
CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM PROJECTS? 
 
The CDM is a flexibility mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol intended to assist countries to meet their 
commitments to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropocentric interference with the climate system.  In addition it was intended 
to assist developing countries with their sustainable development.  CDM’s success at contributing to 
sustainable development has been severely criticised.  Yet in the absence of agreement on exactly 
what needs to be achieved, the debate is somewhat complicated. 
The concept of sustainable development refers to both needs and limits; needs encompass the 
obligation to address global poverty through the various approaches that has emerged over the years.  
Environmental limits impacts on the process of addressing needs.  The most serious dimension of 
environmental limits must be global climate disruption resulting from increased greenhouse gas 
concentration in the atmosphere from human activity.  Global climate change will affect the poor first 
and also most severely. 
If development is seen as a process whereby income poverty is addressed, the criticism levelled 
against the CDM on sustainable development is most probably fair.  Few CDM project types will have 
a direct monetary benefit to the poor, although some will improve the quality of life of the poor.  These 
must be promoted and implemented since carbon finance offers an opportunity as an alternative 
source of development finance.  Yet the most important contribution the CDM will make to sustainable 
development, is by contributing to a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions and helping emerging 
economies onto a more sustainable development trajectory, ultimately securing the livelihoods of the 
poor. 
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4) WHAT IS THE SCALE OF POTENTIAL INCOME FROM THE CLEAN 
DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM FOR SOUTH AFRICA? 
 
South Africa is not a major investment destination in the CDM market.  South Africa’s 17 registered 
CDM projects represent just 0.7% of all registered CDM projects.  Recently the DNA has received 
more project ideas, with a total of 171 projects in the CDM pipeline. 
Projected revenue from the CDM pipeline is between $1.6 billion and $3 billion per year, or taken over 
the lifetime of the projects between $28.7 billion and $59 billion (in constant 2010 dollars). 
 
5) WHAT CAN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT DO TO LEVERAGE THE 
CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM TO BENEFIT THE POOR? 
 
The South Africa Government has played no role in CDM project development, even though as the 
country’s largest property owner it should have enormous opportunities in energy efficiency projects.  
One way in which the Government can leverage the CDM, while delivering direct benefits to the 
quality of life of the poor, is by replicating the model offered by the Kuyasa CDM project.  The 
country’s stock of 1.4 million social housing units constructed over the last fifteen years can be 
retrofitted with solar water heaters, energy efficient lighting systems and proper insulation to improve 
the thermal properties thereof. 
Direct benefits to the poor include job opportunities during the manufacturing and construction 
phases, improved health resulting from improved quality of housing stock and savings on energy 
expenses.  The programme will also generate substantial amounts of carbon finance.  An estimation 
using the parameters of the Kuyasa CDM project, indicates that Government may have a net profit of 
between $328 million and $1.5 billion on the sale of CERs. 
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8.3. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The exploratory nature of this study, and the fact that precedent studies do not exist, exposed gaps 
and uncertainties as well as opportunities for future research.  The study specifically indicated that: 
• Carbon trading through the regulated market does present a viable option as an  alternative 
source of development finance; 
• Carbon finance must be seen as part of a ‘mix’ of finance options; and 
• Carbon finance can make a significant contribution to financing sustainable development. 
Further empirical research is required to substantiate the findings of this study.  Therefore the 
following research is recommended: 
• More in-depth case studies should be done of the projects in the South African CDM pipeline 
at the different stages of development (PIN approved, PDD approved, Registered and CERs 
issued).  This could substantiate for example if the findings on revenue potential done in this 
study, which is based on a CER price band and projected emissions reductions, is in fact 
accurate. 
• More in depth research on the potential for CDM projects in South Africa and specifically what 
should be the national priorities on emissions reductions. 
• In depth research on the size, scope and potential for projects linked to the voluntary carbon 
market. 
These research projects would require substantial resources - especially dedicated researcher time - 
thus they could not be included in this study. 
Based on the results of this study, it is recommended that South Africa needs to have a much more 
focused approach to realising its potential for emissions reductions and by consequence earning 
revenue from the export of carbon credits.  Government especially needs to play a proactive role in 
identifying and developing projects where it has a direct interest, as illustrated in the case of the 
country’s social housing stock.  As the DNA is responsible for evaluating and approving proposed 
CDM projects, it cannot take on this responsibility since it would create a conflict of interest.  It is 
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therefore recommended that an agency like the Central Energy Fund (CEF) is tasked to this end.  The 
CEF is already an active player in the CDM market, assisting several South African municipalities as a 
CDM project developer.  Their current role could quite easily be expanded to include a wider focus, 
assisting the country to move onto a more sustainable development trajectory. 
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ADDENDUM 1 | GLOBAL CO2 EMISSIONS 
 
Source | UNEP, 2009:unnumbered  
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ADDENDUM 2 | COMMON TYPES OF OFFSET PROJECTS 
Project Type Advantages Disadvantages 
Methane Capture and 
Destruction from Landfills 
• Efficient means of reducing 
emissions 
• Captured gas useful as fuel 
• Somewhat reduced odours 
• Reduced risk of ground 
water contamination 
• Relatively inexpensive 
• Easy to measure and 
monitor 
• Potential project based 
concerns about complete 
additionality 
Methane Capture and 
Destruction from Livestock 
• Efficient means of reducing 
emissions 
• Captured gas useful as fuel 
• Reduced odours and co-
pollutants 
• Reduced risk of ground 
water contamination 
• Relatively inexpensive 
• Concerns about complete, 
project-based additionality 
Methane Capture and 
Destruction from Coal Mines 
• Efficient means of reducing 
emissions 
• Captured gas useful as fuel 
• Few leakage concerns 
• Can improve safety for mine 
workers 
• Relatively inexpensive 
• Concerns about complete, 
project-based additionality 
in active mines 
Page | 201  
Copyright ©2011 Stellenbosch University 
All rights reserved 
 
Industrial Gas Destruction • Very efficient 
• Highly additional 
• Relatively inexpensive 
• Easy to reliably measure 
and monitor 
• Potential supply is limited 
• May not provide the 
marketing benefits of other 
offset forms 
Direct Fossil Fuel Reduction • Supports clean technology 
• Cost savings 
• Reduces co-pollutants such 
as SOx, PM and VOCs 
• Reduces fossil fuel 
dependency 
• Potential social benefits 
• Relatively inefficient means 
of reducing GHGs 
Indirect Fossil Fuel Reduction 
(RECs) 
• Established market (in US) 
with certification and 
verification systems 
• Supporting on-grid 
renewable energy important 
for decreasing reliance on 
fossil fuels 
• Reduces co-pollutants such 
as SOx, PM and VOCs 
• Compatibility issues 
between markets for RECs 
and carbon offsets (i.e. 
double counting of 
reductions) 
Reforestation-Afforestation of 
Native Tree Species 
• Large number of potential 
social co-benefits 
• Contributes to biodiversity 
conservation 
• Addresses deforestation, an 
important part of the climate 
• Lack of permanence 
• Uncertain science for 
quantifying reductions 
• Relatively inefficient means 
of reducing GHGs 
• Less efficient than many 
mono-crop projects 
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change problem 
• High potential marketing 
value 
• Relatively expensive 
Avoided Deforestation of Native 
Trees 
• Large number of potential 
social co-benefits 
• Contributes to biodiversity 
conservation 
• Addresses deforestation, an 
important part of the climate 
change problem 
• Potentially less expensive 
than reforestation 
• High potential marketing 
value 
• Lack of permanence 
• Relatively inefficient means 
of reducing GHGs 
• Major concerns about 
leakage (i.e. protecting 
forests in one area shifts 
deforestation elsewhere) 
• Difficult to measure 
additionality 
• No accepted methodology 
under CDM 
Reforestation-Afforestation 
Monoculture  
• Some potential for social co-
benefits 
• Trees with high 
sequestration rates can be 
selected 
• Often lower cost 
• Lack of permanence 
• Relatively inefficient means 
of reducing GHGs 
• Concerns about water 
consumption 
• Reduced social and 
environmental co-benefits 
compared to projects that 
use native tree species 
• Can backfire in marketing 
terms 
Soil Sequestration • Reduced erosion 
• Large number of potential 
• Questions of additionality 
and permanence should be 
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social co-benefits 
• Improved water quality 
• Relatively inexpensive 
carefully considered 
• Science unclear on 
measuring and quantifying 
reductions 
Geological Sequestration • Huge potential for storage • Few co-benefits 
• Technology still evolving 
• Long term risks 
• Effectiveness uncertain 
Source | Adapted from Hamilton et al, 2006:8-9 
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ADDENDUM 3 | VERIFICATION STANDARDS USED IN THE VOLUNTARY MARKET 
 
 Gold 
Standard 
Voluntary 
Carbon 
Standard 
Climate 
Neutral 
Network 
Green-e Climate, 
Community, 
Biodiversity 
Standard 
Chicago 
Climate 
Exchange 
ISO 
14064 
Additionality Tests    X X  X 
Environmental & 
Social Co-
Benefits 
X  X  X   
Requires 
Monitoring 
X X X X X X X 
Reporting/ 
Registration 
X X  X  X X 
Uses 
WRI/WBCSD 
GHG Protocol 
 X X   X X 
Certification 
outside US 
X X X X X X X 
Compatible with 
other standards 
X X X X X X X 
Sequestration 
Projects 
 X X  X X X 
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Off-Grid 
Renewable 
X X X   X X 
Energy Efficiency X X X   X X 
Methane X X X   X X 
Renewable 
Energy Credits 
  X X   X 
Source | Hamilton et al, 2006:11 
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ADDENDUM 4 | CERTIFICATION STANDARDS USED IN THE VOLUNTARY MARKET 
 
 Description Environmental & 
Social Benefits? 
Reporting/ 
Registration 
Certification 
Logo? 
Include 
LULUCF? 
Geographical 
Reach 
Start Date 
Gold 
Standard 
Certification for 
offset projects & 
carbon credits 
Yes VER Registry in 
development 
Yes RE & EE 
projects 
International 2006 
The VCS Certification for 
offset projects & 
carbon credits 
No Use Bank of 
New York; other 
registry TBD 
Yes Yes International Mid-2007 
Green-e Certification for 
offset sellers  
No Registry 
incorporated 
Yes Accepts 
other 
standards 
that include 
LULUCF 
North America; 
international 
possibilities 
Mid-2007 
CCB 
Standards 
Certification 
programme for 
offset projects 
Yes Projects on 
website 
Yes Only 
LULUCF 
International 2007 
CCX Internal system 
for CCX offset 
projects & 
carbon credits 
No Registry 
incorporated 
with trading 
platform 
No Yes International 2003 
Plan Vivo Guidelines for 
offset projects 
Yes No No Community 
based agro-
forestry 
International 2000 
Climate 
Neutral 
Network 
Certification 
programme for 
offset sellers & 
carbon neutral 
No No Yes Yes Primarily North 
America 
2001 
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products 
Greenhouse 
Friendly 
Certification 
programme for 
offset sellers & 
carbon neutral 
products 
No No Yes Yes Australia 2001 
WBCSD/WR
I Protocol 
A set of 
guidelines for 
projects & 
corporate GHG 
accounting 
No Does not include 
registry 
No Protocol 
created for 
LULUCF 
International 2001 
CCAR A registry 
protocol 
No Reporting 
protocols used 
as standards 
No Yes, first 
protocol 
Currently 
California 
2005 
VER+ Certification 
programme for 
offset projects, 
carbon credits & 
carbon neutral 
products 
No TÜV SÜV 
BlueRegistry 
Yes Includes JI 
or CDM 
methodologi
es 
International Mid-2007 
ISO 14064 Certification 
programme 
emissions 
reporting offset 
projects, carbon 
credits 
No No No Yes International Methodolo
gy released 
in 2006 
VOS Certification for 
offset projects & 
carbon credits 
No TBD NO Follow CDM 
or JI 
methodologi
es 
International TBD 
Social Certification for Yes Creating its own Yes Reforestatio South America & 2002 
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Source | adapted from Hamilton et al, 2007:43 
  
Carbon offset projects & 
carbon credits 
registry system 
Yes 
n & avoided 
forestation 
Portugal 
DEFRA Proposed 
consumer code 
for offsetting & 
accounting 
No Does not include 
registry 
No Follow 
CDM/JI 
standards 
UK TBD 
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ADDENDUM 5 | ANNEX 1 PARTIES TO THE KYOTO PROTOCOL  
European Union 
 (15 Member States) 
Economies in Transition Other Parties 
Pa
rty
 
Ta
rg
e
t 
Em
is
si
o
n
 
in
 
19
90
 
Pa
rty
 
Ta
rg
e
t 
Em
is
si
o
n
 
in
 
19
90
 
Pa
rty
 
Ta
rg
e
t 
Em
is
si
o
n
 
in
 
19
90
 
Portugal 27% 59.3 Russia 0% 3,046.6 Iceland  10% 3.3 
Greece 25% 109.4 Ukraine 0% 978.9 Australia 8% 417.9 
Spain 15% 283.9 Croatia -5% 31.8 Norway 1% 50.1 
Ireland 13% 53.8 Poland -6% 564.4 New Zealand 0% 61.5 
Sweden 4% 72.2 Romania -8% 265.1 Canada -6% 595.9 
Finland 0% 70.4 Czech Republic -8% 192 Japan -6% 1,187.2 
France 0% 568.0 Bulgaria -8% 138.4 USA -7% 6,082.5 
Netherlands -6% 211.7 Hungary -6% 122.2 Switzerland -8% 52.4 
Italy -6.5% 511.2 Slovakia -8% 72.1 Liechtenstein -8% 0.3 
Belgium -7.5% 145.7 Lithuania -8% 50.9 Monaco -8% 0.1 
UK -12.5% 748 Estonia -8% 43.5 Turkey   
Austria -13% 78.6 Latvia -8% 25.4    
Denmark -21% 70.7 Slovenia -8% 20.2    
Germany -21% 1,243.7 Belarus -8% 129.2    
Luxembourg -28% 13.4       
EU 15 -8% 4,240       
Sources | United Nations, 1998:23; and CantorCO2e:2010:unnumbered 
Page | 210  
Copyright ©2011 Stellenbosch University 
All rights reserved 
 
ADDENDUM 6 | HOST COUNTRY RANKING 
Host country classification on attractiveness for CDM project investments: 
Very 
Attractive 
Attractive Somewhat 
Attractive 
Limited 
Attractiveness 
Very Limited 
Attractiveness 
Very 
Unattractive 
Argentina Antigua & 
Belize 
Bolivia Azerbaijan Uzbekistan Algeria 
Brazil Chile Egypt Armenia  Albania 
India Costa Rica Israel Bangladesh  Bahrain 
Mexico El Salvador Jamaica Sri Lanka  Botswana 
South Africa Jordan Morocco Colombia  Bahamas 
Thailand Mongolia Philippines Cuba  Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
China Mauritius Vietnam Ecuador  Benin 
Indonesia Maldives  Equatorial 
Guinea 
 Brunei 
 Malaysia  Georgia  Chad 
 Panama  Guatemala  Congo 
(Brazzaville) 
 Trinidad & 
Tobago 
 Honduras  Congo, 
Democratic 
Republic of 
 Uruguay  Laos  Cameroon 
   Madagascar  Central African 
Republic 
   Moldova  Cape Verde 
   Mali  Dominican 
Republic 
   Niger  Ethiopia 
   Nicaragua  Gambia 
   Paraguay  Gabon 
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   Peru  Ghana 
   Uganda  Guinea 
   Yemen  Guyana 
   Zimbabwe  Haiti 
     Iran 
     Ivory Coast 
     Iraq 
     Kenya 
     Kyrgyzstan 
     North Korea 
     Kuwait 
     Kazakhstan 
     Lebanon 
     Liberia 
     Lesotho 
     Libya 
     Malawi 
     Macedonia 
     Mauritania 
     Oman  
     Mozambique 
     Nigeria 
     Nepal 
     Suriname 
     Pakistan 
     Papua New 
Guinea 
     Guinea-Bissau 
     Qatar 
     Rwanda 
     Saudi Arabia 
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     Seychelles 
     Senegal 
     Sierra Leone 
     Sudan 
     Syria 
     United Arab 
Emirates 
     Tajikistan 
     Togo 
     Sao Tome & 
Principe 
     Tunisia 
     Turkmenistan 
     Tanzania 
     Burkina Faso 
     Venezuela 
     Zambia 
Source | Jung, 2005:22 
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ADDENDUM 7 | SOUTH AFRICA’S CDM PROJECT PORTFOLIO 
Up to 28 October 2010, 171 CDM projects have been submitted to the DNA – 137 Project Idea Notes (PINs) and 34 Project Design Documents (PDDs).  Of 
the 34 PDDs, 17 have been registered by the CDM Executive Board as CDM projects, and 4 issued with CERs.  The other 17 are at different stages in the 
project cycle.  The table below is a consolidated list of registered projects (dark shaded background), projects at PDD (light shaded background) and PIN 
stages. 
 
No Date 
submitted 
to 
DNA 
(day/month/year) 
Project Title Project Description Project 
Type 
Annual 
Emission 
Reduction 
(tCO2e) 
Project 
Life-
span 
Project Status Project 
Developer/Owner 
1 10/2005 Kuyasa Low-Cost Urban 
Housing Energy Project 
Installation of solar water 
heaters, ceiling insulation 
and compact fluorescent 
lights in RDP houses 
Energy 
efficiency 
7,000 21 • Registered on 27 August 2005 
• Gold Standard verification 
• Implementation underway 
City of Cape Town 
2 11/10/ 2005 Bethlehem Hydro Construction of hydro 
power plant 
Renewable 
energy 
27,000 20 • Registered on 8 October 2009 NuPlanet BV 
3 11/10/2005 Rosslyn Brewery Fuel-
Switch Project 
Replace coal with natural- 
and biogas as energy 
source 
Fuel switch 107,000 7 • Registered on 29 November 2006 
• Implementation  underway 
South African 
Breweries 
Page | 214  
Copyright ©2010 Stellenbosch University 
All rights reserved 
 
4 10/10/2005 Lawley Fuel Switch Project Replace coal with natural 
gas as thermal fuel 
Fuel switch 19,000 10 • Registered on 6 March 2006 
• Implementation started 
2006 
• CERs issued 06/2008 
Corobrick 
5 22/12/2005 PetroSA Biogas-to-energy 
Project 
Use waste gas presently 
flared to generate 
electricity 
Co-
generation 
29,000 10 • Registered on 29 September 2006 
• Implementation underway 
MethCap (Pty) Ltd 
6 6/02/2006 Emfuleni Power Project Capture and use off-
gasses to generate 
electricity 
Co-
generation 
608,000 10 • Project is at validation stage 
• Project approval 
EcoElectrica (Pty) Ltd 
7 25/04/2006 Durban Landfill-gas-to-
electricity project – 
Marrianhill & La Mercy 
Landfills 
Recover landfill methane 
for electricity generation 
Methane 
recovery 
and flaring 
69,000 7 • Registered on 15 December 2006 
• Construction started in 
2006 
• Project operational 
• First verification done 
Ethekwini Municipality 
8 26/07/2006 Omnia Fertilizer Ltd Nitrous 
Oxide Reduction Project 
Reduce emissions of 
Nitrous Oxide from Nitric 
Acid production 
N2O 
Reduction 
576,000 21 • Registered on 3 May 2007 
• Implementation begun 
• CERs issued 01/2009 
Omnia Fertilizer Ltd 
9 18/07/2006 Tugela CFB10 Conversion of 
Coal to Bark Fired 
Replace coal with biomass 
as fuel input at Tugela Pulp 
and Paper Mill 
Fuel switch 70,000 7 • Registered on 12 February 2007 
• Construction started 
January 2007 
Sappi Kraft Ltd 
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10 28/08/2006 Mondi Richards Bay 
Biomass Project 
Generate electricity from 
biomass 
Co-
generation 
222,000 10 • Registered on 20 May 2007 
• Implementation has begun 
Mondi Business 
Paper 
11 18/08/2006 Mondi Richards Bay Gas 
Turbine Co-generation 
Project 
Switch fuel from coal and 
grid electricity to natural 
gas 
Fuel switch 131,000 20 • At validation stage 
• DNA approval Mondi Business 
Paper 
12 06/11/2006 Transalloys Manganese 
Alloy Smelter Energy 
Efficiency Project 
Reduce the electricity 
consumption in the 
production of silicon 
manganese alloy (SiMn) 
Energy 
efficiency 
83,000 10 • Registered on 19 October 2007 
• CERs issued 11/2008 
Ecosecurities South 
Africa (Pty) Ltd 
13 06/11/2006 Sasol Nitrous Oxide 
Abatement Project 
Reduce the Nitrous Oxide 
emission from the nitric 
acid plants of the Sasol 
Nitro operations 
N2O 
Reduction 
610,000 10 • Registered on 25 May 2007 
• Implementation begun 
• CERs issued 08/2008 
Sasol Nitro Division 
14 20/11/2006 EnviroServe Chloorkop 
Landfill Gas Recovery 
Project 
Recover and use methane 
gas from EnviroServ 
Chloorkop landfill 
Methane 
recovery 
and flaring 
188,000 7 • Registered on 27 April 2007 
• Commissioned 01/2008 
• Operational agreement 
finalised 
EnviroServe Waste 
Management (Pty) 
Ltd 
15 04/12/2006 Nitrous Oxide Emission 
Reduction Project – Plant 9 
Reduce N2O emissions 
during production of nitric 
N2O 
Reduction 
250,000 10 • Registered on 5 November 2007 
• Implementation underway 
African Explosives 
Ltd. South Africa 
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acid (HNO3)  
16 09/05/2007 Nitrous Oxide Emission 
Reduction Project – Plant 11 
Reduce N2O emissions 
during production of nitric 
acid (HNO3)  
N2O 
Reduction 
264,000 10 • Registered on 8 February 2008  African Explosives 
Ltd. South Africa 
17 31/07/2007 Kanhym Farm Manure to 
Energy Project 
Generate electricity from 
anaerobic digestion of 
piggery manure 
Renewable 
energy 
27,000 10 • Registered on 18 July 2008 BioTherm SPV1 (Pty) 
Ltd 
18 28/09/2007 Humphries Boerdery Piggery 
Methane Capture and 
Electricity Generation Project 
Generate electricity from 
anaerobic digestion of 
piggery manure 
Renewable 
energy 
11,000 20 • Approved by DNA 
• Pending approval by the 
CDM EB 
Humphries Boerdery 
(Pty) Ltd 
19 18/09/2007 Durban Landfill Gas to 
Electricity Project – Bisasar 
Road Landfill 
Recover landfill methane 
for electricity generation 
Methane 
recovery 
and flaring 
352,000 20 • Registered on 26 March 2009 Ethekwini Municipality 
20 31/03/2008 Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality Landfill Gas 
Recovery Project 
Recover landfill methane 
for electricity generation 
Methane 
recovery 
and flaring 
243,629 20 • Approved by DNA Ekurhuleni 
Metropolitan 
Municipality 
21 26/05/2008 Alton Landfill Gas to 
Electricity Project 
Recover landfill methane 
for electricity generation 
Methane 
recovery 
70,000 10 • Registered on 24 August 2009 Energ Systems 
uMhlathuze (Pty) Ltd 
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and flaring 
22 07/07/2008 New Energies Commercial 
Solar Water Heating 
Programme in South Africa 
Retrofit electric water 
heaters with solar-based 
technology, install solar 
water heaters at large 
scale hot water users 
Renewable 
energy 
96,780 10 • PDD under review by DNA 
• Outstanding documents Prostart Traders 40 
(Pty) Ltd t/a 
NewEnergies (Pty) 
Ltd 
23 08/07/2008 Karbochem Combined Heat 
and Power Project 
(Newcastle Co-generation 
Project) 
Replace coal with gas as 
an energy source for steam 
production 
Co-
generation 
322,000 21 • PDD under review by DNA 
• Outstanding documents IPSA Group PLC 
24 17/07/2008 Boskor Renewable Electricity 
Plant (BREP) 
Generate electricity from 
sawmill residues for grid 
Renewable 
energy 
14,010 10 • PDD under review by DNA 
• Outstanding documents 
MTO Forestry (Pty) 
Ltd 
25 10/12/2008 The Gluten 20 Dryer of 
Tongaat Hulett Starch Fuel 
Switch Project 
Replace coal with natural 
gas as an energy source 
Fuel switch 8,360 14 • PDD under review by DNA 
• Outstanding documents Tongaat Hulett Starch 
Property Limited 
26 20/04/2009 New England Landfill Gas to 
Energy Project 
Recover landfill methane 
for electricity generation 
Methane 
recovery 
and flaring 
53,652 7 • Approved by DNA Ecosecurities South 
Africa (Pty) Ltd 
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27 23/06/2009 CCE Solutions Biomass to 
Electricity Project 
Generate electricity from 
biomass for grid 
Biomass 54,153 10 • Approved by DNA Mr C. Eleftheriades 
28 03/08/2009 Omnia Steam Turbine 
Project 
Generate electricity from 
wasted pressure release 
Industrial 
process 
(Energy 
supply) 
14,765 7 • PDD under review by DNA 
• Outstanding documents Omnia Fertilizer Ltd 
29 14/12/2009 BioTherm Hernic 
Ferrochrome Co-generation 
Project 
Flare CO-rich off gas into 
CO2, produce electricity for 
the grid 
Industrial 
process 
186,189 10 • PDD under review by DNA 
• Outstanding documents BioTherm Energy 
(Pty) Ltd 
30 26/04/2010 Heat Retention Cooking in 
South Africa 
Introduce Wonder Bag, a 
heat-retention cooker  
Energy 
efficiency 
153,492 7 • Approved by DNA Natural Balance (Pty) 
Ltd 
31 29/04/2010 Lowpal Timbers Wood 
Waste to Energy Project in 
Sabie, SA 
Generate electricity from 
wood waste; prevent 
methane emissions from 
anaerobic decomposition 
Renewable 
energy 
18,889 7 • PDD under review by DNA 
• Outstanding documents EECO Fuels 
Renewable Energy 
Company 
32 15/06/2010 Capture and Utilisation of 
Methane at GFI Mining’s 
Beatrix Mine 
Recover mine and non-
mine methane for 
electricity generation 
Methane 
recovery 
and flaring 
212,730 7 • PDD under review by DNA 
• Outstanding documents GFI Mining SA (Pty) 
Ltd & Promethium 
Carbon (Pty) Ltd 
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33 22/06/2010 Sasol Gas Turbine Co-
generation at Sasol Secunda 
Synfuels Plant 
Replace grid electricity with 
electricity generated onsite 
using natural gas and 
project fuel  
Fuel switch 1,204,444 10 • PDD approved by the DNA on 19/08/2010 Sasol Synfuels (Pty) 
Ltd 
34 25/08/2010 SASSA Low Pressure Solar 
Water Heater Programme 
Install low pressure solar 
water heaters in low 
income households 
Renewable 
Energy 
80,188 10 • PDD under review by DNA International Carbon 
35 18/10/ 2004 Kouga Wind Farm / Pumped 
Storage Hydro 
Generate electricity from 
wind and dammed water 
Renewable 
energy 
26,000 21 • PIN approved by DNA Genesis Eco Energy 
(Pty) Ltd 
36 28/01/2005 Sasol Limited Natural Gas 
Conversion Project 
Replace coal with natural 
gas as feedstock at 2 
plants 
Fuel switch 6,490,000 10 • PIN approved by DNA Sasol Synfuels (Pty) 
Ltd 
37 30/08/2005 Meyerton Bio-Diesel Project Production of bio-diesel 
from waste vegetable oils 
Bio-fuel 
production 
90,000 10 • PIN approved by DNA Exclusive Access 
Trading (Pty) Ltd 
38 23/09/2005 Mafikeng Bio-Diesel  Production of bio-diesel 
from waste vegetable oils 
Bio-fuel 
production 
327,000 30 • PIN approved by DNA Mafikeng Bio-diesel 
39 19/01/2006 Chrome Smelter Fuel Switch Production of electricity 
from smelter off-gasses for 
Co- 600,000 20 • PIN approved by DNA Envigas (Pty) Ltd 
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Project onsite use generation 
40 19/01/2006 Alrode Bio-diesel Production of bio-diesel 
from soya and palm oils 
Bio-fuel 
production 
189,000 21 • PIN approved by DNA Exclusive Access 
Trading (Pty) Ltd 
41 28/03/2006 Concentrated Solar Thermal 
Electricity Generation Project 
Generate electricity from 
concentrated solar for grid 
Energy 
efficiency 
375,000 35 • PIN approved by DNA Eskom Holdings Ltd 
42 28/03/2006 Coal Plant Precipitators 
Energy Efficiency Project 
Efficient use of electricity at 
Eskom’s Matimba power 
station 
Energy 
efficiency 
12,000 32 • PIN approved by DNA Eskom Holdings Ltd 
43 28/03/2006 Gariep Hydroelectric 
Upgrade Project 
Increase generation 
capacity of the Gariep 
hydroelectric power station 
Energy 
efficiency 
77,000 30 • PIN approved by DNA Eskom Holdings Ltd 
44 08/06/2006 Vanadium Iron Smelter 
Energy Efficiency Project 
Reduce energy 
consumption during 
production process at 
Witbank facility 
Energy 
efficiency 
36,000 10 • PIN approved by DNA Highveld Steel & 
Vanadium 
45 22/06/2006 Siyanda Bio-Diesel Install and operate a bio-
diesel production plant 
Bio-fuel 
production 
275,000 7 • PIN approved by DNA 
• PDD at final stage of 
preparation 
Siyanda Biodiesel 
(Pty) Ltd 
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46 20/07/2006 Tshwane-Lilanda Methane 
Gas Project 
Generate electricity from 
methane recovered from 9 
landfill sites around 
Pretoria  
Methane 
recovery 
and flaring 
803,000 10 • PIN approved by DNA Lilanda Holdings (Pty) 
Ltd 
47 28/08/2006 NCP Coal to Gas Fuel 
Switching Project 
Replace coal with methane 
gas at NCP manufacturing 
facility 
Fuel switch 50,000 10 • PIN approved by DNA 
• PDD at final stage of 
preparation 
NCP Alcohols (Pty) 
Ltd 
48 20/09/2006 Letaba Biomass Fuel 
Switching Project 
Replace coal with biomass 
to generate steam 
Fuel switch 19,000 10 • PIN approved by DNA 
• PDD at final stage of 
preparation 
BioTherm SPV 2 
(Pty) Ltd 
49 25/09/2006 NOPI - National Organic 
Produce Initiative 
Introduce hemp biomass, 
lime and wood as 
construction media for low 
cost housing 
Fuel switch 50,000 10 • PIN approved by DNA International 
Consortium of Future 
Energies 
50 14/12/2006 Tongaat-Hulett Co-
generation Project 
Increase electricity 
generation capacity of 
Tongaat plant 
Co-
generation 
55,000 21 • PIN approved by DNA 
• PDD at final stage of 
preparation 
Tongaat-Huletts Go-
generation Company 
51 15/12/2006 SCAW Fuel Switch Project Replace coal with natural 
gas 
Fuel switch 130,000 10 • PIN approved by DNA SCAW Metals (Pty) 
Ltd 
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52 21/12/2006 Mittal Steel Waste Heat to 
Energy Project 
Capture waste heat to 
generate electricity 
Co-
generation 
200,000 10 • PIN approved by DNA Mittal Steel 
53 19/01/2007 Samancor Chrome Electricity 
from Furnace Offgas Project 
Generate electricity from 
waste energy 
Co-
generation 
184,000 21 • PIN approved by DNA Samancor 
54 16/03/2007 Molten Slag and Metal 
Project 
Promote energy efficiency 
at the Metalloys, Samancor 
Meyerton works 
Energy 
efficiency 
200,000 21 • PIN approved by DNA 
• PDD at final stage of 
preparation 
Molten Slag and 
Metal (Pty) Ltd 
55 20/02/2007 Orange-Fish River Small 
Hydro Power Project 
Generate hydro-electric 
power 
Renewable 
energy 
60,000 21 • PIN approved by DNA Clackson Power 
Company (Pty) Ltd 
56 11/02/2007 Southern Cape Cleaner 
Energy Project 
Generate electricity from 
biomass 
Renewable 
energy 
50,000 25 • PIN approved by DNA 
• PDD at final stage of 
preparation 
Carbon and Environ-
mental Options (Pty) 
Ltd 
57 04/05/2007 Biomass Based Combined 
Heat and Power Plant 
Refurbish turbines to 
improve energy efficiency 
and produce power 
Energy 
efficiency 
21,000 15 • PIN approved by DNA Mr P. Reyneke 
58 17/05/2007 Saldanha Bay Clean Fuel 
Switch Project 
Replace coal-fired power 
station with gas-fired power 
station 
Fuel switch 20,170,000 40 • PIN approved by DNA Prof F. Cornish 
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59 25/05/2007 Compact Fluorescent 
Lighting (CFL) in Sol Plaatjie 
Municipality 
Reduce energy use for 
lighting 
Energy 
efficiency 
7,000 21 • PIN approved by DNA 
• PDD at final stage of 
preparation 
The PACE Centre 
60 08/06/2007 Production of electricity from 
combustion of bagasse, 
KwaZulu-Natal 
Install new biomass 
residue fired power 
generation plant 
Co-
generation 
90,000 10 • PIN approved by DNA 
• PDD at final stage of 
preparation 
African Biofuels 
Company (Pty) Ltd 
61 08/06/2007 Production of Ethanol from 
Sugarcane, KwaZulu-Natal 
Replace petrol with bio- 
ethanol for transportation 
Bio-fuel 
production 
77,000 7 • PIN approved by DNA African Biofuels 
Company (Pty) Ltd 
62 15/06/2007 Sasol Secunda Gas Turbine 
Combine Cycle Project 
Generate electricity from 
natural or synthetic gas 
Fuel switch 1,600,000 10 • PIN approved by DNA 
• PDD at final stage of 
preparation 
Sasol Synfuels 
63 19/09/2007 New Denmark Colliery 
Methane Destruction Project 
Destruction of methane 
from New Denmark 
Colliery by flaring 
Methane 
recovery 
and flaring 
27,000 20 • PIN approved by DNA Anglo Coal 
64 28/09/2007 100 MW West Coast Wind 
Farm 
Generate renewable 
energy from wind 
Renewable 
energy 
278,000 21 • PIN approved by DNA Eskom Holdings Ltd 
65 29/11/2007 Sasol Secunda 2nd stage 
Rectisol Off-gas Methane 
Reduce methane 
emissions by using off-gas 
in gas turbine to generate 
Methane 
recovery 
1,600,000 10 • PIN approved by DNA Sasol Synfuels 
Secunda 
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Reduction Project electricity and flaring 
66 30/11/2007 The Lion Phase 1 and Phase 
2 Ferrochrome Smelter 
Surplus Furnace Gas 
Electricity Generation Project 
Replace fossil fuels with 
surplus furnace gas for 
electricity generation 
Co-
generation 
142,960 21 • PIN approved by DNA IST Holdings (Pty) Ltd 
t/a PowerTech IST 
67 30/11/2007 The Boshoek Ferrochrome 
Smelter Surplus Furnace 
Gas Electricity Generation 
Project 
Generate electricity using 
surplus furnace gas to 
replace grid electricity 
Co-
generation 
84,000 21 • PIN approved by DNA IST Holdings (Pty) Ltd 
t/a PowerTech IST 
68 30/11/2007 The Lydenburg Ferrochrome 
Smelter Surplus Furnace 
Gas Electricity Generation 
Project 
Generate electricity using 
surplus furnace gas to 
replace grid electricity 
Co-
generation 
71,480 21 • PIN approved by DNA Xstrata (Pty) Ltd 
69 14/12/2007 The Use Of Slag As A Partial 
Raw Material In The Clinker 
Manufacturing Process 
Substitute existing raw 
materials with non-
carbonated raw materials 
in the clinker 
manufacturing process; 
Industrial 
process 
142,000 20 • PIN approved by DNA PPC (Pty) Ltd 
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reduce fuel usage as a 
result of the substitute  
70 24/01/2008 Assmang Waste Gas 
Utilisation At Machadodorp 
And Cato Ridge 
Use the furnace off-gas 
from existing plants to 
generate electricity 
Co-
generation 
200,000 21 • PIN approved by DNA Promethium Carbon 
(Pty) Ltd & Exxaro 
Coal (Pty) Ltd 
71 07/02/2008 South Africa GeoPower – 
SAGP 1 
Produce geo-thermal 
electricity and supply to 
grid 
Renewable 
energy 
416,000 30 • PIN approved by DNA Dr G.W. Oprisko 
72 14/02/2008 Namakwa Sands Waste Gas 
Utilisation 
Use the furnace off-gas 
from existing plant to 
generate electricity 
Co-
generation 
150,000 7-15 • PIN approved by DNA Promethium Carbon 
(Pty) Ltd & Exxaro 
Coal (Pty) Ltd 
73 15/02/2008 KZN Sands Furnace Off-Gas 
Utilisation 
Use the furnace off-gas 
from existing plant to 
generate electricity 
Co-
generation 
380,000 21 • PIN approved by DNA Promethium Carbon 
(Pty) Ltd & Exxaro 
Coal (Pty) Ltd 
74 15/02/2008 Generation of Electricity from 
the Exxaro Char Plant and 
the Exxaro Coke Furnace 
Off-Gas 
Use the furnace off-gas 
from existing plant to 
generate electricity 
Co-
generation 
140,000 21 • PIN approved by DNA Promethium Carbon 
(Pty) Ltd & Exxaro 
Coal (Pty) Ltd 
Page | 226  
Copyright ©2010 Stellenbosch University 
All rights reserved 
 
75 15/02/2008 Samancor Chrome Furnace 
Off-Gas Utilization At 
Witbank and Middelburg 
Use the furnace off-gas 
from existing plant to 
generate electricity 
Co-
generation 
150,000 21 • PIN approved by DNA Promethium Carbon 
(Pty) Ltd & Exxaro 
Coal (Pty) Ltd 
76 29/02/2008 Red Signal Achieve national control by 
means of existing 
advanced technology, over 
5 GW of energy demand 
Energy 
efficiency 
20,000,000 5 • PIN approved by DNA Messrs B. Forrer & K. 
Hellon 
77 08/04/2008 The Bulbul Drive Landfill Gas 
Electricity Generation Project 
Extraction of landfill gas to 
generate electricity 
Waste 
manage-
ment 
752,000 10 • PIN approved by DNA Carbon Reductions 
South Africa 
78 17/04/2008 IFM Integrated Clean Energy 
Project 
Use the furnace off-gas 
from existing plant to 
generate electricity 
Co-
generation 
127,000 30 • PIN approved by DNA AAP Carbon Ltd. 
79 21/04/2008 ArcelorMittal Steel SA 
Variable Speed Drive Energy 
Management System 
Reduce energy 
consumption at the hot 
strip mill at Saldanha Steel 
Energy 
efficiency 
16,500 10 • PIN in review process by DNA ArcelorMittal Steel SA 
80 21/04/2008 ArcelorMittal Steel SA Waste 
Pressure Recovery Project 
Capture wasted pressure 
at blast furnaces to 
Co-
generation 
94,000 10 • PIN in review process by DNA ArcelorMittal Steel SA 
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generate electricity 
81 24/04/2008 Green Waste to Energy 
Project 
Substitute conventional 
fossil fuel energy source to 
generate steam 
Co-
generation 
25,600 10 • PIN approved by DNA Mr C. Meyer 
82 25/04/2008 Green Energy Plants 
(Biomass from Wood Waste 
and Forest Residue) 
Install a biomass fuelled 
power facility 
Co-
generation 
258,379 21 • PIN approved by DNA ArcelorMittal Steel SA 
83 27/05/2008 PFG Glass Springs Plant 
Retrofit 
Retrofit assembly to 
facilitate fuel switch to 
natural gas 
Fuel switch 150,000 10 • PIN approved by DNA PFG Glass (Pty) Ltd 
84 30/05/2008 CDM Solar Cooker Project 
Sinthumele, South Africa 
Use solar energy for 
cooking 
Renewable 
energy 
50,500 14 • PIN approved by DNA African Carbon 
Solution 
85 03/06/2008 Fuel Switch in Cement 
Manufacturing 
Partial substitution of fossil 
fuels with alternative or 
less carbon intensive fuels 
in cement manufacture  
Biomass 25,000 10 • PIN approved by DNA PPC (Pty) Ltd 
86 18/06/2008 NEEA Retrofitting Of High 
Performance LED Lighting 
Replace incandescent light 
bulbs with high 
Energy 
efficiency 
16,096 10 • PIN approved by DNA FireFly Carbon 
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performance LED lights to 
promote energy efficiency 
87 19/06/2008 Industrial Bio-Coal Project Convert organic waste into 
bio-coal to replace A-grade 
steam coal 
Waste 
manage-
ment 
212,100 7 (14) • PIN approved by DNA Agro Technologies 
88 08/07/2008 Rea-Vaya Bus Rapid Transit 
(BRT) Project 
Establish a sustainable 
mass urban transport 
system 
Transport 370,148 21 • PIN approved by DNA City of Johannesburg 
89 08/07/2008 Cosmo City Solar Water 
Heater Project, 
Johannesburg 
Install high efficiency solar 
water heaters at low-
income housing 
Renewable 
energy 
58,641 21 • PIN approved by DNA City of Johannesburg 
90 14/08/2008 TSB Sugar RSA Komati Mill 
Co-generation Project 
Use baggasse to generate 
electricity for export 
Biomass 50,329 10 • PIN approved by DNA TSB Sugar 
91 21/08/2008 St Albans Prison Methane 
Capturing and Electricity 
Generation Project 
Generate electricity 
through use of wastewater 
gas at domestic 
wastewater plant 
Waste 
manage-
ment 
59 7 • PIN approved by DNA Nelson Mandela 
Metro 
92 27/08/2008 Thos Begbie Project Generate electricity Fuel switch 173,356 12 • PIN approved by DNA Mr G. van Zyl 
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through using gas instead 
of coal 
93 09/09/2008 The Buffalo City Landfill Gas 
to Electricity Clean 
Development Mechanism 
Project 
Extract gas from three 
landfill sites to generate 
electricity 
Methane 
recovery 
and flaring 
140,000 10 • PIN approved by DNA Mr L. Strachan 
94 11/09/2008 The ABSA Towers West 
Energy Centre Project 
Install gas-fired CHP 
generators to produce 
electricity and heat for 
ABSA campus 
Fuel switch 12,000 10 • PIN approved by DNA Mr K. Gafnet 
95 30/09/2008 Trade Plus Aid Commercial 
and Domestic Biogas 
Programme 
Use biogas to generate 
electricity for domestic use 
on diary and pig farms 
around SA 
Waste 
manage-
ment 
176,000 7 • PIN approved by DNA Trade Plus Aid Africa 
96 21/10/2008 TATA Steel KZN Integrated 
Clean Energy Project 
Use the furnace off-gas 
from existing plant to 
generate electricity 
Co-
generation 
96,000 10 • PIN approved by DNA AAP Carbon Ltd. 
97 31/10/2008 Highland Exploration and 
Production (Pty) Ltd Mine 
Replace coal fired power 
generating capacity with 
Methane 
recovery 
180,000 21 • PIN approved by DNA Mr P.D. Price 
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Methane Utilization for 
Power Generation Project 
captured methane and flaring 
98 05/11/2008 Retrofit Kinetic Energy 
Recovery System 
Save fuel and emissions in 
transport fleets through 
fitting kinetic energy 
recovery systems 
Transport 402,000 7 • PIN approved by DNA Mr D. Baylis 
99 21/11/2008 Calgro M3 Green Project Install insulated ceilings, 
solar water heaters and 
energy efficient lighting in 
urban housing projects 
Renewable 
energy 
40,000 10 • PIN approved by DNA Calgro M3 
100 24/11/2008 Pelletizing and Sintering 
Plant 3 (PSP3) 
Increase efficiency in 
ferrochrome production 
Energy 
efficiency 
50,000 10 • PIN approved by DNA Samancor (Pty) Ltd 
101 10/12/2008 Kloof #3 Ice Chiller Project Introduce ice-chiller system 
to replace water as the 
carrier of chill energy 
Energy 
efficiency 
60,441 21 • PIN approved by DNA Goldfields 
102 12/12/2008 BioTherm Adcock Ingram 
Fuel Switching Project 
Replace grid electricity and 
coal derived steam with 
natural gas for heat and 
energy 
Fuel switch 23,480 10 • PIN approved by DNA CDM Africa Climate 
Solutions 
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103 12/01/2009 Dissemination of Institutional 
Fuel Efficient Biomass 
Stoves in SA 
Manufacture and 
disseminate fuel efficient 
biomass stoves to schools 
and other institutions 
Renewable 
energy 
3,000 10 • PIN approved by DNA Mr M. Mabaso 
104 03/02/2009 Nelson Mandela Bay 
Metropolitan’s Landfill Gas 
Project 
Extract gas from two 
landfill sites to generate 
electricity 
Waste 
manage-
ment 
90,000 10 • PIN approved by DNA CEF (Pty) Ltd 
105 13/02/2009 Umoya Energy Establish new wind energy 
facility on three farms near 
Hopefield, Western Cape 
Renewable 
energy 
250,000 21 • PIN approved by DNA Mr D Jenman 
106 20/02/2009 Nelson Mandela Bay 
Municipality Solar Water 
Heating Project 
Replace conventional 
water heating with solar 
water heating 
Renewable 
energy 
280,000 21 • PIN approved by DNA CEF (Pty) Ltd 
107 24/02/2009 Nelson Mandela Bay 
Metropolitan Street Lighting 
Efficiency Project 
Upgrade street lighting with 
more efficient luminaries 
Energy 
efficiency 
15,000 10 • PIN approved by DNA CEF (Pty) Ltd 
108 24/02/2009 Energy Management at 
Nelson Mandela Bay 
Reduce energy use at 6 
wastewater treatment 
Waste 
manage-
9,000 10 • PIN approved by DNA CEF (Pty) Ltd 
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Metropolitan’s Waste Water 
Treatment Facilities Project 
facilities in Metro area ment 
109 02/04/2009 Ethanol-to-Ethylene: 
Substation of Fossil Derived 
Ethylene with Bio-Ethanol 
Feedstock at Safripol HDPE 
Plant 
Substitute fossil derived 
ethylene feedstock with 
biomass derived feedstock 
in the production of high 
density polyethylene 
Fuel switch 1,000,000 14 • PIN approved by DNA Safripol (Pty) Ltd 
110 02/04/2009 Fuel Switch From Coal to 
Biomass at Brick & Clay 
(Pty) Ltd, SA 
Replace coal with biomass 
in existing brick-firing kilns 
and chain grade stocker 
Fuel switch 18,474 7 (21) • PIN approved by DNA Argo Technologies 
111 02/04/2009 Fuel Switch From Coal to 
Biomass at Blueberry Hills 
Ltd, SA 
Replace coal with biomass 
fuel in existing boilers 
Fuel switch 8,819 7(21) • PIN approved by DNA Argo Technologies 
112 02/04/2009 Fuel Switch from Coal to 
Biomass at Summerpride 
Foods, SA 
Replace coal with biomass 
fuel in existing boilers 
Fuel switch 26,093 7(21) • PIN approved by DNA Argo Technologies 
113 02/04/2009 Fuel Switch Coal to Biomass 
at East London Abattoir, SA 
Replace coal with biomass 
fuel in existing boilers 
Fuel switch 18,474 7(21) • PIN approved by DNA Argo Technologies 
Page | 233  
Copyright ©2010 Stellenbosch University 
All rights reserved 
 
114 07/04/2009 Nelson Mandela Bay 
Municipality Wind Power 
Project 
Establish new 60 MW wind 
energy facility for supply to 
grid 
Renewable 
energy 
5,679,538 10 • PIN approved by DNA CEF (Pty) Ltd 
115 08/04/2009 Khwe Khoa Langfontein 
Wind Energy Project 
Establish new 120 MW 
wind energy facility near 
Yzerfontein, Western Cape 
Renewable 
energy 
56,795 10 • PIN approved by DNA CDM Africa Climate 
Solutions 
116 17/04/2009 Kerrifontein Wind Farm 
Project 
Demonstrate the technical 
viability and financial 
feasibility of wind energy in 
South Africa 
Renewable 
energy 
223,000 10 • PIN approved by DNA Oelsner Group (Pty) 
Ltd 
117 18/05/2009 National CDM Facilities PPP 
Between Second Economy 
and Public Sector 
CDM project design, 
formulation, facilitation, and 
engineering and 
management capacity for 
the ‘second economy’ and 
the public sector 
Waste 
manage-
ment 
To be 
confirmed 
7 • PIN in review process by DNA Messrs TA Revert 
and L Gadzikwa 
118 22/05/2009 Mitigation of Methane 
Emissions in the Charcoal 
Production of Silicon 
Reduce methane 
emissions in charcoal 
production by burning off-
Industrial 
process 
30,000 10 • PIN approved by DNA Messrs B Olivier & A 
Kuhl 
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Smelters in South Africa gasses 
119 22/05/2009 Rand Carbide FerroSilicon 
Energy Efficiency and 
Reductant Substitution 
Project 
Introduce renewable 
reductants and promote 
energy efficiency 
Industrial 
process 
184,000 10 • PIN approved by DNA Rand Carbide (Pty) 
Ltd 
120 28/05/2009 Nelson Mandela Bay 
Metropolitan Hydro Power 
Project 
Produce hydroelectricity for 
grid 
Renewable 
energy 
109,158 10 • PIN approved by DNA CEF (Pty) Ltd 
121 29/05/2009 Bellville Landfill Gas Project Extract gas from several 
landfill sites in Cape Town 
to generate electricity 
Waste 
manage-
ment 
193,595 10 • PIN approved by DNA CEF (Pty) Ltd 
122 29/05/2009 Coastal Park Landfill Gas 
Project 
Extract gas from several 
landfill sites in Cape Town 
to generate electricity 
Waste 
manage-
ment 
153,164 10 • PIN approved by DNA CEF (Pty) Ltd 
123 29/05/2009 Vissershok Landfill Gas 
Project 
Extract gas from several 
landfill sites in Cape Town 
to generate electricity 
Waste 
manage-
ment 
285,530 10 • PIN approved by DNA CEF (Pty) Ltd 
124 29/05/2009 Faure and Swartklip Landfill Extract gas from several Waste 80,573 10 • PIN approved by DNA CEF (Pty) Ltd 
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Gas Project landfill sites in Cape Town 
to generate electricity 
manage-
ment 
125 18/06/2009 Boitshepi Landfill Gas 
Project 
Extract gas from landfill 
site in Emfuleni 
Municipality to generate 
electricity 
Waste 
manage-
ment 
56,274 10 • PIN approved by DNA CEF (Pty) Ltd 
126 18/06/2009 Waldrift Landfill Gas Project Extract gas from landfill 
site in Emfuleni 
Municipality to generate 
electricity 
Waste 
manage-
ment 
5,752 10 • PIN approved by DNA CEF (Pty) Ltd 
127 09/07/2009 Installation of Water Efficient 
Showerheads or Low Flow 
Showerheads and Flow 
Regulators to Reduce 
Emissions 
Install water efficient 
showerheads and flow 
regulators to decrease 
energy consumption 
Energy 
efficiency 
7,302,977 7(35) • PIN approved by DNA Green Alliance (Pty) 
Ltd 
128 14/07/2009 Ga-Rankuwa and 
Soshanguve Landfill Gas to 
Energy Project 
Extract gas from several 
landfill sites in Pretoria to 
generate electricity 
Waste 
manage-
ment 
77,073 10 • PIN approved by DNA CEF (Pty) Ltd 
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129 14/07/2009 Hatherley & Kwaggasrand 
Landfill Gas to Energy 
Project 
Extract gas from several 
landfill sites in Pretoria to 
generate electricity 
Waste 
manage-
ment 
79,300 10 • PIN approved by DNA CEF (Pty) Ltd 
130 14/07/2009 Gartskloof & Onderstepoort 
Landfill Gas to Energy 
Project 
Extract gas from several 
landfill sites in Pretoria to 
generate electricity 
Waste 
manage-
ment 
85,133 10 • PIN approved by DNA CEF (Pty) Ltd 
131 20/07/2009 South Africa Solar Water 
Heating Project 
Replace conventional 
water heating with solar 
water heating 
Renewable 
energy 
60,000 21 • PIN approved by DNA Unlimited Energy 
Resources 
132 22/09/2009 Energy Efficiency in Low 
Cost Housing Developments 
Project 
Improve thermal 
performance and water 
heating efficiencies in 
subsidised housing 
Energy 
efficiency 
800,000 21 • PIN approved by DNA Carbon Programmes 
(Pty) Ltd 
133 28/09/2009 Cape Town Integrated Bus 
Rapid Transport System 
Project 
Achieve transport 
efficiency and reduce fuel 
consumption through the 
establishment of a Bus 
Rapid Transport System 
Transport 1,400,000 21 • PIN approved by DNA City of Cape Town 
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134 18/12/2009 BioTherm PFG Waste Heat 
Recovery Project 
Replace coal with waste 
heat to generate steam 
Waste 
manage-
ment 
73,800 10 • PIN approved by DNA BioTherm (Pty) Ltd 
135 18/01/2010 Low Pressure Solar Water 
Heating Pilot Project for Low-
Cost Housing (NMBM) 
Replace conventional 
water heaters with solar 
water heaters 
Renewable 
energy 
3,241 10 • PIN approved by DNA Nelson Mandela Bay 
Municipality 
136 18/01/2010 Nelson Mandela Bay 
Metropolitan CFL Project 
Replace incandescent light 
bulbs with compact 
fluorescent (CFL) lights to 
promote energy efficiency 
Energy 
efficiency 
14,147 10 • PIN approved by DNA CEF (Pty) Ltd 
137 02/2010 Installation of Energy 
Efficient Cooking 
Technologies in Households, 
Institutions and Small 
Businesses in SA 
Promote the sustainable 
use of biomass for cooking 
and space heating; and 
disseminate more efficient 
paraffin burning appliances 
Energy 
efficiency 
60,000 28 • PIN approved by DNA GTZ 
138 05/02/2010 Ekurhuleni Municipality Solar 
Water Heating Program 
Replace conventional 
water heaters with solar 
water heaters 
Renewable 
energy 
375,233 15 • PIN approved by DNA CEF (Pty) Ltd 
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139 15/03/2010 Virtual Power Supply (VPS) Use high heat industrial 
processes to improve 
energy efficiency 
Energy 
efficiency 
1,800,000 21 • PIN approved by DNA Mexel Energy (Pty) 
Ltd 
140 16/03/2010 Massive Introduction of 
LEDs to Rural Communities 
Replace kerosene lights 
with solar lighting in rural 
areas 
Renewable 
energy 
104,300 10 • PIN approved by DNA CARE Ltd 
141 16/03/2010 Installation of Energy 
Efficient Cookers in Rural 
Areas 
Supply rural communities 
with energy efficient stoves 
Energy 
efficiency 
2,720,000 10 • PIN approved by DNA CARE Ltd 
142 17/03/2010 Darling Wind Farm Phase 2 Establish new 7.8 MW 
wind energy facility near 
Darling for supply to grid 
Renewable 
energy 
23,760 10 • PIN approved by DNA Oelsner Group (Pty) 
Ltd 
143 09/04/2010 Replacement of 
Incandescent Light Bulbs 
with Compact Fluorescent 
Lights in SA 
Replace incandescent light 
bulbs with compact 
fluorescent (CFL) lights to 
promote energy efficiency 
Energy 
efficiency 
490,000 7 • PIN approved by DNA CDM Africa Climate 
Solutions 
144 14/04/2010 Distribution of Portable Solar 
Water Heater for Safe 
Supply portable solar water 
heaters to rural 
Renewable 
energy 
1,720,000 10 • PIN approved by DNA CARE Ltd 
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Drinking Purposes communities 
145 20/04/2010 Low Pressure Solar Water 
Heating Programme 
Replace conventional 
water heaters with solar 
water heaters 
Renewable 
energy 
244,877 10 • PIN approved by DNA Solar Academy of 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Pty) Ltd 
146 20/04/2010 The Kerrifontein /Darling 
Phase 2 Wind Farm Project 
Establish new 20.8 MW 
wind energy facility near 
Darling for supply to grid 
Renewable 
energy 
633,600 10 • PIN approved by DNA Oelsner Group (Pty) 
Ltd 
147 13/05/2010 The eThekwini Mini-Hydro 
Electricity Generation Project 
Produce hydroelectricity for 
grid 
Renewable 
energy 
12,000 14(21) • PIN approved by DNA eThekwini 
Municipality 
148 13/05/2010 The eThekwini Western 
Aqueduct Hydro Electricity 
Generation Project 
Produce hydroelectricity for 
grid 
Renewable 
energy 
34,407 14(21) • PIN approved by DNA eThekwini 
Municipality 
149 13/05/2010 The eThekwini Southern 
Wastewater Treatment 
Works Anaerobic Digestion 
Biogas to Energy Project 
Harvest methane-rich 
biogas from sewage sludge 
and use for electricity 
generation 
Methane 
recovery & 
flaring 
97,038 14(21) • PIN approved by DNA eThekwini 
Municipality 
150 13/05/2010 The Mariannhill Mechanical 
Biological Waste Treatment 
Reduce waste disposal to 
landfill volumes 
Methane 
recovery & 
24,872 14(21) • PIN approved by DNA eThekwini 
Municipality 
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to Energy Project flaring 
151 14/05/2010 CSP South Africa Create new clean energy 
industry 
Renewable 
energy 
525,600 14 • PIN under review by DNA Farina Energy Trust 
152 20/05/2010 LED’s Kick-off Replace incandescent light 
units with LED lights to 
promote energy efficiency 
Energy 
efficiency 
560,000 28 • PIN approved by DNA Mr J Hornman 
153 27/05/2010 Rance Timber Biomass-to-
Energy Project 
Use biomass by-products 
for heat and electricity 
generation for onsite use 
Biomass 75,000 21 • PIN approved by DNA Rance Timber (Pty) 
Ltd 
154 23/06/2010 Kruisvallei Hydro Electricity 
Project 
Produce hydroelectricity for 
grid 
Renewable 
energy 
34,000 10 • PIN approved by DNA Kruisvallei Hydro 
(Pty) Ltd 
155 16/07/2010 eThekwini Municipality Solar 
Water Heaters Programme 
Replace conventional 
water heaters with solar 
water heaters 
Renewable 
energy 
27,580 10 • PIN under review by DNA eThekwini 
Municipality 
156 05/08/2010 Grahamstown Invasive 
Biomass Power Project 
Use invasive biomass for 
electricity generation for 
supply to grid 
Renewable 
energy 
21,000 21 • PIN under review by DNA Nollen Group 
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157 26/08/2010 eThekwini Energy Efficient 
Street Lighting and Robots 
Reduce energy 
consumption in the 
eThekwini municipal 
infrastructure 
Energy 
efficiency 
16,431 10 • PIN under review by DNA eThekwini 
Municipality 
158 07/09/2010 DWS Anaerobic Digestion 
Waste Treatment to Energy 
project 
Reduce waste disposal to 
landfill by treatment of food 
and organic wastes 
Waste 
manage-
ment 
18,120 14 • PIN approved by DNA Don’t Waste 
159 09/09/2010 Electrawinds Sisonke Energy Generate electricity from 
wind 
Renewable 
energy 
263,000 10 • PIN approved by DNA Sisonke Energy 
160 14/09/2010 Kasi Rural Outreach To utilise energy efficient 
technology powered by 
renewable energy 
Renewable 
energy 
337,146 21 • PIN approved by DNA iBurst Group (Pty) Ltd 
161 16/09/2010 Wind Farm Beaufort West 
Phase 1 
To use wind turbines to 
generate electricity 
Renewable 
energy 
189,000 20 • PIN under review by DNA Astrum Energy (pty) 
Ltd 
162 17/09/2010 Heat Pump and Hybrid 
Solution Programme for 
South Africa 
Install heat pump and 
hybrid systems in high 
income households and 
SME throughout South 
Renewable 
energy 
237,528 10 • PIN under review by DNA International Carbon 
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Africa 
163 07/10/2010 Standard Bank Efficient 
Lighting Programme of 
Activities 
To install energy efficient 
lighting technologies and 
systems in commercial 
buildings across South 
Africa 
Energy 
efficiency 
6,869 10 • PIN under review by DNA Standard Bank 
164 12/10/2010 Grid Connected Wind Power 
Plant in Lamberts Bay, South 
Africa 
To use wind turbines to 
generate electricity 
Renewable 
energy 
145,230 25 • PIN under review by DNA G7 Energies 
165 12/10/2010 Grid Connected Wind Power 
Plant in Richtersveld, South 
Africa 
To use wind turbines to 
generate electricity 
Renewable 
energy 
608,730 25 • PIN under review by DNA G7 Energies 
166 12/10/2010 Grid Connected Wind Power 
Plant in Klawer, South Africa 
To use wind turbines to 
generate electricity 
Renewable 
energy 
96,820 25 • PIN under review by DNA G7 Energies 
167 12/10/2010 Grid Connected Wind Power 
Plant in Roggeveld, South 
Africa 
To use wind turbines to 
generate electricity 
Renewable 
energy 
2,030,130 25 • PIN under review by DNA G7 Energies 
168 12/10/2010 Grid Connected Wind Power To use wind turbines to Renewable 484,100 25 • PIN under review by DNA G7 Energies 
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Plant in Witberg, South 
Africa 
generate electricity energy 
169 13/10/2010 SA Calcium Carbide Furnace 
Waste Gas to Electricity 
CDM project 
To develop an 8MW 
electricity generation 
capacity project utilising 
furnace waste off-gas 
Fuel switch 46,000 30 • PIN under review by DNA SA Carbide (Pty) Ltd 
170 18/10/2010 Indwe Wind Project To use wind turbines to 
generate electricity 
Renewable 
energy 
135,000 21 • PIN under review by DNA Rainmaker Energy 
171 18/10/2010 Dorper Wind Project To use wind turbines to 
generate electricity 
Renewable 
energy 
1,380,000 21 • PIN under review by DNA Rainmaker Energy 
(Source | South Africa, 2010(a):unnumbered) 
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ADDENDUM 8 | CER EXPORTS PER PROJECT CATEGORY 
Projected revenue from export of CERs generated through the South African CDM project pipeline 
per project category: 
Bio-fuel 
 
Volume 
(tCO2e) 
Price per ton ($) 
16.8 23.8 30.8 
Per Annum 958 000 16 094 400  22 800 400   29 506 400  
Period (min) 17 143 000 288 002 400  408 003 400  528 004 400  
 
Volume 
(tCO2e) 
Price per ton (ZAR) 
115.92 164.22 212.52 
Per Annum 958 000 111 051 360  157 322 760  203 594 160  
Period (min) 17 143 000 1 987 216 560  2 815 223 460  3 643 230 360  
Biomass 
 
Volume 
(tCO2e) 
Price per ton ($) 
16.8 23.8 30.8 
Per Annum 204 482        3 435 298         4 866 672         6 298 046  
Period (min) 2 869 820      48 212 976       68 301 716       88 390 456  
 
Volume 
(tCO2e) 
Price per ton (ZAR) 
115.92 164.22 212.52 
Per Annum 204 482      23 703 553       33 580 034       43 456 515  
Period (min) 2 869 820     332 669 534      471 281 840      609 894 146  
Co-generation 
 
Volume 
(tCO2e) 
Price per ton (millions of $) 
16.8 23.8 30.8 
Per Annum 4 229 419       71 054 239        100 660 172        130 266 105  
Period (min) 72 250 199  1 213 803 343     1 719 554 736     2 225 306 129  
Period (max) 73 450 199  1 233 963 343     1 748 114 736     2 262 266 129  
 
Volume Price per ton (millions of $) 
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(tCO2e) 115.92 164.22 212.52 
Per Annum 4 229 419     490 274 250        694 555 188        898 836 126  
Period (min) 72 250 199  8 375 243 068   11 864 927 680   15 354 612 291  
Period (max) 73 450 199  8 514 347 068   12 061 991 680   15 609 636 291  
Energy efficiency 
 
Volume 
(tCO2e) 
Price per ton (millions of $) 
16.8 23.8 30.8 
Per Annum 34 899 953       586 319 210        830 618 881        1 074 918 552  
Period (min) 279 222 974    4 690 945 963     6 645 506 781        8 600 067 599  
Period (max) 483 706 330    8 126 266 344   11 512 210 654      14 898 154 964  
 
Volume 
(tCO2e) 
Price per ton (millions of $) 
115.92 164.22 212.52 
Per Annum 34 899 953    4 045 602 552     5 731 270 282        7 416 938 012  
Period (min) 279 222 974  32 367 527 146   45 853 996 790      59 340 466 434  
Period (max) 483 706 330  56 071 237 774   79 434 253 513    102 797 269 252  
Fuel switch 
 
Volume 
(tCO2e) 
Price per ton ($) 
16.8 23.8 30.8 
Per Annum 31 525 500  529 628 400   750 306 900  970 985 400  
Period (min) 926 218 572 15 560 472 010   22 044 002 014   28 527 532 018  
Period (max) 927 224 612 15 577 373 482   22 067 945 766   28 558 518 050  
 
Volume 
(tCO2e) 
Price per ton (ZAR) 
115.92 164.22 212.52 
Per Annum 31 525 500  3 654 435 960   5 177 117 610   6 699 799 260  
Period (min) 926 218 572 107 367 256 866  152 103 613 894  196 839 970 921  
Period (max) 927 224 612 107 483 877 023  152 268 825 783  197 053 774 542  
Industrial process 
 
Volume 
(tCO2e) 
Price per ton ($) 
16.8 23.8 30.8 
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Per Annum 556 954  9 356 827  13 255 505  17 154 183  
Period (min) 6 945 245 116 680 116  165 296 831  213 913 546  
 
Volume 
(tCO2e) 
Price per ton (ZAR) 
115.92 164.22 212.52 
Per Annum 556 954 64 562 108  91 462 986  118 363 864  
Period (min) 6 945 245  805 092 800  1 140 548 134  1 476 003 467  
Methane 
 
Volume 
(tCO2e) 
Price per ton ($) 
16.8 23.8 30.8 
Per Annum 4 060 921 68 223 473  96 649 920  125 076 367  
Period (min) 47 732 994 801 914 299  1 136 045 257  1 470 176 215  
Period (max) 48 586 364 816 250 915  1 156 355 463  1 496 460 011  
 
Volume 
(tCO2e) 
Price per ton (ZAR) 
115.92 164.22 212.52 
Per Annum 4 060 921 470 741 962  666 884 447  863 026 931  
Period (min) 47 732 994 5 533 208 664  7 838 712 275  10 144 215 885  
Period (max) 48 586 364 5 632 131 315  7 978 852 696  10 325 574 077  
N20 
 
Volume 
(tCO2e) 
Price per ton ($) 
16.8 23.8 30.8 
Per Annum 1 700 000 28 560 000  40 460 000  52 360 000  
Period (min) 23 336 000 392 044 800  555 396 800  718 748 800  
Period (max) 23 336 000 392 044 800  555 396 800  718 748 800  
 
Volume 
(tCO2e) 
Price per ton (ZAR) 
115.92 164.22 212.52 
Per Annum 1 700 000 197 064 000  279 174 000  361 284 000  
Period (min) 23 336 000  2 705 109 120  3 832 237 920  4 959 366 720  
Period (max) 23 336 000  2 705 109 120  3 832 237 920  4 959 366 720  
Renewable energy 
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Volume 
(tCO2e) 
Price per ton ($) 
16.8 23.8 30.8 
Per Annum 17 581 781 295 373 921  418 446 388  541 518 855  
Period (min) 273 686 143 4 597 927 202  6 513 730 203  8 429 533 204  
Period (max) 274 010 992 4 603 384 666  6 521 461 610  8 439 538 554  
 
Volume 
(tCO2e) 
Price per ton (ZAR) 
115.92 164.22 212.52 
Per Annum 17 581 781 2 038 080 054  2 887 280 076  3 736 480 098  
Period (min) 273 686 143 31 725 697 697  44 944 738 403  58 163 779 110  
Period (max) 274 010 992 31 763 354 193  44 998 085 106  58 232 816 020  
Transport 
 
Volume 
(tCO2e) 
Price per ton ($) 
16.8 23.8 30.8 
Per Annum 2 172 148 36 492 086  51 697 122  66 902 158  
Period (min) 39 987 108 671 783 414  951 693 170  1 231 602 926  
 
Volume 
(tCO2e) 
Price per ton (ZAR) 
115.92 164.22 212.52 
Per Annum 2 172 148 251 795 396  356 710 145  461 624 893  
Period (min) 39 987 108 4 635 305 559  6 566 682 876  8 498 060 192  
Waste Management 
 
Volume 
(tCO2e) 
Price per ton ($) 
16.8 23.8 30.8 
Per Annum 2 347 473 39 437 546  55 869 857   72 302 168  
Period (min) 22 382 733 376 029 914  532 709 045  689 388 176  
Period (max) 23 867 433 400 972 874  568 044 905  735 116 936  
 
Volume 
(tCO2e) 
Price per ton (ZAR) 
115.92 164.22 212.52 
Per Annum 2 347 473 272 119 070  385 502 016  498 884 962  
Period (min) 22 382 733 2 594 606 409  3 675 692 413  4 756 778 417  
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Source: Based on data from the South African Designated Authority (South Africa, 
2010(a):unnumbered). 
 
Period (max) 23 867 433 2 766 712 833  3 919 509 847  5 072 306 861  
